At the very least, one would hope that credentials and perhaps also certain design documents such as threat models aren't public.
There may also be implementation details or code which are subject to NDA, either from the Fed itself or from service providers such as IBM in this case. Sometimes you can get that info from a FOIA request, but that doesn't negate the fact that the employees working on the system are bound by an NDA. The FOIA has to happen and run its course.
Fraud and people trying to mess with the system has been a long term problem and likely always will be. The results of which can hurt people. Keeping details private can make it more difficult for those folks.
If we try to prioritize goals of a system like this... security for people should be one of the highest. I think of the middle income single parent when I envision an example of a person in this system.
> The FedNow Service requires all messages to be cryptographically signed. The service validates the signature
and association between the entity sending the message and the key used to sign it.
Hey, that's neat. I'm super curious how much the internals of this thing could be compared with something like a cryptocurrency. Are those signatures representative of the identities making the transaction? Might it be technically feasible some day for me to craft a transaction on my phone to send money to someone, then publish it directly, and have the person instantly confirm that they received a payment without needing to talk to a bank?
I'm really curious if this is what is going to eventually morph into the CBDC that everyone seems so excited about, or if that project is going to start from scratch.
I'm no expert on this so this is pure speculation, but what immediately jumps out from this document is the amount of security- and availability-critical work that depends on each member bank. With wire transfers this has historically been achieved by gating transfers behind physically visiting a branch (not universally true). The synchronous nature (recipient must confirm transaction in real-time) of transfers may also cause annoying failures when recipient banks do maintenance or something at inconvenient times.
CobrastanJorji|2 years ago
ke88y|2 years ago
There may also be implementation details or code which are subject to NDA, either from the Fed itself or from service providers such as IBM in this case. Sometimes you can get that info from a FOIA request, but that doesn't negate the fact that the employees working on the system are bound by an NDA. The FOIA has to happen and run its course.
mfer|2 years ago
Fraud and people trying to mess with the system has been a long term problem and likely always will be. The results of which can hurt people. Keeping details private can make it more difficult for those folks.
If we try to prioritize goals of a system like this... security for people should be one of the highest. I think of the middle income single parent when I envision an example of a person in this system.
px43|2 years ago
Hey, that's neat. I'm super curious how much the internals of this thing could be compared with something like a cryptocurrency. Are those signatures representative of the identities making the transaction? Might it be technically feasible some day for me to craft a transaction on my phone to send money to someone, then publish it directly, and have the person instantly confirm that they received a payment without needing to talk to a bank?
I'm really curious if this is what is going to eventually morph into the CBDC that everyone seems so excited about, or if that project is going to start from scratch.
ericpauley|2 years ago
unknown|2 years ago
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