[gtr32x]

Thanks for the elaboration. Could you help me further understand one more thing? When you say MCAS only listens to one, does that mean during the time when one AoA sensor fails? Or it always listens to one during normal operation?

Also, it does seem like Boeing dropped the ball here to not build further redundancy here.

[inferiorhuman]

MCAS alternates between the left and right sensor each time the plane lands. With the Lion Air flight I think cycling the electrical power for diagnostic work caused MCAS to pick up the faulty sensor for two flights in a row.

[dTal]

> MCAS alternates between the left and right sensor each time the plane lands

This sounds like spectacularly bad design that manages to extract negative value from having two sensors. What is the logic behind this?

[gtr32x]

That actually sounds awful, sorry for my naivety if this is just industry standard. But for such a mission critical piece to have no redundancy build over it is just poor. Especially that it's prone to failure since it's situated on the outside of the plane.

It just seems to be that this is some terrible engineering done on Boeing's end of not fully understanding the critical situation here.

Generally two failures: 1. a lack of redundancy in a mission critical sensor 2. a blind trust on MCAS's priority over pilots

[6nf]

I believe the MCAS uses the pilot-side sensor.

[azernik]

Boeing dropped the ball in many, many ways.