[meshko]

All the talk about how crappy Boeing engineering here was is bullshit and speculation and I am surprised PG participates in it. What we can discuss objectively here is incident response in which Boeing allowed the situation to continue after the first crash. How did they not run hundreds of hours of simulations, code reviews etc, etc on the system assumed to be at fault? How did they not immediately change the safety features associated with MCAS to be free and mandatory for everyone? Engineering mistakes happen and are hard to prevent. Business mistakes like this are a sign of terrible culture, lack of priorities and are an existential thread to the company.

[salawat]

It's not really speculation. The proof, as they say, is in the impact crater.

The only mystery left is, what is the nature of the paper trail that led to this catastrophe?

Was there malicious malfeasance? Overt and irresistible pressure to certify at all costs?

Was it all just a tragic mistake? We don't know. We only know the physical systems that contributed to the crashes, and some of the motivations that would have contributed. The technical implementation can be roughly inferred by any programmer, and it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out a ball was dropped somewhere for a plane development program to fall afoul of such a foreseeable failure state.

[meshko]

"The technical implementation can be roughly inferred by any programmer", "such a foreseeable failure state"... how many years of experience do you have?