I understand the points about having to comply with laws. But what is is unjustifiable is my view is that their marketing does not match the reality. They probably did some A/B testing and saw that keeping vague promises about not tracking users increases conversion rate. You, as an HN reader, being in the top 0.1% of the population in terms of tech-savviness, may be able to read through the nonsense and understand how little it means when they say "by default, we do not keep any IP logs". But the other 99.9% of the population won't understand it, and that's why their marketing strategy works: they are selling a level of privacy that does not exist to customers who do not know better without technically lying.
Their threat model and all threat scenarios should be front and centre on their front page and sign up page. That is if they care about user privacy not just the bottom line. They have a choice between better-informed customers or more money, and so far, they have chosen the latter.
What this and the new Apple debacle have proven to me is that privacy is not a product that can be purchased. If you want real privacy, you have spend a lot of time learning how to preserve your privacy. No matter what Apple and ProtonMail and similar companies tell you, you cannot buy privacy off-the-shelf.
You can't buy immunity from the legal and law enforcement system, full stop. That's simply an unreasonable expectation.
What you can buy is various degrees and quality of sensible defaults and behaviours that serve your general interest in privacy and security. Privacy from casual snooping or commercial tracking, security from unsophisticated attacks or even sophisticated attacks if you're wiling to also sacrifice some convenience.
These are all worth having, and your choices of product and service provider can have a significant impact on them. I know little to nothing about ProtonMail but maybe they're a better bet than many other similar services, even if they're not perfect.
Yeah, this debacle will probably help them find a better wording of their guarantees.
They do explain the threat model quite well but the information is scattered around (e.g. https://protonmail.com/blog/protonmail-threat-model/) and this matters in an era where the attention span of people is very short.
"No matter what Apple and ProtoMail and similar companies tell you, you cannot buy privacy off-the-shelf."
The cost is personal time and effort, not money. The software needed is generally free of charge. The goal being not a physical product or a service, but a level of knowledge and proficiency. To put it another way, "tech-savviness" cannot be purchased, it has to be achieved.
The cultural problem we face is that the so-called "0.1%" are leveraging their "tech-savviness" against the rest of the population, working for so-called "tech" companies, websites that make money by exploiting the privacy of the "99.9%" in the service of online advertising.
If we take HN comments as true, in some cases, these employees do not even believe in the bottom line they are working to support.1 They are not adopting the behaviour of the "99.9%", i.e., the "expected" behaviour required to sustain their employer's bottom line. Not sure about you, but that would not give me much confidence they are going to work very hard to protect other users' privacy.
The term "dogfooding" is sometimes used amongst tech companies to describe the situation where employees themselves partake in what they offer to non-employees, i.e., "users".2 To persons outside the tech bubble this can be quite amusing. Does this suggest they view their relationship to users as more like "human-to-dog" than "human-to-human". There is nothing inherently wrong with someone peddling something she does not believe in, however we might consider what is/are the reason(s) for her lack of faith.
To be clear, I am not suggesting the cultural problem can be solved. I am attempting to provide further reasons that digital privacy is, like the parent suggested, generally not something you can "buy".
1 Evidence appears periodically in HN comments. For example, yesterday:
"Disclaimer: I work at Google. In cloud, not on Android.
I am privacy conscious so I though I would give a try at Graphene OS, it was brutal."
2 The term is alleged to have first appeared one the joelonsoftware.com website and to have originated at Microsoft.
You may not have given it much thought before, but the idea (in your head, let's say) that Protonmail keeps no logs and thus completely protects you from ip-address discovery by law enforcement would imply that one could freely solicit and exchange unencrypted child pornography with strangers with no fear of detection.
I'm not saying "think of the children", I'm saying "think of law enforcement and the judicial system"
thinking about it now in retrospect, do you think that really could have been a possibility? I don't.
By default they don’t have logging on. Does not mean they can’t turn it on if asked.
You can’t have privacy; you need to be actively participating in our society or you’re dead. As soon as you try to build it you’ll realize it’s a full time job and you won’t be able to afford to eat on what it pays.
Only 5% of people in the US still hunt. We are coupled to the modern systems we have (unless MIT is right and it falls apart soon).
