[Donzo]

Thanks for expressing these problems clearly and succinctly.

Does the Fisherman approach involve validators randomly checking other validators for phony transactions?

Will validators be incentivized to do this?

Is that why they are called fisherman? Because honest validators are "fishing" around for opportunities to catch invalid transactions and increase their stakes?

How long is the challenge period currently being discussed?

The other attack vector that the fisherman opens, "grieving" attacks, whereby malicious nodes launch a series of false reports, knowingly sacrificing their stakes presumably to overwhelm the system and push through a double-spend or phony token mint or something.

Am I interpreting how this attack works correctly?

Has any thought been given to making the challenge period as long as it needs to be to process all challenges, and incentivizing goodwill from those affected by the slowdowns with a fractional return of the slashed stakes... Maybe like a reverse gas cost? Is that insane?

[drcode]

The main issue with fishermen is that they can't help much with data availability issues, because an attacker can just make the data available later during the arbitration process, which leads to a vector for DOS attacks against the arbitration system.

[Donzo]

So the data availability problem renders the fisherman solution useless in a pragmatic sense?