[tritium]

The only way true isolation will emerge, is by regulatory mandate of a purpose defined hardware implementation, with a separate protocol, different datagrams (instead of TCP/IP/UDP packets) and independent land line plants, undersea cables, satellites and more.

Otherwise, you'll always have some goon plugging in a wi-fi router, rigging it to a sat phone with a modem, all just to play quake with their friends, while they idle on some crane barge, or wherever their stuck, bored on some hurry-up-and-wait project plan.

Even then, you'll still have wonder about silicon bugs, or tempest and row-hammer style attacks, for anything software ever touches, when a given industry fails to identify such threats themselves.

[reaperducer]

>purpose defined hardware implementation, with a separate protocol, different datagrams (instead of TCP/IP/UDP packets) and independent land line plants, undersea cables, satellites and more.

If you come up with a different network, then the attackers will just switch to that network.

Remember, the internet used to be lots of different networks. I'm old enough to remember bang paths, BITNET, and e-mail taking a week or more to make it across the Atlantic. Even back then, there were vulnerabilities, and even cross-network vulnerabilities.

And a private satellite is a terrible idea for "security." In a previous life I used to have to operate a satellite uplink, and I can tell you that replacing a transponder's intended content with your rogue content is really quite easy if you just put your mind to it. (It's happened before.)

[tritium]

Yes, that's the idea. Force specialization in the attack sphere, reduce the attacker population with prerequisite knowledge as an entry barrier, simultaneously shrinking the targetable hosts.

Yes, I get that electronic signaling is electronic signaling, and none of it is actually different, at the transmission layer. It's just more DSP and more fast fourier transforms under the hood.

Yes, technical barriers can be eroded with adapters and facades, but it's an added cost to attack, and reduces detective work in that you have to know someone to jump the learning curve and enter the attack envelope. That means detective work can happen within a smaller social graph, and that alone becomes a deterent from sharing information, because everything becomes need-to-know, and insider awareness is a give away for inside jobs.

It's also easier to stamp out, and ostracize insiders, if they have loose lips or have a tendency to lend and give away the car keys.

Not everything needs to be as cheesy as Encryption DRM for optical movie disks and video games. For critical infrastructure safety is important enough to warrant independent military-grade safe guards.

Do military protocols fail? Yes, we have the enigma machines sitting in enough museums to prove it.

This in not an XKCD "too many standards can be solved with one more standard" concept. Isolation and specialization can be effective defense concepts.

[friedButter]

> e-mail taking a week or more to make it across the Atlantic

Any reading material behind this? Really interesting, would like to read up on what caused such a delay

[tonyedgecombe]

That's only likely to happen after a disaster, right now complacency rules.