Hard to debate this with proven facts, from either side.
Opinion? I have no idea. It depends on how you (or I, or someone else) defines or interprets "free will", "requirement", or "consciousness", and whether or not that definition is binary, discrete, or continuous in spectrum.
Hard to paramtereize a relationship when we can't confidently define either member of it.
Personally, I think it's utterly silly to think that free will fits into a material model. If it's real, I'd sooner believe in a panpsychist universe than a magical meat computer that shifts reality at will. The Quantum Indeterminacy argument is God in the Gaps.
> I think it's utterly silly to think that free will fits into a material model.
It isn't silly, but it is hard to discuss it with people because logic breaks down under self-reference and logical debate has been the most popular mode of our debates since Aristotle. Even empiricism doesn't save from this weakness, because it implies we ought to update based on the observed evidence. The Halting Problem and the Incompleteness Theorems are very important to recognize. They lead to a recognition of the infinite self-reference that occurs quite naturally as physics reaches its limit and is employed to model an agent which uses that model to model another agent that is modeling them. This produces computationally irreducible phenomenon. From there we start to reach into game theoretic concerns wherein evidence denial on the basis of equilibrium consideration becomes normal. When extended to imperfect information settings we end up discovering that non-deterministic policies are optimal. This optimality proof and the guarantee of the ability to confound through undecidability give us a grip on what selection and variation ought to select for through an appeal to the central limit theorem.
The funniest thing to me is that the decision to deny this corresponds with choosing an unfactored and unsimplified representation for reality as being more correct. Yet this backfires in the most beautiful way: it is slower to compute then the factored and simpler representation. Which means it is computationally reducible. Which means other agents can know your output before you do. Which makes you victim to Halting Problem attacks - or rather it makes you determined but your world indeterminable for you. But the even more amusing irony is that the entire reason we even use logic and empiricism is because we recognize the proxy relationship advantage as a function of the proxy not being the actual thing. So it is a self-refuting position, because it tries to reject the underlying motive for both the use of logic and the use of evidence. Which, well, when you see it - now that is rather silly!
What it is on the free will side isn't silly, but non-sense. As in, literally non-sensory. When you really realize that is what is happening though it is a mistake to laugh at it. After all, how many fingers am I holding up right now? You aren't sensing it. Non-sense as a belief about your sensory data is actually quite valid, because you aren't sensing it actually corresponds to your actual states. It is congruent, not in-congruent, with relevant states.
In formal reasoning about this topic we therefore differentiate between three things: world state, observation state, and information state. This is starting to get into the game theory aspects of the problem, which can end up being very motivating when you notice the proof of optimality of non-deterministic policy functions under imperfect information, but if you really want to understand the undecidability you probably are better off checking out something like https://www.wolframscience.com/nks/p750--the-phenomenon-of-f...
I think both of those words are nebulous and therefore it is hard to talk about them in a meaningful way.
I feel like freewill is a made up idea entirely and while we might have the experience of free will, the reality is different.
I think drugs are a great thing to think about in reference to free will. There are many drugs that will force your mind into specific modalities. There are drugs that can be injected that will force you to sleep, force you unconscious, or force you to experience reality in a way other than what you are accustomed.
Not eating food can result in people become hangry without even understanding they are angry because they haven't eaten. Interview results and court judgements are different based on having eaten lunch or not.
Even if you believe in the idea of free will, it seems pretty clear that chemical forces can dominate free will. This means that at best free will is a spectrum.
The sights you see are little waves reacting with chemicals in your eyeballs conducting electricity through various nerves. The various stimuli we can experience all have physical and chemical basis. These stimuli are then processed by the machinery of our brain, which can alter the structure and machinery of our brain. At least that's my understanding.
If everything can be explained by a physical processes, then it seems like if you had perfect knowledge about the current state, then you could predict the next, and if you can predict one state, with perfect knowledge of a previous state, then it seems clear that freewill is an illusion and therefore a product of consciousness and not a requirement of it.
If I smashed your hand with a hammer, do you think I could reliably predict you will feel pain? Of course you will. Do you that think that even if you feel pain your response is free will? You can choose to say ow, or try to fight me, or run away so I don't smash your hand again. But what if you had a history of losing fights? What if your testosterone is high or low? What if you have genetic markers that result in under production or over production of adrenaline? Is the adrenaline causing your heart to race free will? Will the subjective experience of rushing adrenaline influence or control your "decision." At what point does influence become control? Are counter influences other predictable physical systems?
Why can't depressed people choose to be happy?
Why can't ADHD people choose to concentrate?
I think dementia and mental illness is another interesting avenue of exploring free well and consciousness.
If I were to try to describe free will somewhat rigorously, I would say free will is the subjective experience of the thinking mind overriding the feeling mind.