You want privacy, go off grid. Those of us living on grid will be sure to leave you be and keep everything we build for ourselves.
None of us explicitly cheered on the end of privacy but we did cheer on the engineering effort that made it happen. Despite numerous voices warning us.
I wonder if the future of a company like Protonmail is that it has to be open source. Almost like simply an API, no privacy statement, no marketing, just a smart contract. More like UniSwap.
They claim to have exceptionally good Tor support, when in reality people have (rightly) been screaming at them for years now to fix their permabroken Tor signup flow.
1. It's impossible to create a paid account with cryptocurrency: You can only use it to pay for an existing account
2. It's impossible to anonymously create any account over Tor: You have to at least pass SMS / secondary email verification, and it better not be an easy to get address ("Email verification temporarily disabled for this email domain" etc.)
Lots of marketing and boxticking (.onion: check), but it looks curiously hostile to anonymity if you actually try to use it.
They are an email provider. Providing true anonymity leads to spam abuse. Spam abuse leads to blacklisting. And blacklisting leads to bankruptcy. Not sure what people expect.
> Under no circumstances can our encryption be bypassed, meaning emails, attachments, calendars, files, etc. cannot be compromised by legal orders.
This is false.
Each time you visit protonmail you re-download (cache can be invalidated) their client. It would be trivial for them to serve a specific user a modified client which uploads their encryption keys.
This problem is not specific to protonmail, any service which contends to be secure with respect to some server (the protocol relies on the client to decrypt stuff the server cannot) can be compromised this way because of implicit trust in the client software which can be modified at any time with no notice - making any auditing entirely meaningless in the case of targeted attacks.
This problem should perhaps be addressed by browsers since it seems they are becoming pseudo operating systems.
They say "cannot be compromised by legal orders" and they say they are bound by and only by swiss laws.
Maybe what they mean is that the swiss authorities have no legal basis on which to force them to serve a modified, backdoored, client like the one you're talking about.
One possible mitigation to this would be to let customers deploy ProtonMail's open-source client [0] themselves to wherever (as one example, this is something that TermPair implements [1]).
They could just not encrypt future emails. Wouldn't help where they've already discarded the plaintext, but newer emails are usually more useful anyway.
You can use ProtonMail Bridge with your own mail client to remove the dependency on the ever-changing webapp. I'm not sure if it's possible to build Bridge from source instead of blindly trusting the binaries they offer, though.
Not only that, but it's very unfortunately worded. There's a missing "contents of emails, attachments, calendars, files, etc. cannot be compromised by legal orders", since I assume there is vital metadata that still can be compromised.
As the manager of various accounts used by environmental and social activists on Protonmail, this is really bad.
I understand they have to follow Swiss law, but surely there are higher standard and processes than: police forward foreign request. Don't challenge or question, just do task required.
Interpol requests are not as universally recognized as what some people here are alluding to. Countries can file these requests with interpol but it's up each country to determine if they act or recognize the request.
If the Chinese government files 500 requests via interpol and the swiss police merely pass them on the proton, will proton mail automatically comply and install malware on their client on targeted accounts?
I hope this is not the case but I expect this to be clarified. On th face of it, organizing an occupy protest hardly seems to pas the bar of "serious criminal cases"
Your concerns are valid but I think you are downplaying this by characterizing it as "swiss police merely pass them to proton". Protonmail recieved a legally binding order from the Swiss Federal Department of Justice.
I'm not saying Swiss laws are infallible but this request was not simply "forwarded":
"Swiss authorities will only approve requests which meet Swiss legal standards (the only law that matters is Swiss law)"
As they mentioned in the blog post, they do challenge many of these requests but it was not legally possible in this case.
IMO the problem is that France use anti-terrorists law against environmental activist. It is not the first time it happens, and I bet that it will happen again.
If I were an environmental activist, I would definitely step up my operational security.
Why don't you use riseup.net, they have been providing similar services specifically for activists for more than 20 years. While they are based in the US, the idea that Switzerland = privacy is bull. In the US, you are not required to keep logs. If you have them, you can be forced to turn them over, but if you don't they cannot force you to enable them.
