[Bartweiss]

> The CEO will be under tremendous pressure if he/she tries to optimize for a 1 year timeframe (for example) as opposed to quarter-by-quarter.

Its bizarre to talk to well-meaning execs (even below C-suite) at public companies and hear them overtly say this. "Well we know X and Y are sound investments for the company's success, but it's a question of finding a way to sell something that long-term without tanking our stock price."

I try not to cry market inefficiency without good evidence, but "shareholders promote good corporate governance" starts feeling pretty bizarre when the people running a company describe shareholders like corporate raiders encouraging them to destroy value for a quick payout.

> I wish boards can come up with a compensation structure for execs which optimizes for long term.

For all the talk about "when founders should get out of the way" and "what makes a good founder doesn't always make a good CEO", it's interesting to see that research still finds companies with founder-CEOs performing substantially better. Higher share prices (which might stem from overconfidence), but also better long-term financials, more R&D spending, more influential patent filings, etc.

And that doesn't necessarily mean founders are super-geniuses, exceptional managers, or even unusually attuned to their market. They get less of their salaries in cash, hold options and stocks longer, and vary their behavior less in response to compensation structure. (Also, they often hold so much stock they can't sell in full without panicking the market.)

So it really does look like we just haven't found a good way to compensate non-founder CEOs: their behavior is extremely responsive to their compensation, but nobody has found a scheme that makes them act long-term to the degree a founder would.