Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

[sounds]

This appears to be a legitimate ME neutralization.

The ME is purportedly placed in "recovery" mode:

  According to Nicola Corna, the current ME state should have been changed from “normal” to “recovery”.

Since the MEI interface is disabled (not visible from a PCI bus scan), there is no way to activate the ME at runtime, even after a full system compromise. It would still be possible to rewrite the BIOS flash chip with a new ME image, but the system would need to be restarted before the ME would read the changes.

I don't speak for the FSF, but it sounds like this is as close to an FSF RYF certification as any Intel CPU is going to get. FSF approval of a device requires that all user-modifiable software be Free Software. Previously, no recent Intel CPUs could be FSF certified as "RYF" because the ME chip would shut the system down after 30 minutes. (Side note: no recent Intel CPUs can be considered "stable" without microcode updates which also violate the FSF's RYF guidelines.)

[1] http://www.fsf.org/resources/hw/endorsement/respects-your-fr...

[fizzo]

I worked with Nicola at the script. Apparently the same firmware modification can be done up to Skylake CPUs, but it is to be checked if ME firmware modification triggers Boot Guard BIOS signature verification. We don't know yet because the only person who tried this on Skylake seems to have Boot Guard not enabled on his board. More info: https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/issues/1

[tunesmith]

ME isn't the last obstacle though, is it? Looking at the purism/librem pages, there are still various other subsystems like FSP/EC/SMC.

https://puri.sm/posts/bios-freedom-status-nov2014/

[discardorama]

> but the system would need to be restarted before the ME would read the changes.

# shutdown -r now

?

[twr]

I succeeded at doing this to an old Asus Z68 motherboard. Steps:

  flashrom -p internal -r bios.rom
  ifdtool -x bios.rom
  python3 me_cleaner.py flashregion_2_intel_me.bin
  python2 dump_me.py flashregion_2_intel_me.bin -x
  python2 me_sigcheck.py FTPR_part.bin
  ifdtool -i ME:flashregion_2_intel_me.bin bios.rom
  exit # Skip this line if you're okay with bricking your motherboard.
  flashrom -p internal -w bios.rom.new

`lspci | grep -i mei` and `lsmod | grep mei` are now empty.

intelmetool:

  ME: FW Partition Table      : OK
  ME: Bringup Loader Failure  : NO
  ME: Firmware Init Complete  : NO
  ME: Manufacturing Mode      : NO
  ME: Boot Options Present    : NO
  ME: Update In Progress      : NO
  ME: Current Working State   : Initializing
  ME: Current Operation State : Bring up
  ME: Current Operation Mode  : Normal
  ME: Error Code              : Debug Failure
  ME: Progress Phase          : BUP Phase
  ME: Power Management Event  : Pseudo-global reset
  ME: Progress Phase State    : 0x3b
  ...
  ME has a broken implementation on your board with this BIOS
  ME: failed to become ready

It took a hard reset to re-enable integrated ethernet.

Awesome!

[corna]

Please report it here https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/issues/3

Thanks

[kevin_b_er]

rootkit is defined by google search as "a set of software tools that enable an unauthorized user to gain control of a computer system without being detected."

* A set of software tools: Check

* Unauthorized user: Check Caveat: user is not authorized by you, but by someone else (Intel)

* Gain control of a computer system without being detected. Can access your machine while it appears to be "powered off" but plugged in. Has full access to RAM. Can draw undetected on top of screen. Can read screen. Check.

So. Does this qualify the Management Engine as a rootkit? It meets the definition. Just because the rootkit is installed by the manufacturer doesn't make it less of one.

[yuhong]

AFAIK the remote network access ("AMT") has to be specifically enabled.

[snvzz]

The ridiculous shit that needs to be done just to rid of some blob.

RISC-V can't take the market over fast enough.

[TD-Linux]

How much are you willing to pay for it?

There's the Talos Secure Workstation, which has no such ME firmware (but costs ~$4.5k) [1].

A RISC-V desktop is pretty far out. There is an Arduino style microcontroller being made in silicon, though [2].