I have been a riseup user for years. They have received foreign legal requests, and they do not simply do the task requested. They've also received US-based legal requests, and challenge them, but in the end, they do not have the data that is being requested, so ultimately they can respond saying exactly that.
It's up to the local authorities as you said. If the Chinese government files 500 requests on interpol and the Swiss authority recognizes the requests, ProtonMail will just have to comply.
But usually interpol rejects many requests from the Chinese government (to track uyghurs for example).
The real scandal here is why the French authority is making such request on an activist, why Interpol processed it (as far as I understand there are no crimes in play here?), and why the Swiss authority recognizes the request?
Perhaps we don't have the full story, but, with only the information we have, it sounds like an abuse of the protocol on 3 different entities. And double standards from Interpol (not okay to track down chinese activists, but ok for french activists?)
Why do the climate activists hiding, I can not understand?
Climate is fashionable and respected today, they would got medals maybe if not hiding?
I can openly say that I am for good climate and ecology. Greta Thunberg is also not hiding.
And about this specific activist, do you know what he is accused of? (It must be something other than activism, right? Difficult to imagine climate activism is illegal in France).
PS: I understand this topic is mostly about Proton failing the privacy expectations, but curious to know what can activist be charged with.
In yesterday thread there were comment if I remember right that included more details. The squatters in question has already been sentenced and given suspended sentences. The request to ProtonMail was about other members of the same group that is suspected of home invasion and theft.
If that qualify as serious crime is still up to debate and it could just be a excuse to go after the organizers. I do however find the case a bit more nuanced after reading those details.
In your job as an intermediary would it be reasonable to roll your own email servers? If done properly then you wouldn't have to trust anyone and could give instructions to your clients on how to produce and use their own private keys. Commercial mail providers don't offer this option for some (likely legal) reason, but if you're willing to share risk with the activists then I think it would be worthwhile.
Sadly, it is impossible hide your identity from gov and legal enforcement (from US to China) if you use any commercial service. As far as I know, FBI knows identity of all “ransomware” hackers. But they just cannot get them.
It's in french but here is a summary:
Law enforcement contacted Protonmail directly and the company told them to use the "Europol channel", which law enforcement did.
Protonmail then provided the date when the account was created, the IP address (Not clear if it is the one when it was created or last login) and the "device", I suppose they are talking about the user agents.
Please keep in mind that companies can charge processing fees on law enforcement requests. I would really like to know if ProtonMail is earning money on this.
Does anyone have information on what the climate activist is accused of? This is the only thing I've found:
> For the past year, a group of people have taken over a handful of commercial premises and apartments near Place Sainte Marthe in Paris. They want to fight against gentrification, real estate speculation, Airbnb and high-end restaurants. While it started as a local conflict, it quickly became a symbolic campaign. They attracted newspaper headlines when they started occupying premises rented by Le Petit Cambodge — a restaurant that was targeted by the November 13th, 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.
I found this page [0] (in French). I don't know how reliable this website (or my French, for that matter) is, but it seems like its a group of activists illegally squatting, damaging the property (at least changing the locks) and causing some public disturbances in the street, and the police were having a difficult time catching them. This email account was linked to the organization's Twitter account, and from there they were able to put together enough information to arrest.
> ProtonMail does not give data to foreign governments; that’s illegal under Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal code. We only comply with legally binding orders from Swiss authorities.
But the arrest was by the French police. So the Swiss government used a warrant to get info from PM and then passed it to France because the charges passed muster under Swiss law ("Swiss authorities will only approve requests which meet Swiss legal standards (the only law that matters is Swiss law)")?
This is the exact kind of clarity that was needed for users to have confidence in their understanding of Protonmail. Andy Yen (Proton CEO) is a very thoughtful communicator and is making the world better.
At some point everything on the internet becomes local, because people and businesses eventually must exist at a location in the real world. Proton is always going to be subject to local law enforcement wherever they are based.
This is a weak response. "What we're changing" isn't specific. It's a "our shit doesn't stink" kind of reply.
"What we're changing" should be far more specific. Start educating users about Tor on your homepage.
Start blogging about Tor more than once in 2017. Have a score for how many users log in through Tor. Have a score for how many times your privacy policy is loaded.
Stop claiming to be the best simply because you have a Tor site with an old version of your app. That's not good enough.
