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ggg2 | 6 years ago
this discussion comes up time and time again (in rpm, apt et al). the consensus is: if you need that extra feature, manually download sensitive packages via ssl or something. everyone else (with nothing to hide, heh) keeps benefiting from a global cache of unencrypted transport of (mostly) open source data.
BuildTheRobots|6 years ago
Yum with CentOS 6 and above does support SSL for mirror sites and a handful of global mirrors also support it (HEG being one).
I suppose there's a slight race condition (eg how do I update the CA-Certificates bundle when I need the new CA-Certificates bundle to connect to the mirror site to download the update), however I tend to agree there should be some privacy as default.
solatic|6 years ago
The real way to protect against this, if it's genuinely part of your threat model, is to maintain a complete local mirror: you can't tell what is installed and at what versions if you simply download everything.
And if it's actually part of your threat model, then you likely have a large enough install base that you need a local mirror for performance/non-security reasons anyway. So it's really a non-issue.
ses1984|6 years ago
forgottenpass|6 years ago
rhinoceraptor|6 years ago
eeZah7Ux|6 years ago
pwnna|6 years ago
isostatic|6 years ago