The problem is that there exist first-hand and second-hand (i.e. MAGIC intercepts) primary sources for decisions from both sides in the summer of 1945 (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/) and they don't really support the theory. (It's possible you could find some reasoning to support the "impress the Soviets" part, but to make that the primary motive would be to ignore the majority.)
Also, keep in mind that Halsey had a bit of a problem with Nimitz and much of the Navy, particularly over the matter of two typhoons and Leyte Gulf, so he may not be entirely unbiased.
There are very few defensible historical positions that seem to rile up unreasonable criticism more than saying the use of atomic weapons on Japan might not have been justified, usually in the form of uneducated meme responses such as "they would never have surrendered" and "it's easy to say that now."
Given that we have evidence that many of those who were there at the time disagreed with the decision and that Japan had already been trying to work towards peace through back-channels, these responses seem to point to a deep need to feel like the United States didn't unjustifiably kill over 100k civilians.
There is little question that the bombings were a better strategic choice than Operation Downfall, which would likely have killed more on both sides, but to paint this as the only alternative is a false dilemma. There is even debate among (prominent, non-revisionist) historians and political scientists as to whether the bombings were the primary reason for the surrender -- contemporary letters from within Japan indicate that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria may have actually been the primary factor (though the bombings certainly played some part, and were a larger factor in arguments made by some particular officials).
I would argue the opposite; criticism of the use of atomic weapons on Japan tends to ramp up during periods of increasing skepticism toward American power (e.g., now). Unfortunately, that criticism is rarely rooted in credible historical argument. I wouldn't say you're arguing from a "uneducated meme response," but I would say that the position that you're taking is the symptom of a post-Vietnam/Watergate narrative regarding CIA conspiracies, the legitimacy of war, and the trustworthiness of American authority. It is, however, not a terribly useful way to approach the context of 1945.
While it is possible to find negative quotes from various individuals, such as the aforementioned Halsey, the question is really whether the people involved in the decision were making it in 'good faith' (i.e. out of the perceived necessity of ending the war on rational terms, and not diplomatic stick-shaking or the need to show off one's latest toys). Overwhelmingly, the primary sources argue that they were, and that the most salient concern was ensuring an unconditional surrender to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, in which the sociopolitical structures that enabled militarism were left intact. The "peace" that Japan was offering would have left its extremely dysfunctional political structures intact, and so was considered unacceptable.
The number of dead, and manner of their death, must also be seen in the context of the time. It doesn't really matter what we believe about the morality of targeting civilians in 2021; by 1945, that particular Rubicon had been crossed years before, and not just by the Allies. The Japanese Army committed atrocities on such a scale as to poison attitudes about the country to this very day; there is a good reason that people in China or the Philippines may roll their eyes when reading about poor Sadako and her thousand paper cranes (a story popularized by a 1977 Canadian novel).
I write this not to minimize any healthy sense of horror or responsibility, but to point out that "it's easy to say that now" is not merely a meme, but in this case responsible historical practice.
Because it's been debunked over and over and over. It's just not supported by historical evidence, even by Japanese historians interviewing surviving Japanese officials. Somebody else has recommended in this thread but I will as well: "Japan's Longest Day" makes for fascinating reading.
The reality is that there was a peace faction in the Japanese government who did want to surrender but the ultranationalistic Japanese military was quite firmly in control and was very much _not_ interested in surrendering, even at the cost of millions of Japanese military and civilian casualties involved in continuing the war. (It's worth remembering that the Allied aerial firebombing campaigns had already devastated every other major city in Japan and caused far more civilian casualties than both atomic bombs did; both the Japanese and Allied militaries accepted this as part of the toll of war.) The aim (and preference of all factions) would have been a peace treaty that let Japan keep its ill-gotten gains in Asia. It took an unprecedented direct order from the Emperor to initiate the surrender, over the objections of the military. Even the high level overview provided by the Wikipedia article has excerpts like "[On August 9,] The cabinet meeting adjourned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus. ... The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged." and "As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup." that directly contradict the idea that Japan was eager to surrender.
And beyond that, at the last minute, a coup attempt was made by fanatics willing to defy even the Emperor in an attempt to prevent the surrender proclamation from being broadcast (the Kyuujou incident).
Does any of this sound like a Japan that was eager to surrender? No, and that's why war historians generally deride this theory, quotes from Halsey, Eisenhower, etc. notwithstanding. Even just reading the Wikipedia article would make this clear: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan
Because anyone who knows the actual history, knows that's bullshit and OP could have just looked up the facts instead of making up something.
Japan was going to fight to the last man/woman/child. They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks. The Pacific theater was already one of the bloodiest battle fronts in the war and the US was battle weary and didn't want to expend another 500,000 Americans to invade Japan. They dropped nukes to avoid another extended and unbelievably bloody conflict.