I'm looking for leadership. Protonmail is clearly an "explainer" more than a leader. I'll keep my eyes peeled for whoever comes along to replace them.
> Under Swiss law, it is obligatory for a user to be notified if a third party makes a request for their private data and such data is to be used in a criminal proceeding.
They’re not explicit with regards to the activist, this would mean the activist was notified upon ProtonMail receiving the request?
I’m not sure there’s much you can do but lawyer up if you receive such a notice, but potentially the activist could have immediately started using Tor (maybe too late though, because to read the notice they might have already leaked their IP).
I don't understand why it is so hard for people on HN to understand that "no logs by default" is perfectly compatible with "if the government orders us to turn on logs, we must".
No company or organization can sustainably stop a determined government request that they continue to operate in financially or physically. It doesn't matter what the company says at some point they will be forced to either shutdown or give in eg lavabit(1).
The government can trace and stop the flow of all or most of their money threating their primary motivation for the business. Or they can physically detain people or equipment required to function.
the only way for an entity to never comply with government orders and continue to function is to remain anonymous and their servers accessible only via temporary addresses or tor since static ip's and domains can be taken away. Making it impossible for receiving email and more effort than the average person would want to access.
It then becomes a catch 22 as you cant fully trust an anonymous, transient entity since their motivation can never be verified(they could be a honey trap), they can rarely be held accountable if they betray you, and they could be replaced or compelled to comply without anyone knowing(someone part of a visible physical social network could have friends put out a warning if something suspicious happened to them).
What it comes down to is what we already know. they only way to be sure your email provider wont hand over your emails is to run your own email server anonymously.
For anyone who cant do that protonmail is still likely the best choice even if its imperfect. plus adding whatever other layers of protection on top you are capable of.
Heres the issue with Proton's marketing that no one is mentioning. The CEO keeps making claims about "Swiss law" as if it is something to be desired. However he never adds any citations to the relevant laws or their interpretation. This seems strange because #1 How many Proton customers know anything about Swiss law (how many can even read German or French^1) and #2 The CEO is not a lawyer, he is a physicist.
It seems prudent that Proton customers would want to have a look at those "Swiss laws" (a) to see what sort of protection they offer and (b) to make sure they dont violate one. In the case of (b) the customer will potentially lose all privacy protections, as emphasized in this announcement.
1 It appears that Swiss law is conveniently published in English however the English translation is not what Swiss courts use.
Any company large enough _will_ have to deal with compliance at some point, that's why most devs in large software companies have to take these silly "exams" every year telling you to not plug a USB key you found on the floor in your company laptop, even if it should be very obvious to most.
I'm seeing a lot of people here that are surprised by the fact that even a company who has privacy as their main marketing point has to deal with compliance, but really, unless you host your own mail server, you just can't guarantee your own privacy.
I don't generally advise hosting your own mail server due to all the troubles that come with it, but this is really one of the only ways I can think of where you can achieve a decent enough level of control when it comes to exchanging emails.
[+] [-] dang|4 years ago|reply
Climate activist arrested after ProtonMail provided his IP address - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28427259 - Sept 2021 (552 comments)
ProtonMail logged IP address of French activist after order by Swiss authorities - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28433131 - Sept 2021 (139 comments)
[+] [-] smnrchrds|4 years ago|reply
Their threat model and all threat scenarios should be front and centre on their front page and sign up page. That is if they care about user privacy not just the bottom line. They have a choice between better-informed customers or more money, and so far, they have chosen the latter.
What this and the new Apple debacle have proven to me is that privacy is not a product that can be purchased. If you want real privacy, you have spend a lot of time learning how to preserve your privacy. No matter what Apple and ProtonMail and similar companies tell you, you cannot buy privacy off-the-shelf.
[+] [-] simonh|4 years ago|reply
What you can buy is various degrees and quality of sensible defaults and behaviours that serve your general interest in privacy and security. Privacy from casual snooping or commercial tracking, security from unsophisticated attacks or even sophisticated attacks if you're wiling to also sacrifice some convenience.
These are all worth having, and your choices of product and service provider can have a significant impact on them. I know little to nothing about ProtonMail but maybe they're a better bet than many other similar services, even if they're not perfect.
