I got my PPL in EU and here it was drilled into me that in Europe there can be exactly ONE plane cleared to use a runway at any time.
When the approaching plane is cleared then there is no allowance for anyone and anything to be on the runway.
So if there is a departing plane waiting on the runway or someone crossing then the approaching plane is given "cleared approach runway 08" but never "cleared to land". Which also means that if you are piloting the landing plane then at your decision height you have to go around.
Also when someone is cleared to land no-one can be given a permission to enter the runway.
There is one clearance that kinda-sorta allows which is "BEHIND landing Boeing 737, line up and wait BEHIND". It intentionally has "BEHIND" before and after the call to be extra clear that the waiting pilot has to confirm that the plane has passed their nose and they can enter the runway while the landing plane is on rollout. But that plane can not be given a takeoff clearance before the plane on the rollout has exited the runway.
We were told that the americans do it differently and I've always found it dangerous.
Europe uses pessimistic runway locks but the US prefers optimistic locks. This improves throughput at US airports with the risk of a rollback on a dirty runway.
Not only can multiple planes be cleared to use a runway: one to depart, one to land in this example, cleared to land in a sequence, but also:
Multiple landing planes are allowed on the same runway surface at the same time in the daytime as in Oshkosh arrivals, but also a Category I (light single) can be cleared to land if the Category I or II aircraft to follow will be 3000 feet from the threshold, a Cat II (light twin) behind a I or II with 4500 feet of separation.
I was wondering if maybe the long-term change from all this was going to be that two clearances can't be issued without visual/instrument confirmation from the tower of execution of movements. Sort of an IFR/VFR rules for tower operations.
Given how advanced ILS is nowadays you could probably automate all of this - if the plane taking off isn't committed to takeoff (traveling at V1) by the time the landing aircraft reaches decision altitude, an automatic go-around is issued. Basically treat the runway as a "control zone" like trains do, and if the plane on the runway hasn't "cleared the zone" (by whatever definition) then the landing aircraft can't enter the zone.
Certainly that's something that could be conveyed as part of the ILS data at least. Maybe it's undesirable to automate it in the sense of the automation causing more problems (more aborts = more chances for something to go wrong, although the assertion is that by V1 you're committed and by decision altitude you can still abort safely, so this all fits inside the "theory of movements") but you can at least let the landing plane know at decision altitude that there's an aircraft still on the runway. Sort of a "green = runway clear, yellow = committed traffic, yellow bars = moving but uncommitted traffic, red = runway occupied/clearance not granted" type indicator perhaps.
Or maybe if the tower can't visually/instrument confirm execution of movements, the pilot on takeoff has to verbally confirm commit before the landing clearance can be granted. Then it just becomes something specific to zero-visibility operations.
It really seems like there should be some change in how movements are handled/clearances are issued. Maybe we don't need to go to full "one clearance at a time" all the time, but it certainly seems like there should be some tighter rules if the tower can't independently confirm movements are being executed, and perhaps convey that information to the pilot as well (although again, I know that pilots are already information-overloaded, but "is there someone on my runway" is seemingly pretty important and straightforward info).
> So if there is a departing plane waiting on the runway or someone crossing then the approaching plane is given "cleared approach runway 08" but never "cleared to land". Which also means that if you are piloting the landing plane then at your decision height you have to go around.
My understanding was that the word "cleared" was to be avoided when you aren't actually cleared to land/take off, and the correct wording was now "continue approach runway 08".
There has been a decent amount of study of the cognitive interpretation of exact wordings, resulting in a standardised phrasing that avoids misinterpretation. It's a good thing. Using the word "cleared" could easily cause a lazy/tired/overloaded pilot over a noisy channel to think they are cleared to land.
> I got my PPL in EU and here it was drilled into me that in Europe there can be exactly ONE plane cleared to use a runway at any time.
* ONE vehicle of any kind!
You can't use the runway because there's a bloody great Volvo in the middle of it, because I put the bloody great Volvo there, because I'm picking up bits of the last guy's wheel spat that fell off, because I don't want to have to write a long long tale about how your prop got chipped.
It seems that the US also has different rules about Low Visibility Procedures / protection of the ILS sensitive area; I don't believe you'd clear anyone for takeoff with someone on a 2-3 mile final, under LVPs.
