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egjerlow | 6 years ago

Ok, I think we either have some communication issues or philosophical differences (if I understand you correctly, you're saying that subjective experience is an illusion? Which to me just shows the absurd lengths one has to go to in order to rule out any question that cannot be answered by science. Your own subjective experience is literally the starting point for any investigative endeavor you might attempt in this world, so I'd be careful with claiming it is only your imagination) or a combination of both, so maybe we should recognize this and leave it here.

You have provided ample examples of emergent properties, which are interesting in their own right for sure, but if you really imagine that Conway's game of life and the unknowable future of that game is analogous to the phenomenon of subjective experience, we either are miscommunicating or there is a quite insurmountable barrier of understanding between us.

Either way, thanks for engaging!

discuss

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acqq|6 years ago

> if you really imagine that Conway's game of life and the unknowable future of that game is analogous to the phenomenon of subjective experience

No. Convay's Game of Life does not include all the physical rules that govern the physical world. The actual rules are much, much more complex, but even they can be condensed to a single equation:

http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/01/04/the-worl...

Conway's game is just a minuscule subset of those, but it is, just like the fractal formulas are, completely enough to demonstrate that the emerging properties are never "intuitive" by looking at the rules themselves, and that for the outcomes of most of the rules there are no "shortcuts" -- you have to calculate all the steps, not skipping anything.

So I see your claim of "uniqueness" of your "subjective experience" nothing more than a claim that you are unable or not willing to accept that the given rules can produce such emerging properties (and additionally being confused by that property of the rule's application being undecidable for any interesting set of rules and outcomes). As I see it, it's completely obvious, from many examples I've given which show that the emerging properties produced by the application of much more minimal rules were absolutely beyond what people were able to accept. But the "non-intuitive" emerging properties do exist, and the property of undecidability effectively guarantees that nobody can predict them in advance, or imagine an easy "shortcut" to some outcome, and also that you can't claim what you claim (that the outcome you "experience" is impossible) and remain intellectually honest, now after you were made aware of how the emerging properties actually work and what are the properties of most of the applications of the rules. More precisely, to remain intellectually honest, you must admit that the emerging properties you consider "unique" can be the result of the given rules. Your only consistent claim can then be "even if they can, I don't like to think about them as such." Nothing more.

On the other side, we can, once we calculate enough, be certain that the application of the rules is enough for any property we observe in any such experiment. Which is what we did with all the simple examples I've demonstrated. But like I've said, there's no shortcut for many steps (for some subsets we do have some, like Newton's laws for exactly two bodies, but see what happens with three already: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-body_problem -- "Unlike two-body problems, no closed-form solution exists for all sets of initial conditions, and numerical methods are generally required" meaning, again, you have to do all the calculation steps to know what is going to happen), so you not being able to find one shortcut exactly where you'd like is also completely normal and trivial, and can not support any claim. It's the property of how the rules work.

egjerlow|6 years ago

I don't (or at least didn't mean to) claim that the emerging properties of, say, Conway's game of life are intuitive. What I am claiming is that there is a qualitative difference between the outcomes of Conway and other physical emerging phenomena and the phenomenon of consciousness (and frankly, I have run out of ways to try to illustrate just how qualitatively different these things are). Just because both actual emergent phenomena and the phenomenon of consciousness are non-intuitive does not mean that they must necessarily be explainable in the same way any more than describing 'fog' and 'thoughts' to both be nebulous terms must mean anything beyond that.

Basically your claim is that everything we see in this world must be explicable in terms of physical laws or 'emergence' simply because emergence has shown to be correct when it comes to unimaginable things before. That, of course, does not logically follow. Of course, you're free to believe that, but then your only consistent claim can be "even if it's not logically true, I don't like to think that science cannot tell us everything.". Nothing more.

But you have already said that what I consider subjective experience is just 'my imagination' (the more I think of it, the more of an empty statement it seems to be. If consciousness is an illusion, then there must still be something that is 'being tricked', and then the question becomes how that phenomenon can happen. It's turtles all the way down.) If this is your stance, why are you still trying to convince me that subjective experience is something that will somehow be shown to be an 'emergent' property? Is it illusory or not?