It's a bit more complicated than that. The main responsibility for implementing connection layer unlinkability lies with Tor (if you use Zcash over Tor, which we will aim to provide good support for), but how effective that is in resisting deanonymization attacks at that layer depends a great deal on the higher level protocol and its implementation. That's why it's recommended to use TorBrowser to browse the web anonymously; if you were to use a stock browser, then there would be numerous attacks that reduce the size of your anonymity set. We've tried to pay attention to minimizing leakage of information in the Zerocash protocol; you can read the numerous tickets on that here: https://github.com/zcash/zcash/issues?page=2&q=is%3Aissue+la...Also, note that even against an adversary that can observe all connection metadata, Zcash maintains strong unlinkability of which notes are involved in a private transaction.
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