How does the prosecution prove the plaintext came from defendants' devices? When DNA is used as evidence not only is there chain of custody rules for biological material, but the details of DNA extraction and comparison are openly documented. You don't just have someone claim something is a match, there's proof.
> How does the prosecution prove the plaintext came from defendants' devices?
You show the recovered key and plaintext and demonstrate that they match the ciphertext.
The chance that several gigabytes of encrypted data accidentally happen to decrypt with wrong key to a different several gigabytes of perfectly valid data is rather slim, which means that any key which produces valid data is the key you are looking for.
You have someone from the FBI and/or the private contractor testify as to how the plaintext was obtained. Same thing as when you do a DNA match, you need to have the technician testify (unless the defense stipulates).
They might just be planning to use the information learned from this to assist in the prosecution without providing it as evidence? For example they could subpoena those involved in the imessage conversations or find other criminal leads?
Same way they 'prove' that the report about DNA is an accurate description of what the actual analysis showed, or that there even was an analysis at all: by trusting the technicians who did it, and the protocols surrounding that. There is no 'single legal way' to do DNA analysis: it's all about the judges and jury trusting the experts to be impartial. Manufacturers of DNA analysis devices don't have to show their firmware source code for the analysis to be admissible as evidence.
Remember that the FBI said that if Apple provided a solution, it would not be used in other cases and that they were [Edit: not] going to use it as a precedent (IIRC the details).
>Remember that the FBI said that if Apple provided a solution, it would not be used in other cases and that they were going to use it as a precedent (IIRC the details).
That's not what they said. What they said is that each particular case is about unlocking each particular phone. And mind you, these are phones that the government has every right to access if they can find a way, either because they have search warrants or are the legal owners (or have the permission of the legal owners) of the phone.
There is nothing controversial about this. The government has used vulnerabilities to extract info from devices gathered during legal searches for a long time. If they seize a safe from your home, they don't need special permission to crack it open.
The government still needs a search warrant or legal ownership of a device in order to perform a search. You're perfectly entitled to make your stuff harder to search, and they're entitled to all the hacking they need to extract the data.
I do not recall any such statements regarding solutions developed in house or learned from organizations other than Apple. If anything the implied threat should have been, either help us or we will find a way and tell all other branches.
It really doesn't seem like we should be blaming Apple here. Apple did what we wanted it to do, stand up for privacy. The FBI is showing off and acting ridiculous. I think they are the ones who are at fault here and we should stop making it sound like Apple did something wrong and that this abuse of power is their fault.
Obviously, they're an easier target so that's why people are attacking them but, honestly, what did they do other than stand for their (AND OUR) values?
LA Times is reporting that the phone is an iPhone 6
> The FBI has agreed to help prosecutors gain access to an iPhone 6 and an iPod that might hold evidence in an Arkansas murder trial, just days after the agency managed to hack an iPhone linked to the San Bernardino terror attacks, a local prosecutor said Wednesday.
IIRC, didn't the unlock in the San Bernardino case use an exploit(s) specific to the 5C or something? Also IIRC the iPhone 6 has some sort of hardware-level protection against this.
Serious question: how is this "unlocking iPhone case", any different from what fbi and other agencies used to do for a while when they seize computers for example, or a locked safe? They also "unlocked" those devices after they got a warrant, what makes this "iPhone case" any different? If they have a warrant - and a way to unlock the device - what is the reason of all this buzz around it?
Computers are rarely found with full-disk encryption. When Ross Ulbricht was arrested he did have his laptop encrypted, but the FBI went to great lengths to arrest him at a cafe when he had it open, on, and unlocked. Normally computer forensics just consists of making an image of the unencrypted disk. Microsoft Bitlocker defaults to asking you to save a recovery key in the cloud where it can be subpoena'd. Apple is unique in offering high-security by default devices to the general public - although the security is part of their product strategy of keeping complete control of the platform.
Safes are drillable, and there may also be "password recovery" services available from the manufacturer.
It is interesting that they have a way to unlock the device, both because it means iPhones are less secure than we thought and because it contradicts their earlier position that they needed Apple to disable security features for them to access a locked device.
