[gallopingcomp]

As a (former) student of psychology, I personally subscribe to the view that both platonism and constructivism are true (edit: in that they both accurately depict different-but-interrelated aspects of mathematics).

It’s a false dilemma much like “is light a wave or a particle” or “free will or determinism”. (Yup, I am that “you can have it all” pollyanna type of person.)

[TheOtherHobbes]

I don't think it's a false dilemma, because the essence of mathematical platonism isn't really that forms exist, but that these forms are how the universe really works.

They're not an approximation, a metaphor, or a point of view. They're the real deal - the base mechanisms. And they can be discovered through the scientific process, with its combination of physical and speculative analysis.

Clearly this is nonsense. Math isn't truly self-consistent, physical research is limited to a range of lab-friendly experiments garnished with some astrophysical guesswork, and all of it gets filtered through consciousness, which we have no clue about.

What we have is a "looking for the key under the light" situation where can only explore the things we can see. We don't know what's in the dark, and it's actually very likely that our consciousness is extremely limited and unable to perceive essential detail.

But because (tautologically) we can't see it we just assume it's not there, and our tiny and contingent view is gloriously universal.

I find the cat metaphor very revealing. Cats share a space with us but they literally do not see the same objects we do. They perceive weight, texture, and dimensions, they're far more sensitive to smell, and they have some innate models for dynamics and mechanics.

But they have no concept of the meaning of a book, a laptop, a wifi card, a Netflix subscription, or a mathematical description of General Relativity. Unless we breed them specially for intelligence for a good few tens of millennia they never will, because cat consciousness is too small to contain those concepts.

It's ridiculously, almost comically naive to believe - purely on faith - that human consciousness isn't severely limited in some analogous ways.

We're quite good at the human equivalent of hunting for food - which includes manipulating physical materials and crude energy sources, with some meta-awareness of abstraction.

What are the odds that's all there is to understand about the universe?

[mannykannot]

> I don't think it's a false dilemma, because the essence of mathematical platonism isn't really that forms exist, but that these forms are how the universe really works.

Consider Euclidean geometry, which is fine, mathematically, but, it turns out, not how the universe works. If mathematical platonists were concerned about whether mathematics' forms are how the universe really works, surely they would insist on the verification of their axioms before proceeding? And then, would mathematical platonism not be just the uncontroversial parts of the physical sciences?

The author reprises the platonism / formalism issue in this article's final section, beginning with the paragraph "But there is still more to be said. Perhaps, after all some of those Big Picture questions do remain lurking in the mathematical background." He refers to Platonists as realists, but, I think, in the sense that the forms are real regardless of whether they are how the universe really works.

[techno_tsar]

I would consider the reverse (that mathematics is constructed) as just as nonsensical. One could argue that if mathematics were constructed, we are essentially taking on faith that mathematical properties in the physical universe just so happen (by coincidence) to correlate with the mathematical principles we have invented. But this seems backwards. The Pythagorean theorem makes more sense as something we have discovered, or the inner corners of a triangle add up to 180 degrees (half a circle); alien civilizations likely have arrived at the same conclusion. The simple answer is that math is simply a feature of the universe.

Even if mathematics isn’t truly self-consistent (it is not), that does not commit one to formalism or constructivism. The belief that abstract entities, if they are real, must be self-consistent, requires us to believe that self-consistency is a precondition for the realism of abstract entities to begin with. But there is no obvious reason to believe this.

As for the limits of our human consciousness: arguably there is a “floor” where we can have strong beliefs in the hypotheses we form about the universe (including those of mathematics). In fact, the essence of Platonism (and where it derives it’s name) is the very view that abstraction is realer than concrete or empirical particulars because it is more unchanging and absolute. It seems inconceivable to find a single world where 2+2 != 4, but we can conceive of worlds where say, Biden is not currently president, or where gravity had a different strength. In other words, the laws of logic (and perhaps many parts of mathematics) seem very fixed, but our other laws less so. Plato thought this told us something about the ultimate hierarchy of metaphysics; modern mathematical platonists like Godel think that we have a mathematical intuition that allows us to perceive mathematical objects; mathematicists like Max Tegmark thought that nothing other than mathematical objects exist at all.

It is this intuition towards the abstract as real, realer, or realist that motivates platonism. To committed platonists, the burden of proof is actually on the non-believers, partly as a preservation of logic and mathematics. If we dismiss that (a common logic), we might be incapable of having a real discussion in the first place. Whether or not that intuition is enough, or free of problems (it is not) is very debatable. However, platonism is not trivially or obviously false.

[igravious]

as an aside I feel like you're misusing the notion of what a Pollyanna is: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/pollyan... “a person who is constantly or excessively optimistic”

To be a Pollyanna (I think) is to be Panglossian: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Panglossian “marked by the view that all is for the best in this best of possible worlds : excessively optimistic”

This sort of thinking goes back to Leibniz (and probably a lot further) “We live in the best of all possible worlds” https://www.britannica.com/topic/best-of-all-possible-worlds

So to be a Pollyanna is to have a certain (overly?) (irrationally?) optimistic towards ones situation in life and perhaps even the nature of human suffering in general. To be contrasted with the Buddhist thought which asserts that basically life is suffering: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Noble_Truths

===

Anyway, back to your belief that (mathematical) Platonism and (mathematical Constructivism can be reconciled.

So a hard-core mathematical Platonist believes – if I am not mischaracterising their position – that things like numbers are actually existing entities that we discover and that even if we humans had never existed that numbers would have or that if we humans cease existing that numbers will continue to exist. So mathematical progress is a progress of discovery, not creation. A hardcore mathematical Constructivist believes that if it were not for us numbers would not exist, the very idea of number would be unthinkable, we think numbers into being. A radical Constructivist (like me) does not believe in actually existing infinities or infinitesimals and so does not believe in actually existing unbounded real numbers like irrationals and transcendentals except in a symbolic or algorithmic sense.

Can these two positions be reconciled? Can we optimistically reconcile them. I think not. But I do think that the slighter weaker proposition that certain formal entities like numbers are necessary, I'm going to say, "truths" in that the nature of the universe necessitates certain types of mathematical entities such that once there are a sufficient class of thinking things to think them they'll pop into being, so to speak.

I am open to correction on any point. I know that my personal position is more-or-less anathema to most mathematicians I've had the pleasure of sharing these ideas with (as in I've gotten into heated drunken debates/arguments about this stuff).

[gallopingcomp]

Wow, I guess my mental model (so to speak) is even more “radical” than yours. I don’t think mathematics is really part of the (empirical) universe, but that they are their own kind of abstract entity. They may happen to correspond to certain patterns in how things exist and interact in the “real world”, or to sentient beings’ reasoning and modeling faculties, but they are not tied to the real world either way.

For comparison: To me, for a number to exist in a “symbolic or algorithm sense” is to for it to exist, period - but in the sense of “creating”/“discovering” a new number system to contain them. The set of rational numbers isn’t really “special” to me. (Non-negative natural numbers are “special” for their association with cardinality, but I will refrain from going down that rabbit hole this time.) (I assume you meant “unbounded” in terms of expansion into elementary algebra; do correct me if I misunderstood you.)

(i.e. Existence=NaN because it’s a loaded word, Abstractness=Yes, Independence=I have some but limited sympathy for the neo-Fregean view on this, “creating” and “discovering” are the same thing to me)

(Which would make me a platonist to some people, an intuitionist to others, I guess)