[trevelyan]

Author of the original paper this write-up was based on here. The sybil attack as a theoretical problem is defined in the "Red Balloons" paper ("information propagation without self-cloning") so that might be a good starting point.

The solution formally and mathematically achieves these properties:

- not profitable to add routing hops - profitable to share with others - not profitable to share with yourself (!!!)

If you have a single central entity somewhere that isn't a sybil attack. Nothing wrong with being concerned about network centralization, but you're much less likely to have it in sybil-proof systems as above given that nodes suddenly have commercial incentives to share data as opposed to hoarding it.

[somezero]

Sybil attacks [1] came out about a decade before the Red Balloons paper [2] or the DARPA Challenge itself [3]. It is proven in [1] that CA is necessary for a Sybil-proof system, which made people to talk about Sybil resistance eg [4] - all before Bitcoin or the DARPA challenge.

Unless I’m categorically missing something, Claims like network centralization is much less likely in a Sybil-proof system, is just plain wrong and confusing, to say the least, if discussed “formally” and “mathematically”.

[1] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/the-syb...

[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1111.2626.pdf

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DARPA_Network_Challenge?wprov=...

[4] https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_...

[trevelyan]

I think perhaps you should read the paper if you want to have a deeper discussion? An understanding of how the mechanism works should make it clear how the solution enables outbound payments to network nodes, which -- in turn -- creates a for-profit incentive to run access points and network infrastructure.

Self-provisioning networks are indeed more strongly resistant to "centralization" than those which are deployed by outside parties. The alternative in the blockchain space is a reliance on outside parties and business models like Infura to provide access nodes and APIs. Unfortunately, any external business model capable of monetizing such infrastructure requires closure around data-and-money-flows, which creates key points where cartelization and monopolization emerges.

Looking at the links you've provided, afaict you seem mostly concerned that the term "sybil-proof" is used to describe a situation in which not using multiple identifies to collude is a dominant strategy instead of an "impossibility according to the laws of physics"? Four points here:

The first is we're dealing with an academic term that is used in a specific context ("no information propagation without self-cloning") and even more specifically in the context of an impossibility proof that has stood for a decade; showing that this impossibility proof is not actually valid is a substantive step forwards and nitpicking terminology is missing the point.

The second is that your definition isn't better. Even networks with trusted third parties cannot prevent sybilling by this definition since it creates a definitional impossibility. While a certificate authority can limit entry, it can never truly know that two distinct identities are not controlled by the same person. All a CA really does is provide a point of closure (monopolization, centralization) which can theoretically identify and tax colluding participants.

The third is that achieving a dominant strategy in which sybilling is disincentivized is a massive step forward. It does not make sense to refer to this as "sybil-resistance" in a field in which mechanisms without this property are considered to have "sybil-resistance".

Finally, and most importantly, one of the consequences of this mechanism that is that all attack vectors that can be carried out using multiple identities are more efficiently carried out with a single identity. So it is not the existence of multiple identities or the collusion between them that is the source of the problem.