[+] [-] ithkuil|4 years ago|reply
They do explain the threat model quite well but the information is scattered around (e.g. https://protonmail.com/blog/protonmail-threat-model/) and this matters in an era where the attention span of people is very short.
[+] [-] o8r3oFTZPE|4 years ago|reply
The cost is personal time and effort, not money. The software needed is generally free of charge. The goal being not a physical product or a service, but a level of knowledge and proficiency. To put it another way, "tech-savviness" cannot be purchased, it has to be achieved.
The cultural problem we face is that the so-called "0.1%" are leveraging their "tech-savviness" against the rest of the population, working for so-called "tech" companies, websites that make money by exploiting the privacy of the "99.9%" in the service of online advertising.
If we take HN comments as true, in some cases, these employees do not even believe in the bottom line they are working to support.1 They are not adopting the behaviour of the "99.9%", i.e., the "expected" behaviour required to sustain their employer's bottom line. Not sure about you, but that would not give me much confidence they are going to work very hard to protect other users' privacy.
The term "dogfooding" is sometimes used amongst tech companies to describe the situation where employees themselves partake in what they offer to non-employees, i.e., "users".2 To persons outside the tech bubble this can be quite amusing. Does this suggest they view their relationship to users as more like "human-to-dog" than "human-to-human". There is nothing inherently wrong with someone peddling something she does not believe in, however we might consider what is/are the reason(s) for her lack of faith.
To be clear, I am not suggesting the cultural problem can be solved. I am attempting to provide further reasons that digital privacy is, like the parent suggested, generally not something you can "buy".
1 Evidence appears periodically in HN comments. For example, yesterday: "Disclaimer: I work at Google. In cloud, not on Android. I am privacy conscious so I though I would give a try at Graphene OS, it was brutal."
2 The term is alleged to have first appeared one the joelonsoftware.com website and to have originated at Microsoft.
[+] [-] int_19h|4 years ago|reply
You can. It's just not that cheap, and not quite as convenient.
https://thehelm.com/
[+] [-] fsckboy|4 years ago|reply
I'm not saying "think of the children", I'm saying "think of law enforcement and the judicial system"
thinking about it now in retrospect, do you think that really could have been a possibility? I don't.
[+] [-] thpint|4 years ago|reply
You can’t have privacy; you need to be actively participating in our society or you’re dead. As soon as you try to build it you’ll realize it’s a full time job and you won’t be able to afford to eat on what it pays.
Only 5% of people in the US still hunt. We are coupled to the modern systems we have (unless MIT is right and it falls apart soon).
You want privacy, go off grid. Those of us living on grid will be sure to leave you be and keep everything we build for ourselves.
None of us explicitly cheered on the end of privacy but we did cheer on the engineering effort that made it happen. Despite numerous voices warning us.
Ciao.
[+] [-] istingray|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] flotzam|4 years ago|reply
1. It's impossible to create a paid account with cryptocurrency: You can only use it to pay for an existing account
2. It's impossible to anonymously create any account over Tor: You have to at least pass SMS / secondary email verification, and it better not be an easy to get address ("Email verification temporarily disabled for this email domain" etc.)
Lots of marketing and boxticking (.onion: check), but it looks curiously hostile to anonymity if you actually try to use it.
[+] [-] istingray|4 years ago|reply
Proton's first and last blog post about Tor was in 2017. [1]
The CEO today claimed to be a leader with Tor simply because they have a Tor site up.
This is 2021, not 2017. I expect better.
[1] https://protonmail.com/blog/tor-encrypted-email/
[+] [-] zarzavat|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] rogers18445|4 years ago|reply
This is false.
Each time you visit protonmail you re-download (cache can be invalidated) their client. It would be trivial for them to serve a specific user a modified client which uploads their encryption keys.
This problem is not specific to protonmail, any service which contends to be secure with respect to some server (the protocol relies on the client to decrypt stuff the server cannot) can be compromised this way because of implicit trust in the client software which can be modified at any time with no notice - making any auditing entirely meaningless in the case of targeted attacks.
This problem should perhaps be addressed by browsers since it seems they are becoming pseudo operating systems.
