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kafkaIncarnate | 4 years ago
'''
https://www.okta.com/blog/2022/03/updated-okta-statement-on-...
I do enjoy the lies given by Okta.
1. We didn't compromise any laptop? It was a thin client.
2. "Okta detected an unsuccessful attempt to compromise the account of a customer support engineer working for a third-party provider." - I'm STILL unsure how its a unsuccessful attempt? Logged in to superuser portal with the ability to reset the Password and MFA of ~95% of clients isn't successful?
4. For a company that supports Zero-Trust. Support Engineers seem to have excessive access to Slack? 8.6k channels? (You may want to search AKIA* on your Slack, rather a bad security practice to store AWS keys in Slack channels )
5. Support engineers are also able to facilitate the resetting of passwords and MFA factors for users, but are unable to obtain those passwords. - Uhm? I hope no-one can read passwords? not just support engineers, LOL. - are you implying passwords are stored in plaintext?
6. You claim a laptop was compromised? In that case what suspicious IP addresses do you have available to report?
7. The potential impact to Okta customers is NOT limited, I'm pretty certain resetting passwords and MFA would result in complete compromise of many clients systems.
8. If you are committed to transparency how about you hire a firm such as Mandiant and PUBLISH their report? I'm sure it would be very different to your report :)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ https://www.okta.com/sites/default/files/2021-12/okta-securi...
21. Security Breach Management. a) Notification: In the event of a Security Breach, Okta notifies impacted customers of such Security Breach. Okta cooperates with an impacted customer’s reasonable request for information regarding such Security Breach, and Okta provides regular updates on any such Security Breach and the investigative action and corrective action(s) taken. -
But customers only found out today? Why wait this long?
9. Access Controls. Okta has in place policies, procedures, and logical controls that are designed:
b. Controls to ensure that all Okta personnel who are granted access to any Customer Data are based on leastprivilege principles;
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
1. Security Standards. Okta’s ISMP includes adherence to and regular testing of the key controls, systems and procedures of its ISMP to validate that they are properly implemented and effective in addressing the threats and risks identified. Such testing includes: a) Internal risk assessments; b) ISO 27001, 27002, 27017 and 27018 certifications; c) NIST guidance; and d) SOC2 Type II (or successor standard) audits annually performed by accredited third-party auditors (“Audit Report”).
I don't think storing AWS keys within Slack would comply to any of these standards?
'''
dhx|4 years ago
- Getting access to a list of accounts (and by extension any new accounts) of an organisation. This would perhaps allow an attacker to beat a new employee through the enrollment process if the attacker were to find out that all new employees get their temporary password set as P@S$w0rd until they enroll for the first time and are required to set a real password. Alternatively, social engineering attacks would be made easier to attempt contact with new employees directly to "help" them with onboarding ("Employee: Why does my MFA token keep resetting? Attacker: You didn't know that you have to first register it at company.oktamfa.com/register?").
- Resetting MFA for a user so that the attacker could then login to an organisation's user account they already know the password for (from other sources assuming password reuse), re-enrolling MFA in the process and therefore effectively bypassing MFA.
- Sending a reset password link via e-mail to a user. The user would be able to continue logging in with their credentials so it does not appear this would cause a denial of service opportunity [1] [2]. For more sophisticated attackers (states) perhaps this is also an opportunity to capture the cleartext reset URL token to gain access to the account if the attacker has access tot he network path the e-mail is sent over.
- Resetting a user password to a temporary one that is e-mailed to the user in plaintext. Would create an annoyance to users in that their current credentials would stop working all of a sudden and they'd have to check their e-mail for the temporary password to use and reset their account [1] [2]. Despite [2] indicating that temporary passwords can be viewed by an administrator of an organisation setting a temporary password, the statement at [3] indicates Okta staff are not able to view the temporary passwords generated and can only send them via e-mail to the user. This is a potential temporary denial of service (lower impact) or for more sophisticated attackers (states) perhaps an opportunity to capture the cleartext password via e-mail if they have access to the network path the e-mail is sent over.
- Getting and elevating access to other internal systems via information mistakenly published for internal Okta employees in Jira or Slack.
- Being able to find and exploit a vulnerability in the administration/superuser systems, Jira, Slack or other internal systems used by Okta to gain greater access.
If LAPSUS$ had already gained some of these higher levels of access, it appears they would have already revealed it.
[1] https://help.okta.com/en/prod/Content/Topics/users-groups-pr...
[2] https://help.okta.com/en/prod/Content/Topics/users-groups-pr...
[3] https://www.okta.com/blog/2022/03/updated-okta-statement-on-...