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TTPrograms | 4 years ago
The strongest point here is the strawman presentation of the altered security model that PoS can be proven to form consensus under. Reading the source he cites is far more informative: https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/11/25/proof-stake-learned-lov...
The majority of the article frames distributed consensus mechanisms in an extremely sophomoric understanding of asset value and the PoW security model. All of these topics (including valid ETH criticisms) are discussed in much better ways in many other places.
thruway516|4 years ago
This is one of those sentences that reads like it is saying a lot but might actually be nonsensical. Care to elaborate on this? i.e how exactly does the article 'frames distributed consensus mechanisms in an understanding of asset value'.
I read the article and I didn't see anything about asset value (whatever that is). As far as I can tell they point out that the article you cited pretty much agrees with what they're saying (about PoS by itself not being self-certifiable or irreversible) but disagree with the position that this can be acceptable in the real world. Whether you agree with that is subjective but the main criticism in the article seems to be directed at those who selling PoS as a sufficient distributed consensus algorithm to replace of PoW. There are blockchain projects raising literally Billions of dollars on this false guarantee so it is valid to criticize them.
TTPrograms|4 years ago
In relation to that I was specifically referring to the misunderstandings present in "Nothing at stake".
You say:
"There are blockchain projects raising literally Billions of dollars on this false guarantee so it is valid to criticize them."
Are you not presupposing the correctness of the author's argument by calling it false? Have you already made up your mind?
betwixthewires|4 years ago
I spent a lot of time talking about this topic with people. The article does have a point, that the security model of proof of stake is fundamentally different and relies on a key assumption (from the article you linked):
> any new node coming onto the network with no knowledge except... the set of all blocks and other "important" messages that have been published...
This is referenced in the OP as a point of security failure. The assumption is that we can rely on social interactions between nodes and that that is good enough. The criticism is that a new node can have no way of definitively knowing that their copy of the chain is the widely used canonical chain. An eclipse attack can occur, or as the OP stated new nodes may need to rely on authoritative sources to get current state which puts centralized power centers in the security model.
It is not a deal breaker (IMO), remember, PoW relies on the security assumption that it is prohibitively difficult for more than half the network to collude. I'd argue these assumptions are equally tenuous. I think as long as disparate, non colluding sources of the canonical chain are available (arguable if this is foregone, seeing as we need PoW to ensure consensus and resistance to collusion, probably not, but all it takes is one person to not collude and contention exists) it wouldn't be a problem.
Another big sticking point is the fact that no external resources must be invested, and/or that there is no ongoing cost. I find this to be the big problem with PoS schemes, I've had quite a number of discussions focused on these two particular issues (stemming from the same fundamental difference, that an internal capital stake is made) and I see benefits of not having ongoing cost and benefits of having it, and also of having a fully self contained system as well as having a system grounded in the outside world. All in all I have come to the conclusion that these differences make neither better nor worse, but that they are simply two completely different game theoretical environments with different security and incentive properties.
TTPrograms|4 years ago
In practice social networks form a cornerstone of all of the unstated assumption of all consensus mechanisms. I'm more worried about supply chain compromise in wallet code than I am about an eclipse attack on a new node. At that point we know our models are too simple to make real world security comparisons.
reginold|4 years ago
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jeron|4 years ago