[gavanm]

You've already included the answer - "using their machines as remote terminals, doing most their actual work on some remote server".

The developer uses MFA (TOTP, Push Notification, Yubikey etc) into a virtual desktop inside the organisation (Citrix, VMWare Horizon, etc).

From there, the developer can SSH / whatever into their development environment - which is hosted "inside" the corporate network, or their cloud provider, via internal links.

All code, and dev boxes live "inside" the corporate network, and only keypresses, mouse movement, and screen diffs are sent back and forth.

Most remote access packages can prevent clipboard, USB device, file transfer etc.

If you need a password manager for work purposes, then it lives on the corporate managed network - not your remote laptop/desktop - and to be really paranoid - you only ever "copy/paste" those passwords - you don't type them in.

If you really want to lock it down further, give the remote workers dedicated corporate equipment that they only use to access the remote desktops, so you can prevent some things like screen capturing, and really lock down the software to prevent things like keylogging software/malware.

You also should have the entire development environment segregated from the "business" corporate network as well.

It's only really an issue if you want to have offline developers - in which case I don't have any thoughts ready to hand - (but would expect it to be a very locked down machine, possibly with an even more locked down VM inside it).

As someone who regularly uses multiple layers of Virtual Desktop -> Virtual Desktop -> Remote Desktop, provided the network can handle it (on both your local network, and the corporate network), it works surprisingly well.

[crabbone]

This is both a misunderstanding of the problem and an attempt to solve an administrative problem using technology... which cannot really solve it.

Developers have nothing to do with this. It's a common practice in companies that have "expensive" production environment (eg. VMs rented from AWS) that developers never get any kind of access to production environment. Ever. At all. No need to tie developers' hand by putting them behind a ton of unnecessary firewalls. They have no need for the sensitive information and shouldn't be burdened by protecting it.

The few people who do have access to company's "expensive" production environment are / should be very few people, most likely in the infra / DevOps department. These people do need to follow special protocol for communicating with the "expensive" environment, which, likely, doesn't happen all that often. Depends on the product, of course, but unlikely to be more than once a day, or even once a week.

----

PS. In many, many years of being in infra / system / automation I had never typed any passwords for any important services I had to use. They are usually difficult to type due to having all kinds of Unicode characters I wouldn't know how to reproduce w/o a little research. It's also very rare that they end up in system clipboard, since I usually end up using something like vi+tmux over SSH in Emacs' ascii-term to copy the password from somewhere and paste it somewhere else. So, stuff like AWS keys would have to be stolen by taking screenshots of my screen or something like that...

I mean, why on Earth would anyone deploy to production environment from their personal laptop? Normally, deployment is made from some sort of a testing / staging environment where the system was being tested / archived before shipping it to the next stop... It sounds like some kind of emergency / unplanned situation where a DevOps had to log into the remote system from their laptop.

[trallnag]

Are you misunderstanding the term "DevOps"? You build it, you run it. If a DevOps team only runs things other developers have build, it is not a DevOps team.

[execveat]

I'm all in for VM based privilege separation, but that won't protect you from infected endpoint. Assuming this was a targeted attack, folks that achieved RCE on DevOp engineer's machine could have waited for her to authenticate and then inject keystrokes into VM, SSH, VNC, Remote Desktop, Citrix or whatever remote management system they're using.

Honestly, this HN thread is full of bad advice and factually incorrect patronizing. Okta-style system asking to accept every single permission would not have protected from an attack, because Okta caches and reuses authentication tokens. Clipboard snooping / keylogger detection wouldn't have worked because none of these solutions are robust against targeted attacks.

The only thing I can think of which would have (and should have) helped is alert SOC / incident reponse team. Good luck finding one though.

[paradox242]

Glad to see someone else with the same reaction, because a lot of this advice is... interesting, like people who are worried about keyloggers but think the clipboard is safe.

[wepzen]

In my experience, I find that working with Virtual Desktops is the most frustrating user experience as a developer you could have. I prefer working in containerized environments which are more efficient and do not require the same amount of configuration processes as a Virtual Desktop.

You should check some solutions out.

[faeyanpiraat]

> You also should have the entire development environment segregated from the "business" corporate network as well.

This is the key point, otherwise you'll also just get a linux machine with developer root access, but EVEN CLOSER to the corporate network.

[realharo]

For most development work, this would probably cause a serious productivity drop, but it definitely makes sense for the portion of the work that involves accessing critical production resources. For DevOps roles, that could well be the majority.