[+] [-] TacticalCoder|4 years ago|reply
Maybe what they mean is that the swiss authorities have no legal basis on which to force them to serve a modified, backdoored, client like the one you're talking about.
[+] [-] ignoramous|4 years ago|reply
[0] https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients
[1] https://github.com/cs01/termpair/#static-hosting
[+] [-] wizzwizz4|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] kijin|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] aero-glide2|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] 3np|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] vmoore|4 years ago|reply
What about their app? They'd have to push a malicious update through the Play Store or Apple's Store to target someone, which is very unlikely.
[+] [-] unknown|4 years ago|reply
[deleted]
[+] [-] potatoeater515|4 years ago|reply
As the manager of various accounts used by environmental and social activists on Protonmail, this is really bad.
I understand they have to follow Swiss law, but surely there are higher standard and processes than: police forward foreign request. Don't challenge or question, just do task required.
Interpol requests are not as universally recognized as what some people here are alluding to. Countries can file these requests with interpol but it's up each country to determine if they act or recognize the request.
If the Chinese government files 500 requests via interpol and the swiss police merely pass them on the proton, will proton mail automatically comply and install malware on their client on targeted accounts?
I hope this is not the case but I expect this to be clarified. On th face of it, organizing an occupy protest hardly seems to pas the bar of "serious criminal cases"
[+] [-] windthrown|4 years ago|reply
I'm not saying Swiss laws are infallible but this request was not simply "forwarded": "Swiss authorities will only approve requests which meet Swiss legal standards (the only law that matters is Swiss law)"
As they mentioned in the blog post, they do challenge many of these requests but it was not legally possible in this case.
[+] [-] malka|4 years ago|reply
If I were an environmental activist, I would definitely step up my operational security.
[+] [-] basedrum|4 years ago|reply
I have been a riseup user for years. They have received foreign legal requests, and they do not simply do the task requested. They've also received US-based legal requests, and challenge them, but in the end, they do not have the data that is being requested, so ultimately they can respond saying exactly that.
(throwaway aswell)
[+] [-] pyuser583|4 years ago|reply
If the Chinese government files a request by means of Interpol, it’s very dishonest to say “an Interpol request.” It’s a Chinese request.
[+] [-] cybrox|4 years ago|reply
There are, which they specifically described.
This also goes for your second described case. The chinese government is only one of the two required.
[+] [-] cocoggu|4 years ago|reply
But usually interpol rejects many requests from the Chinese government (to track uyghurs for example).
The real scandal here is why the French authority is making such request on an activist, why Interpol processed it (as far as I understand there are no crimes in play here?), and why the Swiss authority recognizes the request? Perhaps we don't have the full story, but, with only the information we have, it sounds like an abuse of the protocol on 3 different entities. And double standards from Interpol (not okay to track down chinese activists, but ok for french activists?)
[+] [-] avodonosov|4 years ago|reply
Climate is fashionable and respected today, they would got medals maybe if not hiding?
I can openly say that I am for good climate and ecology. Greta Thunberg is also not hiding.
And about this specific activist, do you know what he is accused of? (It must be something other than activism, right? Difficult to imagine climate activism is illegal in France).
PS: I understand this topic is mostly about Proton failing the privacy expectations, but curious to know what can activist be charged with.
[+] [-] belorn|4 years ago|reply
If that qualify as serious crime is still up to debate and it could just be a excuse to go after the organizers. I do however find the case a bit more nuanced after reading those details.
[+] [-] willis936|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] tlogan|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] janmo|4 years ago|reply
It's in french but here is a summary: Law enforcement contacted Protonmail directly and the company told them to use the "Europol channel", which law enforcement did.
Protonmail then provided the date when the account was created, the IP address (Not clear if it is the one when it was created or last login) and the "device", I suppose they are talking about the user agents.
Please keep in mind that companies can charge processing fees on law enforcement requests. I would really like to know if ProtonMail is earning money on this.
[+] [-] kodah|4 years ago|reply
> For the past year, a group of people have taken over a handful of commercial premises and apartments near Place Sainte Marthe in Paris. They want to fight against gentrification, real estate speculation, Airbnb and high-end restaurants. While it started as a local conflict, it quickly became a symbolic campaign. They attracted newspaper headlines when they started occupying premises rented by Le Petit Cambodge — a restaurant that was targeted by the November 13th, 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.
