[xjwm]

More negative press for Boeing, which they probably don't need after all the 737 MAX issues. From the layman's perspective, I can't tell if Engineers have gotten lazy/complacent in their designs, OR if the FAA has gotten significantly better at screening for potential issues, OR if we're operating so close to the edge of the design envelope that these issues are inevitable. I sincerely hope it is number 2 or 3, but my gut feel is that cost cutting and efficiency are winning over safety and good engineering analysis.

[fzingle]

The whole 737 Max debacle made two things clear.

First, Boeing doesn't prioritize safety anymore. Profit is the driving factor in their decision making. You can read about the issues they have assembling the 787 in South Carolina. It is so bad some airlines are refusing to take delivery unless the plane is validated by the assembly line in Washington.

Second, the FAA was caught being complacent with the 737 Max. It will take some time to fix that, but it is clear they don't want to make the same mistake. Also, the EASA is no longer just rubber stamping approvals following the FAA. Both agencies are combining to improve safety, which is highlighting the management problems at Boeing.

[cptskippy]

> Also, the EASA is no longer just rubber stamping approvals following the FAA

This to me speaks volumes about our regulatory environment. Once upon a time the US regulations were so thorough that other countries would just Me-Too certification if the US had certified something. That's no longer the case and the EU has rightly started to question everything.

The US is in rapid decline on all fronts as half our country stands in the way of anyone trying to fix the problems while ignoring our rapid erosion or blaming it on immigrants and leftists.

[systemvoltage]

Having worked in large manufacturing facilities that cost billions, there is almost a comical and blatant tribalism that kicks in between workers/teams simply because they are located in different sites. The Chinese sites talk down on Vietnamese factories. Texas factories gawk at the ones located in Massachussetts. I think this happens in non-manufacturing industries as well (Microsoft org chart anyone?), but I've seen that the bonds between workers are stronger when they get together and build something like a giant aeroplane. Leadership has a hardtime navigating the waters, especially if something critical (safety) has been neglected. It is easy to look at this in union/non-union differences, but it's not so simple. I would question the leadership and the way they inspire people to build something together. I suspect this is what's lacking at Boeing and once the culture of not caring about quality kicks in, it is difficult eradicate toxicity from this culture.

There is almost an obsession to find out if your BMW was manufactured in South Africa or Germany, the latter being desirable, on BMW enthusiast forums despite of being made with exacting specifications and factory processes.

[mjevans]

Also worth noting, the South Carolina plant is NON-union, while the Washington (state) plants are unionized.

I speculate that focus on safety and quality of work are easier at the unionized plants.

[bobthebuilders]

Just an FYI, it's North Charleston in South Carolina.

[WalterBright]

> Profit is the driving factor in their decision making.

No profit means no airplanes.

[content_sesh]

Boeing was my first job out of college (BS in Aero Eng but I was hired as a software dev). I worked there for a few years in both commercial aviation and defense projects. I've since moved out of the aerospace industry entirely in favor of tech.

Boeing is a huge company and I saw just a small slice of it at my time there. So with that caveat, in my opinion the root cause of Boeing's problems are mismanagement. Mismanagement flows down from the top of the organization and impacts everything they do.

Here's just one example, off the top of my head: There is no "psychological safety" in the workplace. I wasn't aware of this term at the time, but it's crystal-clear with the benefit of hindsight and a decade more working experience. There is no good way to fix irrational or ineffective processes; or at least, I've never seen it happen. What I did see, several times, is course changes and "new approaches" that result in whole departments (dozens of engineers) getting pink slips. So as a result there was inherent mistrust of change, because "we're going to stop doing X and start doing Y" meant "everyone currently doing X needs to scramble to find a new project before the hammer drops". It is impossible to build a culture of continuous improvement and engineering excellence in such an environment.

Again, this is just one example. There's probably hundreds, thousands, more. It's mismanagement all the way down.

[ricardobayes]

What is psychological safety? I don't think I have ever worked at a place that had that.

[icegreentea2]

Many of the FAA's comment point at Boeing trying to push the regulatory timeline along despite elements (specifically software/firmware/avionics) appearing to be not sufficiently complete. This isn't the same thing as the design being fundamentally bad, or even the implementation being fundamentally flawed - it's just not done.

What's not clear is why this is happening. To be clear, nearly all possible outcomes point at either a broken management, and/or engineering culture at Boeing, but all have different flavors. What points at it being a broken management culture (predominantly... this certainly doesn't rule out engineering problems) is this particular section:

> Citing a “lack of data” and the absence of a Preliminary Safety Assessment for the FAA to review, the agency’s letter declares that Boeing hasn’t even met its own process requirements.

> Boeing’s CCS “review dates have continuously slid over a year,” the letter notes.

This section indicates that someone told regulatory to start a TIA process with FAA despite having not completed a review of a vendor supplied critical component (ie, follow their own plan). This indicates that multiple areas within the company which should have been involved (engineering, quality, and regulatory, as well as areas of the company concerned primarily with internal development, and out-sourced systems) were likely all overruled. These are all areas of the company that are supposed to be setup to stop bullshit other areas getting through. All of them have slightly misaligned interests relative to each other that generally tends to keep stuff in check.

Quality is usually very very concerned with at the very least, following your own plan ('meeting its own process requirements'). No one at regulatory would have looked at these gaps (like not at least papering over missing their own process requirements), and thought that formally engaging would be a good idea.

As someone working in medical devices, this definitely smells like something that management rammed through. This doesn't absolve any of other parties/groups of responsibility though. It just means that you have a problem beyond just your documented process, or technical capabilities/competence.

[beavertrilogy]

> Within the FAA, the person said, “there’s a general feeling that Boeing has kind of lost a step,” referring to the slide away from a historic reputation for engineering prowess.

Unfortunately this hits at the development of a culture of complacency.

[b-x]

> [...] after all the 737 MAX issues.

I think using the word issues here is diluting the facts. A more accurate wording would use disasters or catastrophes.

[Dylan16807]

The biggest factor right now is the actual design problems. They caused disasters, but they are not themselves disasters, they are issues.

[a3n]

It may not be lazy engineers so much as senior engineers leaving, and new seniors not effectively mentored and grown.

[Swenrekcah]

I don’t think it’s any of the above. I think management shortsightedness and greed are the primary culprits. Safety and engineering excellence took the back seat for quarterly profits.