[GeorgeKangas]

> ...the need some people seem to have to reach for an extra-physical domain for the mind to exist in.

It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be defined in physical terms. Or any terms, really. Instead of any definition of SE, all that's on offer are ostensions that will direct a reader's attention to his own SE if he's having it. Such as:

Descartes: SE is what you're absolutely certain must exist, even if everything else is an illusion.

Nagel: SE is "what it's like to be _____".

Nagel again (same paper, but not quoted enough): It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. [italics mine]

[skohan]

> It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be defined in physical terms. Or any terms, really.

What makes you think that it's undefinable, rather than that we're just not capable of defining it?

For instance, as human beings we cannot ever really understand systems like the weather, or the economy. We can understand some of the component forces involved, but there are too many things interacting for us really to wrap our minds around how the whole thing moves.

Similarly, we now have a proof for the 4 color problem, but it had to be provided by a computer, because the number of cases involved in the proof was not really within the grasp of the human mind.

As humans, we can basically hold 7-10 things in our mind at one time. So in order to "solve" something, we need to be able to break it down into a maximum of 7-10 component parts at any one time. What if it's the case that the physical origin of subjective experience is perfectly obvious, but it would require a consciousness with the capacity to consider 1000 independent neural processes at the same time to see the solution?

> It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence.

I don't really get this one. How is it that the empirical explanation of subjective experience is compatible with its absence?

[GeorgeKangas]

Thanks for replying, skohan! Since this item has moved far off the front page, I'm guessing that just about nobody else will be seeing whatever else we write here. If you wish, you can email me at [e-mail] .

Descartes described the clearest identifying property of SE: it's absolutely certain to exist. Since absolute certainty lies outside the scope of science: science can't define what SE is, it can only describe what SE does.

Science doesn't rule out the philosophical hypothesis known as "illusionism" (advocated by Keith Frankish), that SE is a delusion.

If you, skohan, have SE and have correctly identified it: its nonexistence will be inconceivable to you. Are you there yet?