(no title)
H4ZB7 | 2 years ago
/usr/sbin/./././some_admin_tool
/usr/sbin/../sbin/../sbin/some_admin_tool
/my_rigged_folder/haha (using symlink)
but i guess it would have required allocating a string or something which may have mattered 40 years ago even though we could have had a better OS in every way 20 years ago
and the same for the process list (in multiple ways, one you can see other people's passwords if they do HISTFILE=/dev/null something --password password, two you can just modify the process list)
and i get the last laugh because un*x lovers will reply to criticism such as "your CLI shit is retarded it logs the passwords to disk" with "NO BRO I USE HISTFILE=/dev/null" to which i reply "that's a lot of shit to type just to not log your password to disk" to which he replies with "NO BRO I USE SPACE PREFIX" and he's still wrong due to previous paragraph. similarily the un*x lover will boast about how he can detect malware / bad guys by using the process list yet nope it can just be bypassed like anything in un*x.
and don't even get me started with how moronic it is for a CLI program to "prompt" the user for a password to avoid this issue (actually you can use patches to make CLI paramters not shared to all users of the system, which is still stupid because none of that type of information should ever be shared in he first place: no other user's process should see any attribute of mine)
and the icing on the cake is the typical way people inside the industry are completely oblivious and say "no man this is actually amazing stuff here"
> It's possible to write extremely powerful tools using shell scripts, and modularize your code. Bourne shell doesn't provide a clear mechanism for referencing relative files. By establishing a command file's base dir, you can reliably reference relative shell scripts.
wow a turing complete language is powerful who knew now if only we had one that wasn't just a cesspit of footguns most of which are there for no real reason and even historically were still invalid
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