[1] https://www.crowdsupply.com/raptor-computing-systems/talos-s... [2] https://www.crowdsupply.com/onchip/open-v

[dublinben]

It's more than just "some blob" though. ME is a system within your system, that is completely out of your control. [0]

[0] https://libreboot.org/faq/#intelme

[jakobdabo]

A rootkit can be anywhere on the PCIe bus.

Just for example, you are using OpenBSD and full disk encryption and you think you are safe? What if the firmware on your NIC can be altered to scan your RAM (using DMA) and send the interesting data (big prime numbers, passwords, etc.) home? What if firmware on your keyboard can be modified (or pre-programmed in factory) to record the last x thousands of keypresses (which will include your boot disk password) on its own flash memory which can be later extracted? There are so many attack vectors.

[dispose13432]

RISC-V is Open Source.

Will the RISC-V based CPU in your computer be Open Source?

A parallel example is while WebKit is Open Source Chrome isn't

[phantom_oracle]

Has Intel ever commented about this issue of removing ME?

Surely, at least 1 Intel staffer reads HN and they must have discussed this internally.

Unless they just brush this off as negligible (a couple thousand paranoid/"extremist" users) ?

[userbinator]

I have a feeling Intel is more likely going to consider this a "vulnerability" and try to close it off in the next revision...

Anyone who works there, has access to the required information, and is unhappy at the situation surrounding ME and other freedom-hostile directions your company is taking, you know what to do!

[wmf]

Their discussion may have consisted of "too bad these extremists don't realize that the ME is harmless if you don't have an Intel NIC".

[WhitneyLand]

Beautiful work. Standing offer to buy dinner for any of the contributors if they come through Dallas.

[bsharitt]

As a potential backdoor with access to a computer with compromising the OS, how much is ME neutralized by just not using the integrated NIC and instead using a PCI-E or USB NIC?

[sounds]

The ME firmware includes a Java VM so that other companies can run their secret apps inside the ME's environment (e.g. DRM crypto plugins). That is just one example of all the features included in the ME firmware, and none of it is published or well documented, much less audited at the source level by an independent third party.

The ME is very alarming, and seems to only become more alarming the closer you look at what it is designed to do.

[yuhong]

How do you think it accesses the network? In fact, I don't think every version has network support in the first place.

[gwu78]

Seems like the BBB is more versatile than the x220. Not to mention it has no ME.

+1 for the use of ifdtool.

[Puts]

What happened to VIA and their x86 CPUs and mini-itx platform people used to build media PCs on? Wouldn't that be a viable option if you really want to avoid ME?

[PeCaN]

VIA is still around. They announced a new core with AVX2 support, Isaiah II, around late 2014 but it appears their x86_64 license will run out before it actually gets produced. The situation is really unclear. In 2010 they got a 6-year license extension thanks to the FTC, so it's possible VIA can't actually produce x86 CPUs anymore.

VIA is 100% a viable option—they support SSE 4.1, run Windows 10, and their integrated GPUs even run DirectX11 natively¹—except that they compete with Atom, not desktop or even regular laptop CPUs. However, the current (40nm Isaiah) “high-end” VIA microarchitecture is a out-of-order, 3-fetch 7-dispatch wide² superscalar, fully pipelined core. So it should outperform a modern Atom by a decent margin, with only slightly higher power consumption.

Apparently VIA is still fairly popular in China (and by virtue of being a Taiwanese company, possibly Japan as well).

1. See e.g. http://www.viatech.com/en/boards/mini-itx/epia-m920/

2. http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2008/01/via-cpu-isaiah/2/

[spikengineer]

Any research on how to disable AMD PSP.

[tedunangst]

What if I like using the integrated NIC?

[dsp1234]

Just reboot after neutralization.

"With ME neutralized, the MEI interface disappears from the PCI bus, and the integrated NIC ceases to work, but will resume to work after a reboot."

[kevin_b_er]

The NIC permits remote access to the Intel rootkit, you probably don't want to use the NIC.

[yuhong]

I think the most important lesson is that the arms race against laptop theft is ridiculous.