(no title)
gtr32x
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7 years ago
I've always been confused here on this, does that mean the 737 MAX has a high chance to have faulty reading from their AoA sensors? Or is that pretty much the industry standard right now? This has always seem like the actual culprit.
azernik|7 years ago
Generally a sensor with such a critical failure mode would be triple-redundant - if one fails, the discrepancy between sensors is flagged and the aircraft runs on the other two until the broken one is fixed. In this case, the aircraft had two sensors of the type (Angle-of-Attack), but MCAS was only listening to one of them.
pas|7 years ago
I've seen pictures of it ( https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/2317/how-does-a... ) and seems to be a simple mechanical component.
Why isn't this compounded with something that works by estimating the AoA from other factors? A few simple gravity based sensors would be able to tell the vector of the plane, and simply assuming that wind (airflow) is parallel to the ground would go a long way. Or is the vertical component of the local airflow so variable?
gtr32x|7 years ago
Also, it does seem like Boeing dropped the ball here to not build further redundancy here.
kjar|7 years ago
dingaling|7 years ago
Half the industry uses three or four AoA sensors with majority voting.
The other half ( Boeing ) uses two.
londons_explore|7 years ago
Instead, the sensors should detect failure, for example by using a motor to detect if the vane is stuck and cannot turn freely.
The flight controls should also be able to fly even if all sensors of a certain type have failled. Angle of attack for example can be approximated with an accelerometer and gyro well enough to keep the plane in the air.