[Gravyness]

Run "ssh -T [e-mail]" command.

It should error like this:

    @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
    @    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @
    @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
    IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
    Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!
    It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.
    The fingerprint for the RSA key sent by the remote host is
    SHA256:uNiVztksCsDhcc0u9e8BujQXVUpKZIDTMczCvj3tD2s.
    Please contact your system administrator.

Note that the SHA256 present there matches perfectly the one github send. If you don't remember the very first time you connected to github you also had to accept the key. The warning above shows up because the server is saved as a different RSA, for the SSH client it seems that someone setup a server for github but has a different key, which could mean someone is trying to trick you into connecting into the wrong server. This could also mean that github changed their RSA key which is why they published this article.

[pbhjpbhj]

The fingerprint is a hash of the key, so in theory -- say with a quantum computer -- I could create a key that's different and provides a hash-collision. Is that right?

It would just take many ages of the universe, at present, to calculate a collision, right?

[8organicbits]

There's a narrow window for that attack. The fingerprint is only used on the first connection, for manual verification. Any later connections would check the ~/.ssh/known_hosts which has the full public key.

If you somehow can MITM an SSH connection on the first connection, you can probably use any key. Most people don't check the fingerprint.

But you are correct, computing an SSH key with a collisionwis expected to take an infeasible amount of time/energy with current understanding of crypto and available computers.