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aaronAgain | 5 years ago

I've never looked at DOH as an attack on DNSSEC, though I suppose you could. I think the resistance is more about the big corporate and the Internet level DNS operators like Google's 8.8.8.8, they want to be able to manipulate DNS responses when necessary. I know, evil corporate IT Ops hijacking my HNN connection. No, not that.

Think about a coordinated effort by top tier DNS providers globally to stop a giant bot network by simultaneously 'hijacking' DNS responses for the command and control server host-names. In classic DNS this is easy, just intercept the requests at the LDNS provider and return a dummy server IP, all good.

That falls apart with DOH and DNSSEC. With DNSSEC you cannot forge a response to a client that strictly expects signed responses for a particular zone. And with DOH, the various corporate IT shops cannot inspect and 'hijack' the responses. Though, the DOH operator can still change the response. But that moves the capability outside of local corporate IT and into a multinational company that might not agree with your request to 'fix' a problem via assisted DNS hijacking.

So all of these new, safer DNS delivery methods do legitimately impact the ability of "good"* operators to protect the Internet. Is the trade off worth it to protect users DNS traffic versus being able to respond to threats? I think that protecting users daily traffic is net-net better as it is a steady state problem and state sponsored actors have the resources to subvert a population via DNS. But I also feel the loss of a tool to protect users at the same time. Things like this are never zero-sum.

Disclaimer: I work for Microsoft and although I don't operate DNS services as part of my job, I have spent a lot of time on this particular topic over the years. These are my opinions, not the companies. I welcome challenges to my opinions, that's how I learn.

*"good" is always a situational thing.

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pvg|5 years ago

Losing the ability to do this very specific mitigation seems a tiny price to pay for not having everybody's DNS requests have zilch for transit privacy and integrity all the time.