[plokiju]

that very much depends on your philosophy. Many believe that there is no continuous "self" in the first place.

it doesn't matter if the upload is a copy, if the "original" is constantly being shredded and re-printed every moment anyway

[keiferski]

But the shredding and reprinting machine is a human body, biological in nature. That isn’t equivalent to a digital “body” made of software. There is a difference between the body-self of yesterday’s cells and a self made of software.

Again I’m not denying that elaborate imitations of the human brain won’t be possible. But that these won’t be copies, they’ll be a new thing. Hence “uploading” is an incorrect model.

[jacobr1]

> There is a difference between the body-self of yesterday’s cells and a self made of software.

There doesn't seem to be a strong reason to presume this. What is your basis for stating this?

> But that these won’t be copies, they’ll be a new thing. Hence “uploading” is an incorrect model.

Sure, that's a relevant, but pedantic point. Does it matter? Presume star-trek transporters were real, effectively they could be said to be duplicating and murdering every-time someone is beamed up. But the subjective experience is still one of continuity. It seams likely that would be the case for an "uploaded duplicate" they would "feel" like the original, in mind (barring sensory differences). Whether the "upload" process itself is destructive is another matter.