[BjornW]

A WordPress plugin may contain hundreds of interdependent npm packages all neatly bundled and minified. Without access to a package.json or package-lock.json it is quite hard to find out which individual packages have been used. Quite often there is also no public repo available of the development files.

To give an example of my process thus far:

Someone in my team wants to see if we can use plugin X. I’m downloading the plugin to have a look at the code. Luckily this plugin has included a non-minified version of the js file. I can derive the use of npm packages from this file. Using Snyk I have a look at the first package mentioned. It’s axios. The included version is vulnerable (high & medium severity) and has been for almost a year (Note: the last version of the plugin is 3 months old and does not exclude this vulnerable version in it’s package.json which I found in a Github repo later on).

Since I have no package.json nor package-lock.json (all I have is the distributed build) I can’t easily update the npm package. I have no clue as to how this package relates to the other packages and how their version might depend on each other. Even if I would update the package, all other users of this plugin are still vulnerable. I contacted the plugin author. He tells me he will update the plugin as soon as possible. The plugin is (as of today) still not updated & has not released a new version. In the meantime there have been two new versions of the axios package released.

Every user of plugin X is still vulnerable to the issues mentioned on Snyk, but is this a real problem in this specific WordPress plugin context? I’m not sure how to interpret the high & medium severity in the context of this plugin. How exploitable are these issues & what is the impact of the exploits in the context of this plugin? Do I need to be a logged in user? Is this something which can be triggered by any visitor? What am I able to do when I can exploit these vulnerabilities? I can only try to find answers to these questions if I’m willing to invest a lot more time into this, which more or less beats the purpose of using a ‘ready-made’ WordPress plugin. And this is just one package of multiple npm packages used in this plugin. Packages which also have their own dependencies as well….

At this moment I’m wondering if any WordPress plugin using npm packages can be trusted at all.

ps: The way the npm ecosystem is structured is, in my view at least, problematic. Often packages are not like libraries as I’d expect, but look more like a function call or method call. I’d prefer to write these short pieces of code myself instead of depending on external code which also includes extra risks. The very rapid release schedules makes it even harder to trust external software (like a WordPress plugin) using npm packages as it seems they cannot keep up with it.

I’m sorry if this seems like a npm rant, but I’m seriously looking for methods on how to deal with these issues so we can use external software (like WordPress plugins) built with npm packages.

[TekMol]

My first question here would be: What is the attack vector you are worried about? If your wordpress instance is taken over, what is the problem? That the intruder gains access to data they should not have? Or that they will use your machine in some way that would harm you?

[BjornW]

There are multiple attack vectors I can think of, although most can be mitigated using other security measures. I don't want to rely on audits only off course. To give you an example: using the WordPress environment as a stepping stone to gain more access, running client-side software without out permission (stealing data from visitors, our resources e.g. crypto miners), defacement/fake-news, etc.

[andris9]

npm with wordpress usually means front-end code, so one possible issue is attackers sneaking in stuff like credit card number stealing scripts etc. So it is more like protecting end users and less protecting the server/system.