Interestingly, in the US, for all its "optimistic" procedures, a controller isn't allowed to issue a conditional ("behind X") line-up-and-wait.
But, if an arriving aircraft is still on the runway, a controller can clear a departing aircraft for takeoff if there will be adequate separation when the departing aircraft starts takeoff roll (i.e., the arriving aircraft will be clear of the runway at that point).
> So if there is a departing plane waiting on the runway or someone crossing then the approaching plane is given "cleared approach runway 08" but never "cleared to land".
In ICAO phraseology, "cleared to land runway 08" is allowed. Further:
> If the runway is obstructed when the aircraft reports ‘final’, but it is expected to be available in good time for the aircraft to make a safe landing, the controller will delay landing clearance by issuing an instruction to ‘continue approach’.
Just to give a little context as a pilot: It is the job of the tower controller to decide who uses the runway when. There are often multiple planes waiting to take off, and multiple planes nearing the airport to land. It's not uncommon for a tower controller to allow a plane to takeoff while another is approaching the runway. The theory is, of course, that the flight will depart in plenty of time.
In this case, the controller failed to tell the departing flight to hurry (the references to 'no delay' or 'immediate' in the blog post), AND frankly timed things pretty close given the weather. Without the ability to actually see the approaching plane, or perhaps even the plane on the ground, it will probably be found that timing a departure that close at all was reckless. That said, I feel for these tower controllers, it's not common for many planes to get stacked up waiting to depart, and it is their job to get them out. What may have worked just fine on a clear-weather day simply became too dangerous on that day.
The official manual for air traffic controllers in the US is the FAA Order JO 7110.65W [1], if anyone cares to review it.
Reminds me of a time in 1999 when a US Air crew at Rhode Island refused to takeoff in the fog when the controller insisted it was okay. Another aircraft had landed and was lost in the fog about their location, even saying they were on on an active runway and even said an aircraft just took off (over them).
Animation + text here if curious:
https://youtu.be/qUDFY5qlTSA
So I am neither a pilot nor an aviation geek, but to me it looks like, besides heavy fog, two things happened. (1) control misjudged the approach time for FedEx. 3 miles out is - what? - a minute and a half, at best at approach speed? (2) control did not expedite a takeoff for southwest so they took their sweet time rolling onto the runway and accelerating.
At this day and age it is bewildering to see all of this running on human communication essentially. Why cannot descending plane lay a claim on a runway in some computer system and a cabin in Southwest - blare a horn for pilots trying to steer into a claimed runway?
That's called Runway Status Lights, controlled by an Autonomous Runway Incursion System [1]. The busiest US airports have that, but Austin doesn't have one.[1][2]
So the tower controllers had responsibility for separation. Here are the current FAA rules on separation between departing and arriving aircraft using the same runway. See section 3-1-3 of [3].
This is the rule: "Separate an arriving aircraft from another aircraft using the same runway by ensuring that the arriving aircraft does not cross the landing threshold until one of the following conditions exists .... The other aircraft has departed and crossed the runway end or turned to avert any conflict. If you can determine distances by reference to suitable landmarks, the other aircraft needs only be airborne if the following minimum distance exists between aircraft: ...when either is a Category III aircraft- 6,000 feet."
The trouble is, the controller can apparently say "Cleared to land" when they expect that departing aircraft will be airborne and at least 6,000 feet down the runway, and thus out of the way, before the incoming aircraft crosses the landing threshold. Not when it actually is in the air and out of the conflict zone. Or at least in this case, the controller did. This is apparently called "reduced runway separation". The intent is to increase traffic capacity.
But this was in fog. Tower probably could not see the departing aircraft, and they did not apparently have a sensor system to compensate for that.
One issue with that is that "aviation" includes a lot more than commercial airliners - it also includes inexpensive, Spartan general aviation aircraft. The cost of such a system would be prohibitive.
Just look at the rollout for ADS-B In/Out if you're curious how difficult that might be to implement.
Because adding more technology doesn’t always makes things work better. I like this idea but the problem is you’ve just added another point of failure.
Sure it may avoid this situation, but how many aircraft lifted off and landed at airports in the same day? In America I’d hazard a guess at aground the tens of thousands. Any new system has to reduce the complexity or risks of flying and that’s very hard to do.
I’m not an aviation expert either but it’s assume that some form of system exists for this also in a more manual form.