[+] [-] snakeboy|4 years ago|reply
[0] https://paris-luttes.info/recit-policier-de-sainte-marthe-15...
[+] [-] yjftsjthsd-h|4 years ago|reply
> ProtonMail does not give data to foreign governments; that’s illegal under Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal code. We only comply with legally binding orders from Swiss authorities.
But the arrest was by the French police. So the Swiss government used a warrant to get info from PM and then passed it to France because the charges passed muster under Swiss law ("Swiss authorities will only approve requests which meet Swiss legal standards (the only law that matters is Swiss law)")?
[+] [-] kazen44|4 years ago|reply
cross border criminal investigation and police cooperation is very common in Europe, and fully within swiss law.
[+] [-] indymike|4 years ago|reply
At some point everything on the internet becomes local, because people and businesses eventually must exist at a location in the real world. Proton is always going to be subject to local law enforcement wherever they are based.
[+] [-] istingray|4 years ago|reply
This is a weak response. "What we're changing" isn't specific. It's a "our shit doesn't stink" kind of reply.
"What we're changing" should be far more specific. Start educating users about Tor on your homepage.
Start blogging about Tor more than once in 2017. Have a score for how many users log in through Tor. Have a score for how many times your privacy policy is loaded.
Stop claiming to be the best simply because you have a Tor site with an old version of your app. That's not good enough.
I'm looking for leadership. Protonmail is clearly an "explainer" more than a leader. I'll keep my eyes peeled for whoever comes along to replace them.
[+] [-] forix|4 years ago|reply
[0] https://ctemplar.com/how-ctemplar-over-tor-makes-your-email-...
[1] https://ctemplar.com/email-comparison-table/
[+] [-] MitchellCash|4 years ago|reply
They’re not explicit with regards to the activist, this would mean the activist was notified upon ProtonMail receiving the request?
I’m not sure there’s much you can do but lawyer up if you receive such a notice, but potentially the activist could have immediately started using Tor (maybe too late though, because to read the notice they might have already leaked their IP).
[+] [-] YLYvYkHeB2NRNT|4 years ago|reply
Very classy post. To-the-point. There are limitations with digital services.
If you don't like what happened, you need to change things. They only way to change things is to change the law. This begins with voting.
[+] [-] bluelu|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] COGlory|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] rinron|4 years ago|reply
the only way for an entity to never comply with government orders and continue to function is to remain anonymous and their servers accessible only via temporary addresses or tor since static ip's and domains can be taken away. Making it impossible for receiving email and more effort than the average person would want to access. It then becomes a catch 22 as you cant fully trust an anonymous, transient entity since their motivation can never be verified(they could be a honey trap), they can rarely be held accountable if they betray you, and they could be replaced or compelled to comply without anyone knowing(someone part of a visible physical social network could have friends put out a warning if something suspicious happened to them).
What it comes down to is what we already know. they only way to be sure your email provider wont hand over your emails is to run your own email server anonymously. For anyone who cant do that protonmail is still likely the best choice even if its imperfect. plus adding whatever other layers of protection on top you are capable of.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit
[+] [-] kdunglas|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] avodonosov|4 years ago|reply
[+] [-] o8r3oFTZPE|4 years ago|reply
It seems prudent that Proton customers would want to have a look at those "Swiss laws" (a) to see what sort of protection they offer and (b) to make sure they dont violate one. In the case of (b) the customer will potentially lose all privacy protections, as emphasized in this announcement.
1 It appears that Swiss law is conveniently published in English however the English translation is not what Swiss courts use.
[+] [-] TwinProduction|4 years ago|reply
I'm seeing a lot of people here that are surprised by the fact that even a company who has privacy as their main marketing point has to deal with compliance, but really, unless you host your own mail server, you just can't guarantee your own privacy.
I don't generally advise hosting your own mail server due to all the troubles that come with it, but this is really one of the only ways I can think of where you can achieve a decent enough level of control when it comes to exchanging emails.
[+] [-] un_montagnard|4 years ago|reply