Show HN: Chitchatter – P2P chat app that is serverless, decentralized, ephemeral
191 points| jckahn | 3 years ago |chitchatter.im | reply
Chitchatter is very much an early MVP, so I'd like to get your feedback. Thanks for looking!
191 points| jckahn | 3 years ago |chitchatter.im | reply
Chitchatter is very much an early MVP, so I'd like to get your feedback. Thanks for looking!
[+] [-] adg001|3 years ago|reply
Anyone with knowledge of the room UUID can listen to the conversation, even though the presence of the eavesdropper may (or may not) show up in the connected peers' counter. It is of essence to share such UUIDs over a secure channel, or the communication security will be compromised trivially.
It is mentioned in the README the relevance of government level threat actors and email, SMS, Discord, among the possible mediums over which the UUIDs can be shared. Of course this leaves Chitchatter open to be attacked by governments and network operators, who do have access to the phone network(s), email servers, and other platforms involved. It would be best to prefer other out-of-bound channels, or come up with one-time UUIDs generators able to resynchronise and shared among the peers.
[+] [-] jckahn|3 years ago|reply
> Anyone with knowledge of the room UUID can listen to the conversation, even though the presence of the eavesdropper may (or may not) show up in the connected peers' counter.
Though much of Chitchatter's security model is based on security by obscurity, I don't know that peers would be able to connect without room participants being notified. Is there a scenario you have in mind where a peer would be able to connect and intercept messages without the peer counter incrementing?
[+] [-] feb|3 years ago|reply
In addition, the README says one can audit the full code and the assets used. For example, it suggests to audit the gh-pages branch for the static assets. But when hosting with github, that branch could change at any time and deliver non-audited content. Powerful attackers like government could do it easily, and less powerful ones too.
[+] [-] DreamFlasher|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ajconway|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] TheJoeMan|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] kornhole|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] x-complexity|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] chriscjcj|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] laserfly|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] jckahn|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ackbar03|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] gfodor|3 years ago|reply
https://github.com/gfodor/p2pcf
[+] [-] Sophira|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] bilekas|3 years ago|reply
I'm not sure what the point might be in that case.
Or is it a cloudflare service based websocket service?
I'll check it out when I have a chance at Which point I'll probably have some more dumb questions!
[+] [-] jckahn|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] deepstack|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] earnesti|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] cjtrowbridge|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] jckahn|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] rendaw|3 years ago|reply
The Tox website doesn't say anything about the architecture, neither does Wikipedia. Apparently it's a library implemented in C and everyone's expected to use that. The Wikipedia reference links are dead, the only 3rd party implementation says "On hold until Tox gets proper docs."
[+] [-] e12e|3 years ago|reply
And if you trust github/Microsoft to not play games on what is delivered to you (say, because someone backed by the patriot act asked them to).
[+] [-] snewhacker|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] jstanley|3 years ago|reply
For an alternative (but sadly barely-used) chat protocol that does use Tor, see Ricochet: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ricochet_(software)
[+] [-] jckahn|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] timbit42|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] porcc|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] blamestross|3 years ago|reply
The short of it is, sending secure messages without anonymity is pretty well solved, and while DHTs/webtorrent will buy you some obscurity, it can't solve any anonymity problems at scale.
[+] [-] jckahn|3 years ago|reply
Additionally, a core feature of Chitchatter is that all communication is ephemeral and not persisted to disk, ever. Even if peers are identified, there would be no record of what communication took place. Do you think that should sufficiently protect users?
[+] [-] saimiam|3 years ago|reply
When I sent a message from the second browser, it didn’t get delivered to anyone, and the first room showed a message saying “someone has left the room”.
Looks like your message identity is driven off ip or something unique to the device rather than browser.
[+] [-] djbusby|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] altilunium|3 years ago|reply
Anyone can self-host it on free replit instance.
[+] [-] nl|3 years ago|reply
Make it clear you can use markdown
Have a max size of message (noting that MD can make short messages take a lot of space)
Allow rooms to have names
QR Code to link to room
[+] [-] jckahn|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] can16358p|3 years ago|reply
Why does it have the feeling of something being designed by Google?
[+] [-] onion2k|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] wgx|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] o_m|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] anon115|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] DeathArrow|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] deknos|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] anon115|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] geysersam|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] SquidJack|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] peddling-brink|3 years ago|reply
There are significant downsides to this plan depending on your threat model.
[+] [-] unknown|3 years ago|reply
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[+] [-] unknown|3 years ago|reply
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