Consciousness is much harder. The idea clearly exists, because we all have some notion of "I." Being able to say "I feel this way" means that consciousness is an idea that exists. It seems like the idea of consiousness must involve the idea of a closed system because "I" indicates a separation of one grouping of atoms from another. I'm not sure what the second property is that creates subjective experience, memory?
> If I smashed your hand with a hammer, do you think I could reliably predict you will feel pain? Of course you will.
In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct yes-or-no answer. The halting problem is an example: it can be proven that there is no algorithm that correctly determines whether arbitrary programs eventually halt when run. [1]
You are predicting my state in advance of it having been achieved. I'm fully capable of intentionally disrupting your prediction, for example, by drugging the nerves in my arms such that they cannot send signals to my brain. Your claim of knowledge is a false claim and I deny it.
This is not a pedantic point. It relates directly to the concept of computationally irreducible systems [2][3][4]. These processes create the condition for non-deterministic outcomes as a consequence of deterministic systems. We then have to ask: since it is possible, should it actually be that way? Which leads to research on optimal solving of games under imperfect information. Nash has shown optimal mixed/impure strategies [5][6][7][8].
> If everything can be explained by a physical processes, then it seems like if you had perfect knowledge about the current state, then you could predict the next, and if you can predict one state...
This is false. Even if you know the deterministic rules of a system it is not the case that you can predict the state of that system [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8].
> I feel like freewill is a made up idea entirely and while we might have the experience of free will, the reality is different.
Humans seem to struggle with thinking about this for several reasons, but two important ones are that logic breaks down under self-reference and humans are cooperative with each other [9]. The first is a problem because most of our tradition of debate descends from argumentative traditions descending from Aristotle which is logical tradition of debate [10]. The second is a problem because cooperative agents tend to make themselves predictable. They make themselves stand out from "the world" rather than appearing as if "of the world". This is not actually generally the case, but because we have exceptionally capable senses we don't always realize what the actual decision problems really look like and how nice we have it due to our cooperative tendencies. For a more representative example try to spot the predators in the two cited images which pursue the "of the world" competitive equilibrium [11][12].
unknown|3 years ago
[deleted]
coreyp_1|3 years ago
Opinion? I have no idea. It depends on how you (or I, or someone else) defines or interprets "free will", "requirement", or "consciousness", and whether or not that definition is binary, discrete, or continuous in spectrum.
ted_bunny|3 years ago
Personally, I think it's utterly silly to think that free will fits into a material model. If it's real, I'd sooner believe in a panpsychist universe than a magical meat computer that shifts reality at will. The Quantum Indeterminacy argument is God in the Gaps.
JoshCole|3 years ago
It isn't silly, but it is hard to discuss it with people because logic breaks down under self-reference and logical debate has been the most popular mode of our debates since Aristotle. Even empiricism doesn't save from this weakness, because it implies we ought to update based on the observed evidence. The Halting Problem and the Incompleteness Theorems are very important to recognize. They lead to a recognition of the infinite self-reference that occurs quite naturally as physics reaches its limit and is employed to model an agent which uses that model to model another agent that is modeling them. This produces computationally irreducible phenomenon. From there we start to reach into game theoretic concerns wherein evidence denial on the basis of equilibrium consideration becomes normal. When extended to imperfect information settings we end up discovering that non-deterministic policies are optimal. This optimality proof and the guarantee of the ability to confound through undecidability give us a grip on what selection and variation ought to select for through an appeal to the central limit theorem.
The funniest thing to me is that the decision to deny this corresponds with choosing an unfactored and unsimplified representation for reality as being more correct. Yet this backfires in the most beautiful way: it is slower to compute then the factored and simpler representation. Which means it is computationally reducible. Which means other agents can know your output before you do. Which makes you victim to Halting Problem attacks - or rather it makes you determined but your world indeterminable for you. But the even more amusing irony is that the entire reason we even use logic and empiricism is because we recognize the proxy relationship advantage as a function of the proxy not being the actual thing. So it is a self-refuting position, because it tries to reject the underlying motive for both the use of logic and the use of evidence. Which, well, when you see it - now that is rather silly!
What it is on the free will side isn't silly, but non-sense. As in, literally non-sensory. When you really realize that is what is happening though it is a mistake to laugh at it. After all, how many fingers am I holding up right now? You aren't sensing it. Non-sense as a belief about your sensory data is actually quite valid, because you aren't sensing it actually corresponds to your actual states. It is congruent, not in-congruent, with relevant states.
In formal reasoning about this topic we therefore differentiate between three things: world state, observation state, and information state. This is starting to get into the game theory aspects of the problem, which can end up being very motivating when you notice the proof of optimality of non-deterministic policy functions under imperfect information, but if you really want to understand the undecidability you probably are better off checking out something like https://www.wolframscience.com/nks/p750--the-phenomenon-of-f...
atomicnature|3 years ago
There is no unanimous definition for either ABC or XYZ, ultimately leading to profitless discussion.
