Oddly enough, this has been the single most useful piece for me in understanding what the folks who created the DAO sought to achieve. It also points out some problems that, no doubt, can be rectified in a future instance.
The folks who created it (slock.it) are planning to be the first proposal voted on. Now you might understand why the incentives are so incredibly slanted towards yes votes (and even more so on the first vote, given the extraPremium or whatever the pyramid aspect of the initial price is called).
If the people behind a DAO elect to commit some illegal act, who's responsible?
The DAO itself is a dumb object, incapable of moral or ethical reasoning, while the people behind it are not.
However, the people behind the DAO are effectively anonymized, are they not? The entity which commits the act is culpable, but the law usually goes after accomplices or enablers as well.
Unless I'm thinking about this all wrongly, this opens up a really messy can of worms and we now live in a world where you have to watch your back at every turn.
Which isn't to say it wasn't already like that, but it's been turned up to eleven now.
As an example:
DAO[A] is created by individuals for the purpose of doxxing one of the founders of slock.it. DAO[B] answer the call and gather the information providing it to DAO[A] who contracts with DAO[C1] to publish the information on a server paid for by DAO[C2], who then does so.
The founder and/or his family (all the founders of slock.it are male, apparently) are now potentially exposed to harm.
Is this a likely scenario? Do we now have to have a Rule 35 that says if there's a thing that can be done, a DAO will exist for it?
This is game theoretics at its best: A new game with rules that are executed reliably, huge amounts of money, huge numbers of voting participants.
I think that the most reasonable thing will happen over the long run, but in the meantime there will be some drama. Thankfully the community and leaders are well-prepared and well-equipped.
The DAO should allow the owners more control of funding. Instead of a single "creation period" with arbitrary fixed rules to fund The DAO, new funding rounds should be possible, that can be voted on as any other proposal.
This would prevent The DAO from running out of funds to support a long term but seemingly viable project midway, either due to splits/withdrawals or because of unexpected additional costs.
It also would allow a group of investors to split from The DAO and form a more private organization. They could decide not to have an initial "creation period", thereby preventing outside investors from getting in and upsetting their shared vision. They could also then have a funding round which guarantees they still own more than 50% of their DAO.
Thank you - this paper is the clearest introduction to what the DAO is and what it is trying to achieve that I have read. I found the official website for the DAO confusing and information light.
[+] [-] ChuckMcM|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] street|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] speeder|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] drivingmenuts|9 years ago|reply
The DAO itself is a dumb object, incapable of moral or ethical reasoning, while the people behind it are not.
However, the people behind the DAO are effectively anonymized, are they not? The entity which commits the act is culpable, but the law usually goes after accomplices or enablers as well.
Unless I'm thinking about this all wrongly, this opens up a really messy can of worms and we now live in a world where you have to watch your back at every turn.
Which isn't to say it wasn't already like that, but it's been turned up to eleven now.
As an example:
DAO[A] is created by individuals for the purpose of doxxing one of the founders of slock.it. DAO[B] answer the call and gather the information providing it to DAO[A] who contracts with DAO[C1] to publish the information on a server paid for by DAO[C2], who then does so.
The founder and/or his family (all the founders of slock.it are male, apparently) are now potentially exposed to harm.
Is this a likely scenario? Do we now have to have a Rule 35 that says if there's a thing that can be done, a DAO will exist for it?
[+] [-] street|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] FatAmerican|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] will_brown|9 years ago|reply
1. A company comprised of lawyers and coders to review the legitimacy, legality, enforceability of DAO smart contracts; and
2. An insurance company to insure all DAO contracts for the instances the contracts are faulty and breached.
[+] [-] wmf|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] jamespitts|9 years ago|reply
I think that the most reasonable thing will happen over the long run, but in the meantime there will be some drama. Thankfully the community and leaders are well-prepared and well-equipped.
[+] [-] reddytowns|9 years ago|reply
This would prevent The DAO from running out of funds to support a long term but seemingly viable project midway, either due to splits/withdrawals or because of unexpected additional costs.
It also would allow a group of investors to split from The DAO and form a more private organization. They could decide not to have an initial "creation period", thereby preventing outside investors from getting in and upsetting their shared vision. They could also then have a funding round which guarantees they still own more than 50% of their DAO.
[+] [-] onetwotree|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] sethammons|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] codeulike|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] newobj|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] throw_away|9 years ago|reply
* convert this to etherium downloading the etherium client and sending the bitcoin to an address given.
* go to the DAO site, where you are given a different hash to send the eth to to get a hash of DAO tokens.
[+] [-] um_ya|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] chrispeel|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ok_craig|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] planetjones|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] mikek|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] gjm11|9 years ago|reply
[+] [-] homero|9 years ago|reply