Go listen to the Hardcore History podcasts "Supernova in the East" and it'll make it much more clear.
I don't think it's bullshit. I think Navy Admiral William F. Halsey did say those things.
"The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before."[1]
Those are the facts... GP made nothing up.
OTOH - the Cold War should be ample evidence of the West's distrust of Stalin and USSR generally. I think it's entirely plausible the motivation to drop the bomb included Soviet deterrence.
mcguire|4 years ago
Also, keep in mind that Halsey had a bit of a problem with Nimitz and much of the Navy, particularly over the matter of two typhoons and Leyte Gulf, so he may not be entirely unbiased.
Matticus_Rex|4 years ago
Given that we have evidence that many of those who were there at the time disagreed with the decision and that Japan had already been trying to work towards peace through back-channels, these responses seem to point to a deep need to feel like the United States didn't unjustifiably kill over 100k civilians.
There is little question that the bombings were a better strategic choice than Operation Downfall, which would likely have killed more on both sides, but to paint this as the only alternative is a false dilemma. There is even debate among (prominent, non-revisionist) historians and political scientists as to whether the bombings were the primary reason for the surrender -- contemporary letters from within Japan indicate that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria may have actually been the primary factor (though the bombings certainly played some part, and were a larger factor in arguments made by some particular officials).
mezentius|4 years ago
While it is possible to find negative quotes from various individuals, such as the aforementioned Halsey, the question is really whether the people involved in the decision were making it in 'good faith' (i.e. out of the perceived necessity of ending the war on rational terms, and not diplomatic stick-shaking or the need to show off one's latest toys). Overwhelmingly, the primary sources argue that they were, and that the most salient concern was ensuring an unconditional surrender to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, in which the sociopolitical structures that enabled militarism were left intact. The "peace" that Japan was offering would have left its extremely dysfunctional political structures intact, and so was considered unacceptable.
The number of dead, and manner of their death, must also be seen in the context of the time. It doesn't really matter what we believe about the morality of targeting civilians in 2021; by 1945, that particular Rubicon had been crossed years before, and not just by the Allies. The Japanese Army committed atrocities on such a scale as to poison attitudes about the country to this very day; there is a good reason that people in China or the Philippines may roll their eyes when reading about poor Sadako and her thousand paper cranes (a story popularized by a 1977 Canadian novel).
I write this not to minimize any healthy sense of horror or responsibility, but to point out that "it's easy to say that now" is not merely a meme, but in this case responsible historical practice.
ThrowawayR2|4 years ago
The reality is that there was a peace faction in the Japanese government who did want to surrender but the ultranationalistic Japanese military was quite firmly in control and was very much _not_ interested in surrendering, even at the cost of millions of Japanese military and civilian casualties involved in continuing the war. (It's worth remembering that the Allied aerial firebombing campaigns had already devastated every other major city in Japan and caused far more civilian casualties than both atomic bombs did; both the Japanese and Allied militaries accepted this as part of the toll of war.) The aim (and preference of all factions) would have been a peace treaty that let Japan keep its ill-gotten gains in Asia. It took an unprecedented direct order from the Emperor to initiate the surrender, over the objections of the military. Even the high level overview provided by the Wikipedia article has excerpts like "[On August 9,] The cabinet meeting adjourned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus. ... The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged." and "As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup." that directly contradict the idea that Japan was eager to surrender.
And beyond that, at the last minute, a coup attempt was made by fanatics willing to defy even the Emperor in an attempt to prevent the surrender proclamation from being broadcast (the Kyuujou incident).
Does any of this sound like a Japan that was eager to surrender? No, and that's why war historians generally deride this theory, quotes from Halsey, Eisenhower, etc. notwithstanding. Even just reading the Wikipedia article would make this clear: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan
diogenescynic|4 years ago
Japan was going to fight to the last man/woman/child. They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks. The Pacific theater was already one of the bloodiest battle fronts in the war and the US was battle weary and didn't want to expend another 500,000 Americans to invade Japan. They dropped nukes to avoid another extended and unbelievably bloody conflict.
Go listen to the Hardcore History podcasts "Supernova in the East" and it'll make it much more clear.
engineer_22|4 years ago
"The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before."[1]
Those are the facts... GP made nothing up.
OTOH - the Cold War should be ample evidence of the West's distrust of Stalin and USSR generally. I think it's entirely plausible the motivation to drop the bomb included Soviet deterrence.
[1] http://www.doug-long.com/ga1.htm
pessimizer|4 years ago
This is not history, this is a hypothetical.
> They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks.
I suspect this would have been ineffective.
beepbooptheory|4 years ago