[jfr]

Wrong.

The OpenSSH model implies that you check the fingerprint of the public key before you send encrypted data using that key. That is why SSH shows you the fingerprint of the server key when you first connect, and you have to answer "yes" in order to accept the key and add it to your keyring. You are supposed to have talked to the person managing the system and that person should have given you the fingerprint of the key.

It is virtually impossible for the ISP to intercept and sniff the stream without changing the fingerprint.

The user still has to trust its SSH client.

[tptacek]

"Wrong! Random people will totally verify key fingerprints when they're logging into Google Mail at Starbucks! After all, that's what every sysadmin does with SSH, right!"

[jfr]

gmaslov is clearly talking about the OpenSSH trust model. You are confusing it with the Trust On First Use model, which is not the same thing.