Is there a point at which it makes more sense for Boeing to cancel the MAX and start over with a new airframe?
Personally I don’t love the idea of flying on one of these at this point, no matter how many tweaks they make. I’m sure many others will feel the same.
At what point is a new airframe the better PR move for all involved?
> Personally I don’t love the idea of flying on one of these at this point, no matter how many tweaks they make. I’m sure many others will feel the same.
I would rather fly on one of these once they're back in the air.
The alternative to found and fixed issues is not a lack of issues.
Bear in mind that most of the flying public aren't even aware that there's a problem, so the only issue is getting the airplane airworthy. PR is a "minor" issue that only affects the airlines and that segment of business travel that are aware of the problem. Don't forget that people forget stuff quickly because there's always something new to worry about.
And for me, personally? If the corrected airplane is deemed airworthy by the appropriate regulatory bodies, I'll have no problem flying on it.
I’m with you on this. If they allow this plane to fly again, I’ll be actively avoiding it when booking my tickets. Even if that means much higher ticket prices. It would take many years of flawless service of this plane to change my mind.
No it doesn't. No reason backed by facts available to the public for decertifying the airplane have arisen.
The worst case scenario (for Boeing), at this point, is the FAA and/or other aviation regulators, decide that the differences require different type certification for the aircraft and therefore mandate a unique type rating by pilots to fly the plane. That would require they be trained about those differences.
The answer is to stop calling this a 737. Make it a new airframe subject to new type certification. That frees boeing to adopt comprehensive flight controls rather than this layered protections approach. It also means fully training new crews, the avoidance of which was much of the 737-max selling point.
As unfortunate as it might be, I feel this situation is the perfect demonstration of the "speed, quality, price; pick 2" conundrum.
They went fast to beat Airbus, cheap as the total cost of the package (plane + training + etc ...) and therefore quality takes a hit.
It happens everywhere but I think we were all under the assumption that surely this industry wouldn't stoop as low.
I've been told a while ago that the engineering of planes involved a fair amount of "duct-tape" (used loosely here) to make all of it work despite the risk involved. I didn't think much of it.
Now I sure have a different take on those words. While growing up plane crashes that happened were rare or their own kind of event(9/11, german pilot suicide, MH370). Therefore people around my age (30) might have bigger faith in planes than one should expect from travelling in hundred of tons of metal, composite materials and fuel going 500+ MPH in the sky.
It seems like the sane thing to do is to scrape all these 737-MAX planes currently grounded. They should have all their parts recycled/reused into a completely new airplane and the 737 should be retired.
Of course that's not going to happen. There is simply way too much money involved and way too many interests to allow Boeing to take that kind of hit.
It seems like the airline industry is surviving without this substantial number of planes in their fleet. Have prices surged for the old 737-MAX routes? Have companies taken out more debt to put in orders for Airbus and Bombardier replacements, or are they confident the existing stock will return this year?
The 737 did survive their rudder issue several decades ago. Maybe this new generation of 737 will survive this? I'm sure there are a number of people who will avoid booking flights on these jets if they can though, at least for several months or a year.
You’re not the only one. It’s a fundamentally flawed design that should be scrapped. That people are focusing exclusively on the software is a testament to the power of PR and regulatory capture.
The 737Max's design decisions seem to have been driven by their desire to maintain their 737NG type-rating.
So even though it is aerodynamically a different aircraft (with the engines further out), it mimics the 737NG with an effective emulator. For pilots certified on the 737NG, apparently minimal retraining is required to fly the 737Max.
Using this analogy, the MCAS system was seemingly put in place to behind-the-scenes manage a flight-envelope condition on the Max that would not happen on the NG.
So what happens when the 737Max hardware has a failure? How is the failure condition reported and managed by the flight crew? Are all failures on the 737Max passed through like they were 737NG failures? Does the flight crew respond as if they were flying a 737NG or a 737Max?
Correctly mimicing a 737NG during proper flight and under failure conditions seems like a tall order.
This is somewhat of a misunderstanding of the situation.
The 737Max was built to provide a more fuel efficient model compatible with all of the 737-sized gates and etc stuff airlines owned. They did this by slapping bigger engines on, but to make them fit they pushed them forward of the wing (can’t make the plane taller or it doesn’t fit all the etc it’s supposed to be compatible with).
Big, front positioned engines messed up the aerodynamics. Now, at speed, as a plane got closer to (but not at) the stall angle, forces suddenly inverted, and it became much easier to pitch up into a stall than push down away from it. This violated FAA rules that say for a commercial plane to be certified, at any point short of a stall it must always be harder to pull into it than push out.