The Southwest crew here is also to blame, they knew a plane was on short final to their runway in terrible visibility and for some reason took their sweet time taking off.
> Why cannot descending plane lay a claim on a runway in some computer system and a cabin in Southwest - blare a horn for pilots trying to steer into a claimed runway?
Because you have unions protecting the manual, error-prone job of human operators.
> Why the Austin airport situation was so dangerous.
Because the planes almost collided. But the author wants to say more than that. The article covers the “how” things went wrong by analyzing the transcript. The write-up doesn’t answer the key ”why” question —- why are existing procedures and training not suitable?
Safety-critical systems (including procedures and protocols) must be designed to account for wide human variation, including mistakes and miscommunications. Let’s not waste our time pointing fingers at one person.
The author didn't point fingers at anyone. He was explicit that the investigators will do the job of finding out the "why". His tone is entirely appropriate given that, if the FedEx operators had not went above and beyond, we would have seen a mass casualty event at Austin's airport.
Accusing the author of blaming individuals is rather silly when you're rushing to blame training/procedures/the system.
Man the FedEx crew who gave the "Southwest Abort" call on the radio earned their wings that day. Just amazing presence of mind to do exactly the right thing in the moment.
It was a good thing to try, but the Southwest plane was above V1 (edit: may not have been, but acted as if they were) and couldn't abort, and didn't. Both planes climbed away from the runway with minimal clearance between them. It was simply luck that they didn't crash anyway.
The fast reaction by the Fedex pilots may have contributed to increased distance between the planes that saved them, but their callout to the Southwest flight didn't fundamentally change anything. Maybe we'll find out that the Southwest flight climbed slower, suspecting the Fedex plane was directly over them. In that case maybe the callout in addition to the Fedex crew being attentive saved the day, but I haven't seen anyone claim that yet.
If the Southwest crew had realized how close the Fedex plane was, maybe they would have aborted even if it meant running off the end of the runway, but they didn't do that.
I'm not sure anymore, given the above replay, that the Southwest plane was at V1. The Fedex flight was at least directly over (according to some other transponder-based replay videos), and might have passed the Southwest plane by about a plane length (as shown in the above video), before the Southwest plane had accelerated enough to close the velocity gap. Maybe Fedex waited, but if they radioed the request for Southwest to abort before the planes were overlapping in the horizontal plane, Southwest should have easily been able to stop.
Yes but the primary cause of the Tenerife disaster (a collision on the ground with one 747 taking off and another one crossing the runway) was poor CRM in the cockpit of the departing plane, with bad visibility and multiple incidents as contributing factors.
IIRC, it wasn't caused by the inexperience of the tower controller, or them being distracted, etc.
Listening to that audio is incredible almost chilling. The calmness in the voices.
I understand this is how they are selected, trained and ultimately operate everyday moment-to-moment but the gap is so far for me I can't begin to understand it.
Genuine question, why is this not fully automated today? Seems like something we should be easily capable of doing given CAT III.
To be honest, recordings from cockpits where pilots aren't that eerily calm (to our amateur ears) typically end with a fatal crash.
It reminds me of a video I saw that explored the crew resource management of a plane, and the good culture of the airline, that led to decision making that prevented a situation caused by the captain's earlier error becoming far worse.
blancolirio does excellent breakdowns of air incidents over on youtube with very low latency, here's his video on the above incident for those interested: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SvUOHa8n7aQ
F for Southwest and the tower for lack of awareness, big fucking A+ for FedEx guys for babysitting everybody around.
I think one problem with the radio communication is that because of its terse and scripted nature all of the emotion is removed and it does not convey the urgency.
I can imagine the apprehension of FedEx pilots when they asked "confirming we are cleared to land Runway 18 Left?". I can also understand why the controller just treated it as one of the million other question of the same type without ever catching there is anything wrong here.
Question: are all approaching and departing planes on the same radio channel? Just wondering how the FedEx pilot communicated with Southwest plane. And if so, how does that work at very busy airports like Atlanta where there must be a couple dozen planes coming at going during peak times? Seems it would be confusing for everyone to be hearing everyone’s comms with ATC? (On the other hand it’s probably a good thing, and certainly was in this situation; just wondering how they handle that)
Wow. Just listed to the audio on this. At the end the tower radios over to the Fedex crew: "You have our apologies, we appreciate your professionalism".