No it does not. Govt never claimed this. What it does is show that, the FBI will do exactly what the Chinese are currently most likely doing if need be.
I don't really have a too much of a problem with them unlocking individual phones. I have a problem with them asking for the master key to all phones, which is what they were doing in the San Bernardino case.
I'm glad I have an iPhone 6. Anything without touchID is now insecure thanks to the FBI. It sounds like Apple knew this would happen which is why they recently hired a Signal developer:
Are there any good articles on the difference between iPhone 5, 5c, 6, and 6c in terms of security? Also, has anyone covered why NAND Flash clone attack vector would not work? I had many people tell me that is definitely, for sure, certainly would not work, and yet no one I spoke with could explain exactly why that was the case.
See Page 12 on advantage of A7 or higher processor, but, in particular:
"On devices with an A7 or later A-series processor, the delays are enforced by the
Secure Enclave. If the device is restarted during a timed delay, the delay is still
enforced, with the timer starting over for the current period. "
The question still outstanding, is whether the Secure Enclave can be modified, and also, whether it can be modified without a passcode.
Put down the pitchforks people. This is standard operating procedure and you're not gonna win any arguments opposing it. If the government gets a search warrant for the contents of a safe in your home, they're perfectly entitled to crack it open with whatever techniques they discover. The now-moot case against Apple was about whether they can compel the safe-maker's assistance, which is a very different issue.
This is the protection against search and seizure that you're entitled to within the US:
>The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,[a] against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
>"Ok, now how to make these phones even more secure?"
Or more likely how to _market_ the next round of phones as being more secure and whether claiming the upgrade is essential for businesses ("our old phones are all broken now, you must upgrade") will lead to a gross increase in profits or not.
So if the FBI is just going to have the Israeli company Cellebrite unlock the phone, why couldn't Conway prosecutor's office do this directly? And given the number of public articles of opinion offered to the FBI on how trivial it was to unlock 5c and previous iPhones, and the number of companies offering unlocking them as a service, is the FBI just incredibly slow at setting a standard forensic process, or is there some other reason these phones aren't being unlocked?
Apple SHOULD NOT demand to find out how the FBI did it because it would expose them to discovery requests in future court cases where they would have to tell other people (read China / Russia) how to do it. For now they have plausible deniability and they have plenty of talent to figure out how it was done, or if all else fails, they can pay that same security firm to tell them under cover of an NDA.
If it is discovered that Apple knows about the exploit, regardless of how they know about it, then they can be compelled to reveal it in court. An NDA does not give one a pass on testifying in a court of law.
It is in Apple's best interest to find out what the exploit is, how long it's been out there, and fix it instead of playing legal games. Such an exploit in the wild is a security concern for every person who owns that phone, not just criminals. There is no telling how many people are out there accessing privileged information in the private and government sectors with that phone. It is a concern covering criminal activity all the way to foreign government spying.
As a bonus, if it's an exploit that's been known from before the FBI's claim that only Apple can help them breach the phone, then we know the FBI was full of it. The FBI has been known to use questionable tactics before and backed out of cases that weren't going their way to avoid revealing those questionable tactics. This whole iPhone thing reeks of this.
'If all else fails' they would have to write the security firm a blank cheque. I know Apple have a lot of money but the fee would likely be astronomical. Unless, of course, Apple wanted an ongoing contract with the firm to dig out vulnerabilities (on top of whatever they already do). I wonder if that sort of relationship would be economical for both parties.
[+] [-] cmurf|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] qb45|10 years ago|reply
You show the recovered key and plaintext and demonstrate that they match the ciphertext.
The chance that several gigabytes of encrypted data accidentally happen to decrypt with wrong key to a different several gigabytes of perfectly valid data is rather slim, which means that any key which produces valid data is the key you are looking for.
[+] [-] bradleyjg|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] forgotpwtomain|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] roel_v|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] hackuser|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] matheweis|10 years ago|reply
Directory Comey very explicitly said that "The San Bernardino litigation isn't about trying to set a precedent or send any kind of message"
https://www.lawfareblog.com/we-could-not-look-survivors-eye-...