Boeing decided to add some software to automatically push the nose down when you get to the force inversion point. This uses the stabilizers to add force to the stick, so the pilot always has that extra force making it easier to push out of a stall than pull into it, meeting the FAA requirement. This is MCAS.
Thus MCAS is in no way a “737NG emulator”. You could call the plane a 797 and you’d still need it to meet fundamental certification requirements about stick forces. Ie) it’s not so much mimicking an older 737 as it is just pretending to be a sanely designed commercial airframe at all.
The type certification stuff only enters into it when Boeing didn’t want to tell people about MCAS because it might have caused them to think harder about the need for more training, the lack of which was a selling point for them.
As I've mentioned at in other parts of the thread, a very thorough design review is at a minimum warranted.
As I've sat down and worked on reverse engineering, and reverse engineering things as best I can from pieces of technical info strewn hither and yon, I'm developing serious concerns over how far Boeing has actually gone in their FMEA.
Given their complete omission or misclassification of the Angle of Attack sensor, I can't really give them the benefit of a doubt that they actually thought through the consequences of more severe, but less likely occurrences like double flameout, or alternator failure. Both of which would represent another critical threat to the MCAS software; which must be active in order for the airframe to be asserted as airworthy.
Well we have such quandaries with yaw dampeners too. But yaw dampeners are not computer controlled. I think it's a substantial betrayal of FAR 25 if computers are being allowed to paper over aerodynamic defects or non-compliance with applicable FARs.
Using computers to aid safety, to reduce pilot workload, that's all fine. But to use them to certify an airplane as having certain aerodynamic behaviors when they do not really have those behaviors? Perverse.
And further, the software routine under discussion can in effect be neutralized, easily, in-flight, by flipping two switches. Is it really acceptable, by Boeing and the FAA, to render an airplane legally unairworthy by flipping two switches? And even more damning, to me as a pilot, is they apparently found it acceptable to require no training for the true behavior of the airplane minus this augmentation that is easy to disable inflight and is in fact recommended to be disabled as a memory checklist item for certain kinds of emergencies?
Seriously what the fuck?
If true it is wrongdoing. It's wrong for Boeing to go down that road, it's wrong for the FAA to permit it - until the FARs are changed. There should be public hearings and all kinds of regulatory requirements for expected computer and software standards, failure rates, redundancies, and other guarantees. We have such guarantees in writing for the physical aerodynamics of the airplane! There absolutely should be equivalents for computers and software if they are somehow going to take up the slack for otherwise inadequate aircraft design. You don't just get to silently wordsmith everything and say oh this computer thingy here will satisfy the aerodynamic requirement.
Fucking hell. It makes me angry. And that's why I really hope there is a misunderstanding, that really the airplane is certifiable as airworthy without any computer augmentation, and that the problem is merely that the pilots were kept out of the loop to avoid type rating required difference training. That's bad enough. But I think it's worse to paper over aerodynamic short-comings, waiving it off with computer augmentation when not a single allowance for that is made in the FARs.
> Both the FAA and EASA along with Canada and Brazil
That’s two interesting other countries, presumably chosen because the presence of Bombardier and Embraer mean Canada and Brazil have some experience in certifying planes? Notably missing are Russia and China who also make planes
My understanding is that the certification work by FAA was simply trusted by EASA, and it was just carried over.
The FAA in turn had been systematically delegating parts of the certification back to the manufacturers themselves, and obviously have not provided enough oversight.
After the crashes the EASA have obviously determined they need to redo the verification work themselves.
Agreed. This may become more common since as far as I understand aviation authorities around the world used to trust the FAA. Now they don’t and are doing their own due diligence.
EASA trusted the FAA to do their job and actually check the plane before certifying it. The FAA instead gladly outsourced the certification to...
... Boeing.
Which ultimately leads to the loss of reputation for the FAA, which is why EASA is now checking the plane themselves and finding numerous faults with it.
It's like University A would tomorrow get rid of all teaching assistants because it's cheaper that way and just have students self-grade their exams. Everyone will hence have only A+ and everyone is happy. Until finally a lot of really bad University A students will leave the job market unimpressed and thus hurting the reputation of University (FA)A.
Part of me feels Boeing gets what they deserve but there's also some possibility for nasty competitive foul play if Europeans really decide to turn the screws on Boeing to help bolster Airbus.