As someone who lives in Austin and recalls a fair amount of other issues with the airport I didn't realize I had yet another concern to worry about... Good thing we had someone paying attention but it seems like we should add more buffer time between these comings and goings. Though I know a lot of the airport has been overwhelmed with plenty of other issues.
Is zero visibility an unheard of condition at Austin’s airport? I thought I saw the other day they don’t have ground radar, which would probably be the leading resolution item if it’s the case. But even then, why not slow things down for the weather? 3 miles or 60 second turnaround when the runway is cat III??
Me too. Usually the pilots will mention it if they receive an RA, though. I think TCAS might even be disabled (or nerfed?) at low altitudes like this -- not positive, though.
From what I've read, it sounds like this airport is not equipped with the ATC-equivalent of TCAS -- which I think would have been sounding all kinds of alarms (how early?) in the tower for a scenario like this.
I admire how pilots are able to communicate so concisely and professionally. No one swore at each other or ranted over the radio. Southwest didn’t drag their feet because they didn’t appreciate FedEx’s tone.
I suspect that higher stakes encourage politeness. A much lower stakes example than the OP: politics at a startup vs. at a big company.
I know nothing about ATC, but to be blunt, it sounds like the controller is absolutely not paying attention and possibly even distracted with something else throughout most of the video until they realize there is a near-collision. Is there video footage of the control room that will be reviewed?
Off topic but I need to ask this. When I was flying from Austin to SLC on October 30 2022, I saw something which looked like an airplane suspended stationary in the air with black smoke billowing out of both wings.
I didn’t have the presence of mind to get a video, and I haven’t been able to find out anything about it since.
[+] [-] jnsaff2|3 years ago|reply
When the approaching plane is cleared then there is no allowance for anyone and anything to be on the runway.
So if there is a departing plane waiting on the runway or someone crossing then the approaching plane is given "cleared approach runway 08" but never "cleared to land". Which also means that if you are piloting the landing plane then at your decision height you have to go around.
Also when someone is cleared to land no-one can be given a permission to enter the runway.
There is one clearance that kinda-sorta allows which is "BEHIND landing Boeing 737, line up and wait BEHIND". It intentionally has "BEHIND" before and after the call to be extra clear that the waiting pilot has to confirm that the plane has passed their nose and they can enter the runway while the landing plane is on rollout. But that plane can not be given a takeoff clearance before the plane on the rollout has exited the runway.
We were told that the americans do it differently and I've always found it dangerous.
[+] [-] mulmen|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] sokoloff|3 years ago|reply
Multiple landing planes are allowed on the same runway surface at the same time in the daytime as in Oshkosh arrivals, but also a Category I (light single) can be cleared to land if the Category I or II aircraft to follow will be 3000 feet from the threshold, a Cat II (light twin) behind a I or II with 4500 feet of separation.
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/ATC.pdf
[+] [-] paulmd|3 years ago|reply
Given how advanced ILS is nowadays you could probably automate all of this - if the plane taking off isn't committed to takeoff (traveling at V1) by the time the landing aircraft reaches decision altitude, an automatic go-around is issued. Basically treat the runway as a "control zone" like trains do, and if the plane on the runway hasn't "cleared the zone" (by whatever definition) then the landing aircraft can't enter the zone.
Certainly that's something that could be conveyed as part of the ILS data at least. Maybe it's undesirable to automate it in the sense of the automation causing more problems (more aborts = more chances for something to go wrong, although the assertion is that by V1 you're committed and by decision altitude you can still abort safely, so this all fits inside the "theory of movements") but you can at least let the landing plane know at decision altitude that there's an aircraft still on the runway. Sort of a "green = runway clear, yellow = committed traffic, yellow bars = moving but uncommitted traffic, red = runway occupied/clearance not granted" type indicator perhaps.
Or maybe if the tower can't visually/instrument confirm execution of movements, the pilot on takeoff has to verbally confirm commit before the landing clearance can be granted. Then it just becomes something specific to zero-visibility operations.
It really seems like there should be some change in how movements are handled/clearances are issued. Maybe we don't need to go to full "one clearance at a time" all the time, but it certainly seems like there should be some tighter rules if the tower can't independently confirm movements are being executed, and perhaps convey that information to the pilot as well (although again, I know that pilots are already information-overloaded, but "is there someone on my runway" is seemingly pretty important and straightforward info).
