top | item 35796827

(no title)

badtuple | 2 years ago

It seems like the point being made is that because an LLM lives within the universe and can't store the entire universe, it would need to "reason" to produce coherent output of a significant length. It's possible I misunderstood your post, but it's not clear to me that any "reasoning" isn't just really good hallucination.

Proving that an AI is reasoning and not hallucinating seems super difficult. Even proving that there's a difference would be difficult. I'm more open to the idea that reasoning in general is just statistical hallucination even for humans, but that's almost off topic.

> Any model that trivially depends upon statistics could not do causal reasoning, it would become exponentially less likely over time. At long output lengths, practically impossible.

It's not clear to me that it _doesn't_ fall apart over long output lengths. Our definition of "long output" might just be really different. Statistics can carry you a long way if the possible output is constrained, and it's not like we don't see weird quirks in small amounts of output all the time.

It's also not clear to me that adding more data leads to a generalization that's closer to the "underlying problem". We can train an AI on every sonnet ever written (no extra tagged data or metadata) and it'll be able to produce a statistically coherent sonnet. But I'm not sure it'll be any better at evoking an emotion through text. Same with arithmetic. Can you embed the rules of arithmetic purely in the structure of language? Probably. But I'm not sure the rules can be reliably reversed out enough to claim an AI could be "reasoning" about it.

It does make me wonder what work has gone in to detecting and quantifying reasoning. There must be tons of it. Do we have an accepted rigorous definition of reasoning? We definitely can't take it for granted.

discuss

order

tysam_and|2 years ago

Reasoning and hallucinating are terms that are more shallow that are oftentimes used in discussions of this topic, but ultimately don't cover where and how the model is fitting the underlying manifold of the data -- which is in fact described by information theory rather well. That's why I referenced Shannon entropy, which is important as an interpretive framework. It provides mathematical guarantees and ties nicely into the other information compressive measures which do I feel answer some of the queries you're noting seem more ambiguous to you.

That is the trouble with mixing inductive reasoning sometimes with a problem that has mathematical roots. There are degrees where it's intractable to easily measure how much something is happening, but we have a clean mathematical framework that answers these questions well, so using it can be helpful.

The easiest example of yours that I can tie back to the math is the arithmetic in the structure of language. You can use information theory to show this pretty easily, you might appreciate looking into Kolmogorov complexity as a fun side topic. I'm still learning it (heck, any of these topics goes a mile deep), but it's been useful.

Reasoning on the other hand I find to be a much harder topic, in terms of measuring it. It can be learned, like any other piece of information.

If I could recommend any piece of literature for this, I feel like you would appreciate this most to start diving into some of the meat of this. It's a crazy cool field of study, and this paper in particular is quite accessible and friendly to most backgrounds: https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.12482