>but there's also some possibility for nasty competitive foul play if Europeans really decide to turn the screws on Boeing to help bolster Airbus.
reply
Then FAA would fight back and everyone loses, for now there is no reason to doubt the issues raised so let's wait until say Europeans raise some bogus reason and then accuse them. though so far FAA and Boeing are the ones with less credibility (since were trying not to ground the MAX even with 2 planes crashed)
[+] [-] burlesona|6 years ago|reply
Personally I don’t love the idea of flying on one of these at this point, no matter how many tweaks they make. I’m sure many others will feel the same.
At what point is a new airframe the better PR move for all involved?
[+] [-] Waterluvian|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ethbro|6 years ago|reply
I would rather fly on one of these once they're back in the air.
The alternative to found and fixed issues is not a lack of issues.
[+] [-] HeyLaughingBoy|6 years ago|reply
Bear in mind that most of the flying public aren't even aware that there's a problem, so the only issue is getting the airplane airworthy. PR is a "minor" issue that only affects the airlines and that segment of business travel that are aware of the problem. Don't forget that people forget stuff quickly because there's always something new to worry about.
And for me, personally? If the corrected airplane is deemed airworthy by the appropriate regulatory bodies, I'll have no problem flying on it.
[+] [-] WalterBright|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] JKCalhoun|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] cadence-|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] cmurf|6 years ago|reply
The worst case scenario (for Boeing), at this point, is the FAA and/or other aviation regulators, decide that the differences require different type certification for the aircraft and therefore mandate a unique type rating by pilots to fly the plane. That would require they be trained about those differences.
[+] [-] woogiewonka|6 years ago|reply
Am I the only one who sees this as a grand fuck up that only has one outcome? And it's certainly not what they are trying to sell the public on.
[+] [-] sandworm101|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] lapnitnelav|6 years ago|reply
They went fast to beat Airbus, cheap as the total cost of the package (plane + training + etc ...) and therefore quality takes a hit.
It happens everywhere but I think we were all under the assumption that surely this industry wouldn't stoop as low.
I've been told a while ago that the engineering of planes involved a fair amount of "duct-tape" (used loosely here) to make all of it work despite the risk involved. I didn't think much of it.
Now I sure have a different take on those words. While growing up plane crashes that happened were rare or their own kind of event(9/11, german pilot suicide, MH370). Therefore people around my age (30) might have bigger faith in planes than one should expect from travelling in hundred of tons of metal, composite materials and fuel going 500+ MPH in the sky.
[+] [-] djsumdog|6 years ago|reply
Of course that's not going to happen. There is simply way too much money involved and way too many interests to allow Boeing to take that kind of hit.
It seems like the airline industry is surviving without this substantial number of planes in their fleet. Have prices surged for the old 737-MAX routes? Have companies taken out more debt to put in orders for Airbus and Bombardier replacements, or are they confident the existing stock will return this year?
The 737 did survive their rudder issue several decades ago. Maybe this new generation of 737 will survive this? I'm sure there are a number of people who will avoid booking flights on these jets if they can though, at least for several months or a year.
[+] [-] teh_infallible|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] LoSboccacc|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] testfoobar|6 years ago|reply
So even though it is aerodynamically a different aircraft (with the engines further out), it mimics the 737NG with an effective emulator. For pilots certified on the 737NG, apparently minimal retraining is required to fly the 737Max.
Using this analogy, the MCAS system was seemingly put in place to behind-the-scenes manage a flight-envelope condition on the Max that would not happen on the NG.
So what happens when the 737Max hardware has a failure? How is the failure condition reported and managed by the flight crew? Are all failures on the 737Max passed through like they were 737NG failures? Does the flight crew respond as if they were flying a 737NG or a 737Max?
Correctly mimicing a 737NG during proper flight and under failure conditions seems like a tall order.
[+] [-] msbarnett|6 years ago|reply
The 737Max was built to provide a more fuel efficient model compatible with all of the 737-sized gates and etc stuff airlines owned. They did this by slapping bigger engines on, but to make them fit they pushed them forward of the wing (can’t make the plane taller or it doesn’t fit all the etc it’s supposed to be compatible with).
Big, front positioned engines messed up the aerodynamics. Now, at speed, as a plane got closer to (but not at) the stall angle, forces suddenly inverted, and it became much easier to pitch up into a stall than push down away from it. This violated FAA rules that say for a commercial plane to be certified, at any point short of a stall it must always be harder to pull into it than push out.
Boeing decided to add some software to automatically push the nose down when you get to the force inversion point. This uses the stabilizers to add force to the stick, so the pilot always has that extra force making it easier to push out of a stall than pull into it, meeting the FAA requirement. This is MCAS.