[+] [-] mnw21cam|3 years ago|reply
My understanding was that the word "cleared" was to be avoided when you aren't actually cleared to land/take off, and the correct wording was now "continue approach runway 08".
There has been a decent amount of study of the cognitive interpretation of exact wordings, resulting in a standardised phrasing that avoids misinterpretation. It's a good thing. Using the word "cleared" could easily cause a lazy/tired/overloaded pilot over a noisy channel to think they are cleared to land.
[+] [-] Gordonjcp|3 years ago|reply
* ONE vehicle of any kind!
You can't use the runway because there's a bloody great Volvo in the middle of it, because I put the bloody great Volvo there, because I'm picking up bits of the last guy's wheel spat that fell off, because I don't want to have to write a long long tale about how your prop got chipped.
True story.
[+] [-] cjrp|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] kcg|3 years ago|reply
But, if an arriving aircraft is still on the runway, a controller can clear a departing aircraft for takeoff if there will be adequate separation when the departing aircraft starts takeoff roll (i.e., the arriving aircraft will be clear of the runway at that point).
[1] 7110.65 3-9-5 Anticipating Separation
[+] [-] throw0101c|3 years ago|reply
In ICAO phraseology, "cleared to land runway 08" is allowed. Further:
> If the runway is obstructed when the aircraft reports ‘final’, but it is expected to be available in good time for the aircraft to make a safe landing, the controller will delay landing clearance by issuing an instruction to ‘continue approach’.
* https://www.skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/115....
[+] [-] unknown|3 years ago|reply
[deleted]
[+] [-] zackbloom|3 years ago|reply
In this case, the controller failed to tell the departing flight to hurry (the references to 'no delay' or 'immediate' in the blog post), AND frankly timed things pretty close given the weather. Without the ability to actually see the approaching plane, or perhaps even the plane on the ground, it will probably be found that timing a departure that close at all was reckless. That said, I feel for these tower controllers, it's not common for many planes to get stacked up waiting to depart, and it is their job to get them out. What may have worked just fine on a clear-weather day simply became too dangerous on that day.
The official manual for air traffic controllers in the US is the FAA Order JO 7110.65W [1], if anyone cares to review it.
1 - https://www.faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/order/atc.pdf
[+] [-] catminou|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] mynegation|3 years ago|reply
At this day and age it is bewildering to see all of this running on human communication essentially. Why cannot descending plane lay a claim on a runway in some computer system and a cabin in Southwest - blare a horn for pilots trying to steer into a claimed runway?
[+] [-] Animats|3 years ago|reply
So the tower controllers had responsibility for separation. Here are the current FAA rules on separation between departing and arriving aircraft using the same runway. See section 3-1-3 of [3].
This is the rule: "Separate an arriving aircraft from another aircraft using the same runway by ensuring that the arriving aircraft does not cross the landing threshold until one of the following conditions exists .... The other aircraft has departed and crossed the runway end or turned to avert any conflict. If you can determine distances by reference to suitable landmarks, the other aircraft needs only be airborne if the following minimum distance exists between aircraft: ...when either is a Category III aircraft- 6,000 feet."
The trouble is, the controller can apparently say "Cleared to land" when they expect that departing aircraft will be airborne and at least 6,000 feet down the runway, and thus out of the way, before the incoming aircraft crosses the landing threshold. Not when it actually is in the air and out of the conflict zone. Or at least in this case, the controller did. This is apparently called "reduced runway separation". The intent is to increase traffic capacity.
But this was in fog. Tower probably could not see the departing aircraft, and they did not apparently have a sensor system to compensate for that.
[1] https://skybrary.aero/articles/autonomous-runway-incursion-w...
[2] https://skybrary.aero/articles/runway-status-lights-rwsl
[3] https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/atc_html...
[+] [-] Ancapistani|3 years ago|reply
Just look at the rollout for ADS-B In/Out if you're curious how difficult that might be to implement.
[+] [-] kochie|3 years ago|reply
Sure it may avoid this situation, but how many aircraft lifted off and landed at airports in the same day? In America I’d hazard a guess at aground the tens of thousands. Any new system has to reduce the complexity or risks of flying and that’s very hard to do.
I’m not an aviation expert either but it’s assume that some form of system exists for this also in a more manual form.
