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k32 | 5 years ago

> Any widely used distros do this.

I've yet to encounter another distro that deliberately breaks 3rd party software the way Nix did it to rebar3 (before it was reverted).

> Plus, the statement that you have to patch all packages is false.

IIRC `patchShebangs' script runs for any package using stdenv.

> I'd also like to add that nixpkgs has the most extensive testing for packages compared to any other distros I've seen.

Which distros? Can you share a comparison in number of tests/coverage?

> Dramatic, but again, simply not the case.

As other commenters mentioned, software written for GNU\Linux often assumes FHS. NixOS breaks FHS, and has to patch soft to work around that.

> This is a good thing.

How so?

> This is a good thing. Manual patching for the most common problems isn't sustainable, especially if you maintain a large number of packages. Just ask packages maintainers of any major distros.

Other major distros don't break FHS, therefore they don't need to patch trivial things like shebangs.

> All packages in nixpkgs has a mandatory review process as you should very well know. As scary as you make it sound, I'm pretty sure at least one committer have taken a look at your code to see if there was anything malicious in it.

It depends on your threat model. Mine is stricter.

> If this is the case, it wouldn't be a security problem at all because the dependencies would have to be prefetched and their hashes precomputed.

Once again, it breaks the cryptographic chain of custody set by the upstream. In my threat model that's not acceptable. I tend to trust the upstream more than the distro.

> Why not store secrets in a private location, just like you would on any other distros???

Secret provisioning is by far the most difficult DevOps problem, and it can go catastrophically wrong for all too many reasons. Nix not only doesn't help, but also introduces additional footguns with world-readable configuration files.

> What is it that other distros have that Nix is missing?

Other distros have FHS. FHS accounts for secret management, among other things.

> Yes, it saves me from having to do a clean install of my system every few months.

Ok, though I never had to do a clean install of GNU\Linux either on my dev machine.

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aidenn0|5 years ago

The fact that they reverted the rebar change suggests that or wasn't intentional.

soraminazuki|5 years ago

> I've yet to encounter another distro that deliberately breaks 3rd party software the way Nix did it to rebar3

Except that your anecdote is completely misleading given that the patched version was intended for creating Nix packages. You could've just used the unmodified version instead.

Furthermore, upstream developers complain about how distros are breaking their software all[1] the[2] time[3]. Again not a Nix specific problem. Nix even alleviates some of the problems because you can use different versions of the same software, meaning that different packages don't have to share dependencies as aggressively as other distros do.

> Which distros? Can you share a comparison in number of tests/coverage?

Arch, Debian, CentOS, and Homebrew, though the last one isn't strictly a Linux distro. I can't possibly count the numbers given that the sheer number of packages available, so it's based on experiences at looking at package definitions. I tend to check package definitions across distros a lot to write packages fir Nix.

> It depends on your threat model. Mine is stricter.

If you have a problem with software projects accepting outside contributions even if they go through review, you have a problem with using free and open source software in general. It makes me wonder how you even manage to use the Linux kernel.

> Once again, it breaks the cryptographic chain of custody set by the upstream. In my threat model that's not acceptable.

Then use the unmodified rebar3 for your project instead. But anyways, if your threat model involves not trusting SHA256, you likely have a problem with your said cryptographic chain of custody too.

> Nix not only doesn't help, but also introduces additional footguns with world-readable configuration files.

> FHS accounts for secret management, among other things.

That's an outright lie. NixOS doesn't prevent you from storing secrets in a file and applying your usual UNIX permissions. FHS has absolutely nothing to do with it.

[1]: https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/5599 [2]: https://web.archive.org/web/20181021091049/https://github.co... [3]: https://twitter.com/videolan/status/1153963312981389312

k32|5 years ago

> Except that your anecdote is completely misleading given that the patched version was intended for creating Nix packages. You could've just used the unmodified version instead.

The package was called rebar3, not rebar3-nix or something. If the fork was called differently then no one would complain. Also this fork was based on hacks, like patching rebar3's internal files and messing with caches. If you don't see anything wrong about this, then this way of thinking just proves what I said in the parent.

But forking rebar3 wasn't needed at all, because rebar3 _already_ had all the features needed for Nix. Namely, it has get-deps command producing fixed output derivation, and it supports _checkouts directory, needed for hermetic build.

> Then use the unmodified rebar3 for your project instead. But anyways, if your threat model involves not trusting SHA256, you likely have a problem with your said cryptographic chain of custody too.

There's no reason to use SHA256, if you just replace it with a different SHA256 whenever it doesn't match with the upstream.

> Nix even alleviates some of the problems because you can use different versions of the same software, meaning that different packages don't have to share dependencies as aggressively as other distros do.

Docker exists. Although it's not perfect by any means, it doesn't require reinventing the entire world. I extrapolated my experience with Erlang to the rest of NixOS reinventions, which in theory could be wrong, but it was convincing enough for me.

> That's an outright lie. NixOS doesn't prevent you from storing secrets in a file and applying your usual UNIX permissions. FHS has absolutely nothing to do with it.

I was not talking about "storing secrets in a file", but rather about the whole live cycle of the secrets, including transferring them between parties, storing, provisioning, rotation, etc (imagine you have to solve a problem of changing some secret on 100 machines securely and reproducibly via blue/green deployment). As far as I know, Nix doesn't provide facilities for solving this problem at scale. I would be happy to be proven wrong.

> FHS has absolutely nothing to do with it.

It absolutely does. Some pieces of software look for secrets in /etc/ (Kafka, for example). When etc (or its analogue in /nix) is world-readable hilarity ensues.