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nspassov | 8 years ago
With PoS cheating is likely to become a bigger issue [1], since with PoW the miners who get punished will have wasted their time and electricity.
Would be great to hear comments from more knowledgable people.
nspassov | 8 years ago
With PoS cheating is likely to become a bigger issue [1], since with PoW the miners who get punished will have wasted their time and electricity.
Would be great to hear comments from more knowledgable people.
RoboTeddy|8 years ago
Block validation can only enforce certain kinds of rules, such as:
* People can only spend outputs they have the private key for
* You can't spend an output that has already been spent
* The block reward has a predetermined size
There are other kinds of rules that we don't know how to enforce yet. For example, we might want the rule, "Always create blocks with the top n transactions that offer the highest fee per byte, out of all the new transactions you've learned about". The trouble is that we don't know how to prove that a miner has learned of a transaction over the network. (Maybe there was a network partition, or maybe their internet connection died for a minute-- how can we tell between those conditions, and the case where the miner learned of but ignored a transaction?)
The "misbehaviors" listed in the article fall into this category: things we might like to make rules against, but don't know how to (or know how to, but haven't bothered yet).
barbegal|8 years ago
[1] http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/pos-still-pointless/
[2] https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.05407
konschubert|8 years ago
If you give people a certain block reward, say 1$ per year, then the capital they are willing to invest to gain that reward will be 1$ divided by the worldwide rate of capital returns at the given risk level.
The argument is that it doesn't matter if we are dealing with capital that is locked away in mining hardware + lost as electricity or in a smart contract. The total amount of "economic work" locked away will be the same.
I think that's correct. Proof of stake is not cheaper for the short-term economy than proof of work.
But what about the long term? 100 years? The kind of time frame that investors don't worry about, but we as mankind should?
I guess what I'm saying is that locking away capital today maybe has less long term damage than wasting extreme amounts of energy.
RoboTeddy|8 years ago
(1) Anyone can decide to become a 'randomness provider' by putting up a large security depsoit
(2) Every epoch (some number of blocks), each provider chooses a private random number and commits to it by publishing its hash
(3) During the next epoch but, each provider publishes the random they committed to earlier.
(4) xor together all the random values. The result is a pseudorandom number everyone can agree on, and which should be sufficiently good for many applications include PoS selection
If any provider fails to publish the random number they committed to, they lose their security deposit and there is no random value provided for the associated epoch. The process starts over.
If you're worried about bribing attacks over all providers, recognize that all we need is a single altruistic provider to keep the system safe. Altruistic behavior may be rare compared to selfish behavior, but I think we can usually rely on its nonzero presence.
If you're still really worried that collusion could be going on amongst ALL randomness providers, just become a provider yourself.
It's possible for a provider to wait for all other providers to reveal their values, and then privately determine whether or not the final random value would be favorable to them; they then have the option of canceling the epoch by keeping their private value hidden and losing their security deposit. This option (in combination with a particular application, and the size of the security deposit of providers) puts a bound on what the random value can be safely used for (e.g., if it's for a lottery, the expected value of another truly random swing at the jackpot has to be lower than the value of a security deposit).
mhluongo|8 years ago
1 - https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1067.pdf
konschubert|8 years ago
They are of course vulnerable to some amount of manipulation, but with a good algorithm that could be rendered sufficiently costly to become impractical.
konschubert|8 years ago
unknown|8 years ago
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thescriptkiddie|8 years ago