[+] [-] idlewords|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] andreareina|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ekianjo|3 years ago|reply
Because you have unions protecting the manual, error-prone job of human operators.
[+] [-] xpe|3 years ago|reply
> ‘As bad as it gets without body bags.’
> Why the Austin airport situation was so dangerous.
Because the planes almost collided. But the author wants to say more than that. The article covers the “how” things went wrong by analyzing the transcript. The write-up doesn’t answer the key ”why” question —- why are existing procedures and training not suitable?
Safety-critical systems (including procedures and protocols) must be designed to account for wide human variation, including mistakes and miscommunications. Let’s not waste our time pointing fingers at one person.
[+] [-] hitekker|3 years ago|reply
Accusing the author of blaming individuals is rather silly when you're rushing to blame training/procedures/the system.
[+] [-] dang|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] seanhunter|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] harshreality|3 years ago|reply
The fast reaction by the Fedex pilots may have contributed to increased distance between the planes that saved them, but their callout to the Southwest flight didn't fundamentally change anything. Maybe we'll find out that the Southwest flight climbed slower, suspecting the Fedex plane was directly over them. In that case maybe the callout in addition to the Fedex crew being attentive saved the day, but I haven't seen anyone claim that yet.
If the Southwest crew had realized how close the Fedex plane was, maybe they would have aborted even if it meant running off the end of the runway, but they didn't do that.
...
The flightradar replay is terrifying. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3cVMUCdxG0
I'm not sure anymore, given the above replay, that the Southwest plane was at V1. The Fedex flight was at least directly over (according to some other transponder-based replay videos), and might have passed the Southwest plane by about a plane length (as shown in the above video), before the Southwest plane had accelerated enough to close the velocity gap. Maybe Fedex waited, but if they radioed the request for Southwest to abort before the planes were overlapping in the horizontal plane, Southwest should have easily been able to stop.
[+] [-] SOLAR_FIELDS|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] anderber|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] bambax|3 years ago|reply
IIRC, it wasn't caused by the inexperience of the tower controller, or them being distracted, etc.
[+] [-] jacobgorm|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] irjustin|3 years ago|reply
I understand this is how they are selected, trained and ultimately operate everyday moment-to-moment but the gap is so far for me I can't begin to understand it.
Genuine question, why is this not fully automated today? Seems like something we should be easily capable of doing given CAT III.
[+] [-] EdwardDiego|3 years ago|reply
It reminds me of a video I saw that explored the crew resource management of a plane, and the good culture of the airline, that led to decision making that prevented a situation caused by the captain's earlier error becoming far worse.
https://youtube.com/watch?v=SeDulCEr-40
[+] [-] MPSimmons|3 years ago|reply
[1] - https://www.amazon.com/Field-Guide-Understanding-Human-Error...
[2] - https://www.abebooks.com/servlet/BookDetailsPL?bi=3123581163...
[+] [-] jonathanyc|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] kqr|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] thot_experiment|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] unknown|3 years ago|reply
[deleted]
[+] [-] twawaaay|3 years ago|reply
I think one problem with the radio communication is that because of its terse and scripted nature all of the emotion is removed and it does not convey the urgency.
I can imagine the apprehension of FedEx pilots when they asked "confirming we are cleared to land Runway 18 Left?". I can also understand why the controller just treated it as one of the million other question of the same type without ever catching there is anything wrong here.
[+] [-] insane_dreamer|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] b800h|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] softsound|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] martyvis|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] kylehotchkiss|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] russdill|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] neom|3 years ago|reply
https://skybrary.aero/articles/tcas-ii-ra-very-low-altitude
https://www.faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/advisory_circular/...
[+] [-] mh-|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] adanto6840|3 years ago|reply
From what I've read, it sounds like this airport is not equipped with the ATC-equivalent of TCAS -- which I think would have been sounding all kinds of alarms (how early?) in the tower for a scenario like this.
[+] [-] blantonl|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] jonathanyc|3 years ago|reply
I suspect that higher stakes encourage politeness. A much lower stakes example than the OP: politics at a startup vs. at a big company.
[+] [-] digdigdag|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] Xcelerate|3 years ago|reply
[+] [-] bckr|3 years ago|reply
I didn’t have the presence of mind to get a video, and I haven’t been able to find out anything about it since.
Any idea what the heck I was looking at?