What’s is the supposed business case for sharing raw, unmodified 42Mpix photos?
And if they are still modified later on, and perhaps re-signed, that’s where I would attack.
I would assume they can sign both RAWs and JPEGs. I can imagine a hardened coprocessor that can sign things coming from the sensor and image processor, so you get signed RAW and/or JPEG and you can't extract the private keys. Any modification later on means it's no longer signed. Unless I'm missing something, this is pretty good until someone extracts or leaks the private keys. Maybe they came up with something much smarter :)
> What’s is the supposed business case for sharing raw, unmodified 42Mpix photos?
TFA (TFPR?) answers this.
"This technology is particularly applicable for passports and ID verification but goes further in tackling image manipulation in the media, medical and law enforcement fields. For the insurance and construction sectors, this technology will offer a secure foundation for inspection and recording of damage."
> And if they are still modified later on, and perhaps re-signed, that’s where I would attack.
Even so, the existence of an original capture makes post-capture attacks useless. An effective attack will modify the image before it's signed.
Well first you offer signed downsizing software that only runs on windows 11 with verified boot, then after a few more steps the only way to print (on the printer you purchased but also pay for ink and a monthly subscription service) or share the photo is via sony's $19.99/mo photo software or a subscription to lightroom.
If they did things correctly (and I assume a company like Sony did) then each camera will have its own signed certificates attributed to it. Yes you can sign fake pictures, but the signature won't be from the same camera, which is a pretty good mitigation against this.
karamanolev|3 years ago
CharlesW|3 years ago
TFA (TFPR?) answers this.
"This technology is particularly applicable for passports and ID verification but goes further in tackling image manipulation in the media, medical and law enforcement fields. For the insurance and construction sectors, this technology will offer a secure foundation for inspection and recording of damage."
> And if they are still modified later on, and perhaps re-signed, that’s where I would attack.
Even so, the existence of an original capture makes post-capture attacks useless. An effective attack will modify the image before it's signed.
Schroedingersat|3 years ago
TeeMassive|3 years ago
Schroedingersat|3 years ago
gjvnq|3 years ago