Thus MCAS is in no way a “737NG emulator”. You could call the plane a 797 and you’d still need it to meet fundamental certification requirements about stick forces. Ie) it’s not so much mimicking an older 737 as it is just pretending to be a sanely designed commercial airframe at all.
The type certification stuff only enters into it when Boeing didn’t want to tell people about MCAS because it might have caused them to think harder about the need for more training, the lack of which was a selling point for them.
[+] [-] salawat|6 years ago|reply
As I've sat down and worked on reverse engineering, and reverse engineering things as best I can from pieces of technical info strewn hither and yon, I'm developing serious concerns over how far Boeing has actually gone in their FMEA.
Given their complete omission or misclassification of the Angle of Attack sensor, I can't really give them the benefit of a doubt that they actually thought through the consequences of more severe, but less likely occurrences like double flameout, or alternator failure. Both of which would represent another critical threat to the MCAS software; which must be active in order for the airframe to be asserted as airworthy.
I'm just not buying it.
[+] [-] cmurf|6 years ago|reply
Using computers to aid safety, to reduce pilot workload, that's all fine. But to use them to certify an airplane as having certain aerodynamic behaviors when they do not really have those behaviors? Perverse.
And further, the software routine under discussion can in effect be neutralized, easily, in-flight, by flipping two switches. Is it really acceptable, by Boeing and the FAA, to render an airplane legally unairworthy by flipping two switches? And even more damning, to me as a pilot, is they apparently found it acceptable to require no training for the true behavior of the airplane minus this augmentation that is easy to disable inflight and is in fact recommended to be disabled as a memory checklist item for certain kinds of emergencies?
Seriously what the fuck?
If true it is wrongdoing. It's wrong for Boeing to go down that road, it's wrong for the FAA to permit it - until the FARs are changed. There should be public hearings and all kinds of regulatory requirements for expected computer and software standards, failure rates, redundancies, and other guarantees. We have such guarantees in writing for the physical aerodynamics of the airplane! There absolutely should be equivalents for computers and software if they are somehow going to take up the slack for otherwise inadequate aircraft design. You don't just get to silently wordsmith everything and say oh this computer thingy here will satisfy the aerodynamic requirement.
Fucking hell. It makes me angry. And that's why I really hope there is a misunderstanding, that really the airplane is certifiable as airworthy without any computer augmentation, and that the problem is merely that the pilots were kept out of the loop to avoid type rating required difference training. That's bad enough. But I think it's worse to paper over aerodynamic short-comings, waiving it off with computer augmentation when not a single allowance for that is made in the FARs.
[+] [-] peteretep|6 years ago|reply
That’s two interesting other countries, presumably chosen because the presence of Bombardier and Embraer mean Canada and Brazil have some experience in certifying planes? Notably missing are Russia and China who also make planes
[+] [-] duguxu|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] everybodyknows|6 years ago|reply
http://newsinflight.com/2019/07/06/easa-has-outlined-five-re...
[+] [-] Gustomaximus|6 years ago|reply
Given half of pilots will be below average... that doesn't sound great. Shouldn't it be all pilots have strength enough.
[+] [-] ape4|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] SiempreViernes|6 years ago|reply
The FAA in turn had been systematically delegating parts of the certification back to the manufacturers themselves, and obviously have not provided enough oversight.
After the crashes the EASA have obviously determined they need to redo the verification work themselves.
[+] [-] Swenrekcah|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ulfw|6 years ago|reply
EASA trusted the FAA to do their job and actually check the plane before certifying it. The FAA instead gladly outsourced the certification to...
... Boeing.
Which ultimately leads to the loss of reputation for the FAA, which is why EASA is now checking the plane themselves and finding numerous faults with it.
It's like University A would tomorrow get rid of all teaching assistants because it's cheaper that way and just have students self-grade their exams. Everyone will hence have only A+ and everyone is happy. Until finally a lot of really bad University A students will leave the job market unimpressed and thus hurting the reputation of University (FA)A.
[+] [-] thesimon|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] cadence-|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] m3kw9|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] boiengprocedure|6 years ago|reply
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[+] [-] boiengprocedure|6 years ago|reply
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[+] [-] boiengprocedure|6 years ago|reply
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[+] [-] boiengprocedure|6 years ago|reply
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[+] [-] meddlepal|6 years ago|reply
[+] [-] simion314|6 years ago|reply
Then FAA would fight back and everyone loses, for now there is no reason to doubt the issues raised so let's wait until say Europeans raise some bogus reason and then accuse them. though so far FAA and Boeing are the ones with less credibility (since were trying not to ground the MAX even with 2 planes crashed)