If you can precisely define both the terms, then there will be no need for debate.
And if you can't define the terms, then also, there is no need for debate :)
thedevindevops|3 years ago
mattbgates|3 years ago
Someone just released this tool last week: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35016444
jstx1|3 years ago
About things we don’t even know exist, or what they are if they do exist? There’s better ways to spend a Friday.
hayst4ck|3 years ago
I feel like freewill is a made up idea entirely and while we might have the experience of free will, the reality is different.
I think drugs are a great thing to think about in reference to free will. There are many drugs that will force your mind into specific modalities. There are drugs that can be injected that will force you to sleep, force you unconscious, or force you to experience reality in a way other than what you are accustomed.
Not eating food can result in people become hangry without even understanding they are angry because they haven't eaten. Interview results and court judgements are different based on having eaten lunch or not.
Even if you believe in the idea of free will, it seems pretty clear that chemical forces can dominate free will. This means that at best free will is a spectrum.
The sights you see are little waves reacting with chemicals in your eyeballs conducting electricity through various nerves. The various stimuli we can experience all have physical and chemical basis. These stimuli are then processed by the machinery of our brain, which can alter the structure and machinery of our brain. At least that's my understanding.
If everything can be explained by a physical processes, then it seems like if you had perfect knowledge about the current state, then you could predict the next, and if you can predict one state, with perfect knowledge of a previous state, then it seems clear that freewill is an illusion and therefore a product of consciousness and not a requirement of it.
If I smashed your hand with a hammer, do you think I could reliably predict you will feel pain? Of course you will. Do you that think that even if you feel pain your response is free will? You can choose to say ow, or try to fight me, or run away so I don't smash your hand again. But what if you had a history of losing fights? What if your testosterone is high or low? What if you have genetic markers that result in under production or over production of adrenaline? Is the adrenaline causing your heart to race free will? Will the subjective experience of rushing adrenaline influence or control your "decision." At what point does influence become control? Are counter influences other predictable physical systems?
Why can't depressed people choose to be happy?
Why can't ADHD people choose to concentrate?
I think dementia and mental illness is another interesting avenue of exploring free well and consciousness.
If I were to try to describe free will somewhat rigorously, I would say free will is the subjective experience of the thinking mind overriding the feeling mind.
Consciousness is much harder. The idea clearly exists, because we all have some notion of "I." Being able to say "I feel this way" means that consciousness is an idea that exists. It seems like the idea of consiousness must involve the idea of a closed system because "I" indicates a separation of one grouping of atoms from another. I'm not sure what the second property is that creates subjective experience, memory?
JoshCole|3 years ago
In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct yes-or-no answer. The halting problem is an example: it can be proven that there is no algorithm that correctly determines whether arbitrary programs eventually halt when run. [1]
You are predicting my state in advance of it having been achieved. I'm fully capable of intentionally disrupting your prediction, for example, by drugging the nerves in my arms such that they cannot send signals to my brain. Your claim of knowledge is a false claim and I deny it.
This is not a pedantic point. It relates directly to the concept of computationally irreducible systems [2][3][4]. These processes create the condition for non-deterministic outcomes as a consequence of deterministic systems. We then have to ask: since it is possible, should it actually be that way? Which leads to research on optimal solving of games under imperfect information. Nash has shown optimal mixed/impure strategies [5][6][7][8].
> If everything can be explained by a physical processes, then it seems like if you had perfect knowledge about the current state, then you could predict the next, and if you can predict one state...
This is false. Even if you know the deterministic rules of a system it is not the case that you can predict the state of that system [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8].
> I feel like freewill is a made up idea entirely and while we might have the experience of free will, the reality is different.
Humans seem to struggle with thinking about this for several reasons, but two important ones are that logic breaks down under self-reference and humans are cooperative with each other [9]. The first is a problem because most of our tradition of debate descends from argumentative traditions descending from Aristotle which is logical tradition of debate [10]. The second is a problem because cooperative agents tend to make themselves predictable. They make themselves stand out from "the world" rather than appearing as if "of the world". This is not actually generally the case, but because we have exceptionally capable senses we don't always realize what the actual decision problems really look like and how nice we have it due to our cooperative tendencies. For a more representative example try to spot the predators in the two cited images which pursue the "of the world" competitive equilibrium [11][12].
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem
[2]: https://mathworld.wolfram.com/ComputationalIrreducibility.ht...
[3]: https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/4lbck4/computat...
[4]: https://www.wolframscience.com/nks/p750--the-phenomenon-of-f...
[5]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategy_(game_theory)
[6]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Forbes_Nash_Jr.
[7]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium
[8]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategy_(game_theory)#Mixed_s...
[9]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_...
[10]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/
[11]: https://www.boredpanda.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/s...
[12]: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michael-Kuba-2/publicat...
kkpupu|3 years ago
[deleted]