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PhantomGremlin | 4 years ago
The security wouldn't need to be perfect. Even something simple would be sufficient to deter an unscrupulous reseller.
PhantomGremlin | 4 years ago
The security wouldn't need to be perfect. Even something simple would be sufficient to deter an unscrupulous reseller.
genmud|4 years ago
If I were concerned about counterfeit things, in an application like this, you would pre program each one with a unique key and everything would be tied to it. Firmware upgrades need to be validated, to download, you would need the key, run the software, key needs to sign something back… etc.
https://www.microchip.com/en-us/product/ATSHA204A
myself248|4 years ago
But the original would have to see it coming and put this in the design, AND maintain a registry of all the valid chip serials. No hobbyist wants that headache.
triactual|4 years ago
Since the key is unique to the device, it can easily be disavowed in the central database if a device does become compromised. Anything less than this is probably a few hours from being completely broken. And this scheme can be broken by non-state actors, especially if the private key storage is naively or poorly implemented. Many MCUs have multiple levels of readout protection and it can be easy to misconfigure. A single mistake in memory mapping could expose information on external interfaces. And then you’re trying to do all of this in China, on the cheap. Pack a lunch.
andi999|4 years ago
buescher|4 years ago
R0b0t1|4 years ago
With the customer as a willing participant such things are hard to subvert.
GrumpyYoungMan|4 years ago
rsaxvc|4 years ago
If you had such a chip, who would check it for authenticity? That check would need to be well secured, so likely not the ARM firmware on the nanovna itself.
Possibly not nanoVNA-saver: the unscrupulous supplier might just include an unlabeled CDR with patched software.
R0b0t1|4 years ago