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randomsilence | 3 years ago
If you have a one-time password, worse case is that some man in the middle gets that password.
If you engage in a proof of private key ownership for your login, a man in the middle can use that exchange to log into another server that has the same public key.
tptacek|3 years ago
Second, an attacker targeting your keypair-backed SSH session on an insecure first-use gets your session; against a password, they get your password, which is strictly worse.
It's not my claim that keypairs neatly solve the first-use problem with SSH (though: that problem can be solved, with more keypairs). It's that keys are categorically better than passwords. Which, of course, they are.
The alarming thing about this thread is that there's a couple people here that clearly seem to believe logging in with a password to a "new" SSH server is safe. It's literally the basis for the "Wall of Sheep" at hacker conferences; they were doing it at Usenix when I was there in 1998.
heinrich5991|3 years ago
No, this is not true. The proof of private key ownership is bound to that specific SSH session (identified by some shared secret established via DH). This means the attackers options are: MITM the DH: Then your authentication won't work against any server. Don't MITM the DH but forward your authentication to the wrong server: Then you're on the wrong server (you might not notice), but the attacker cannot look into your session or modify anything.
remram|3 years ago
Yes, it is still not perfect, but here's the advantage.