[+] [-] wbillingsley|10 years ago|reply
Given Apple didn't provide a solution, that seems rather moot...
[+] [-] wildmusings|10 years ago|reply
That's not what they said. What they said is that each particular case is about unlocking each particular phone. And mind you, these are phones that the government has every right to access if they can find a way, either because they have search warrants or are the legal owners (or have the permission of the legal owners) of the phone.
There is nothing controversial about this. The government has used vulnerabilities to extract info from devices gathered during legal searches for a long time. If they seize a safe from your home, they don't need special permission to crack it open.
The government still needs a search warrant or legal ownership of a device in order to perform a search. You're perfectly entitled to make your stuff harder to search, and they're entitled to all the hacking they need to extract the data.
[+] [-] Shivetya|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] zodPod|10 years ago|reply
Obviously, they're an easier target so that's why people are attacking them but, honestly, what did they do other than stand for their (AND OUR) values?
[+] [-] molecule|10 years ago|reply
> The FBI has agreed to help prosecutors gain access to an iPhone 6 and an iPod that might hold evidence in an Arkansas murder trial, just days after the agency managed to hack an iPhone linked to the San Bernardino terror attacks, a local prosecutor said Wednesday.
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-arkansas-fbi-pho...
[+] [-] Pwngea|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] usaphp|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] pjc50|10 years ago|reply
Safes are drillable, and there may also be "password recovery" services available from the manufacturer.
[+] [-] superuser2|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] icebraining|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] unknown|10 years ago|reply
[deleted]
[+] [-] sickbeard|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] einarvollset|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] matheweis|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] einarvollset|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] rcthompson|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] nitrogen|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] Mtinie|10 years ago|reply
* Officially, because presumably it's been going on for a long time but not publicly discussed to the degree that it is being discussed now.
[+] [-] free2rhyme214|10 years ago|reply
http://techcrunch.com/2016/02/25/apple-hires-developer-behin...
[+] [-] perfectstorm|10 years ago|reply
So yea, it's an iPhone 6.
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-arkansas-fbi-pho...
[+] [-] Piskvorrr|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] x0054|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ghshephard|10 years ago|reply
See Page 12 on advantage of A7 or higher processor, but, in particular:
"On devices with an A7 or later A-series processor, the delays are enforced by the Secure Enclave. If the device is restarted during a timed delay, the delay is still enforced, with the timer starting over for the current period. "
The question still outstanding, is whether the Secure Enclave can be modified, and also, whether it can be modified without a passcode.
[+] [-] wildmusings|10 years ago|reply
This is the protection against search and seizure that you're entitled to within the US:
>The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,[a] against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
[+] [-] hellofunk|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] pbhjpbhj|10 years ago|reply
Or more likely how to _market_ the next round of phones as being more secure and whether claiming the upgrade is essential for businesses ("our old phones are all broken now, you must upgrade") will lead to a gross increase in profits or not.
[+] [-] droithomme|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] einarvollset|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] spacehome|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] arthurgibson|10 years ago|reply
Is it just acceptable at this point to publish AP content with typos?
[+] [-] merpnderp|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] cboppert|10 years ago|reply
[deleted]
[+] [-] x0054|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] talmand|10 years ago|reply
It is in Apple's best interest to find out what the exploit is, how long it's been out there, and fix it instead of playing legal games. Such an exploit in the wild is a security concern for every person who owns that phone, not just criminals. There is no telling how many people are out there accessing privileged information in the private and government sectors with that phone. It is a concern covering criminal activity all the way to foreign government spying.
As a bonus, if it's an exploit that's been known from before the FBI's claim that only Apple can help them breach the phone, then we know the FBI was full of it. The FBI has been known to use questionable tactics before and backed out of cases that weren't going their way to avoid revealing those questionable tactics. This whole iPhone thing reeks of this.
[+] [-] kingosticks|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] nobodyshere|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] sschueller|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] roel_v|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] roel_v|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] SixSigma|10 years ago|reply
[+] [-] jerianasmith|10 years ago|reply