(no title)
haacked | 4 years ago
For our threat model, we focus on _companies_ using Slack, Discord, and Teams, though our efforts apply to communities, etc. For the sake of this question, I'll focus on companies using Slack, but most of it applies to the others.
Even without Abbot, if someone gains access to an employee Slack account, they can do immense damage. So it's very important for companies to enforce good security on Slack such as 2-factor auth, etc. If you use Abbot, that's even more important. To interact with Abbot in chat, a user must be logged into your Slack organization. So we encourage customers to take their Slack account security seriously.
Now it may happen that a Slack account is compromised despite a company's best efforts. So the next level of protection is the ability to protect skills using Abbot's access control. You can restrict skills to a limited set of users. That makes it possible to follow the principle of least privilege and reduce exposure of the most sensitive skills.
Finally, despite our best efforts, there may be the case where someone gains access to a privileged account. Abbot logs every interaction it has with users, whether through the Bot console (in the website) or via chat. So if someone does somehow get access, you can audit what activities they took, what secrets they accessed.
It's also important to look at security from the perspective of a skill author. To create a skill, a user has to be a member of the "Members" role in https://ab.bot/. This requires that they are a member of the associated Slack organization and have logged into https://ab.bot/ with their Slack account (we don't implement our own authentication).
An Abbot Administrator can choose to let anyone in the Slack organization automatically be added to the "Members" role when they log in. That may be appropriate for smaller high-trust companies. For larger companies, administrators may want have tighter control on access to the website.
Skill authors are encouraged not to embed tokens and other secrets in the code for skills. Instead, use the secrets management built in. There's also a proxy link feature for certain cases where a secret is embedded in a URL and you don't want the secret exposed even to skill authors.
That's where we are today.
In the future, we'd like to integrate with Active Directory, LDAP, etc. for managing access to the site and skills. Also, we know that many systems people want to access are going to be behind a firewall. So we are looking into onprem options, but those may be further down the road.
If you have some ideas on where we can improve or areas we should be thinking about, we are definitely interested in hearing about it. This is very important to us.
xfitm3|4 years ago
Additionally companies forced to be SOX compliant require separation of duties, which is often incompatible with slash commands that impact production or revenue generating infrastructure.
icey|4 years ago
SOX compliance is a bit outside of our domain of influence; our goal is to give people the most powerful tools we can, in a way that they can run it in their environment without having to reinvent the wheel.
icey|4 years ago
On reread, I realize that I'm not sure I understand what sort of attack you're talking about. While I think we've done a good job of making Abbot a safe entity, could you describe how this works? It's possible there's an attack vector we haven't considered. Thanks for sharing!
thanksforfish|4 years ago