[mmalone]

I work at smallstep.

For home wifi this is totally overkill. Better security is always nice but, in this case, there's a significant usability & interop tradeoff for home use (though that may change over time... we'll see).

For business / enterprise settings, this has real value. Distributing a password to everyone doesn't scale and alternative EAP methods have huge security problems. For managed devices, certs can be pushed and EAP-TLS can be configured easily. And it's all seamless for end users[1].

For example, EAP-TLS mitigates "evil twin" attacks, where a rogue access point broadcasts your SSID. If you're using something like EAP-PEAP, which is password based, the user is sending a password to the RADIUS server. If they connect to a rogue AP, they just sent their password to the bad guy. If the password is their LDAP/AD/Okta password, that could be very bad.

There are a variety of mitigations for this sort of attack but, without getting into details, EAP-TLS is widely considered the most secure option. So, yea, if you're relying exclusively on wifi for security you're doing it wrong. But that doesn't mean you don't need to secure your wifi.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KSL_Ke7HcpU

[andrewaylett]

PEAP can still require a trusted server certificate -- getting set up with MDM is a pain, and scaling by hand is also a pain, but you can (and I do) set up my devices to require a specific valid SAN on the RADIUS connection. No extra certificate trust required, if the RADIUS server has a certificate that chains up to the default trust store.

I remain disappointed that there's no standard mechanism for mapping between an SSID and a domain name to know which SAN to trust.

[mmalone]

Just to clarify, are you describing EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS wrapping PEAP? I'm still learning a lot of this stuff... but, my understanding is that PEAP doesn't do TLS but TTLS + PEAP does. Right?

Fact remains, though, that users will probably bypass any certificate warnings (if allowed) and send their passwords to rogue APs. EAP-TLS mitigates this. Definitely pros & cons, but that's a clear win for EAP-TLS.

There are a lot of things that'd be nice to see in Wifi. Binding the SSID is an interesting one, though I suspect the folks working on this stuff were reluctant to rely on (and trust) the Web PKI CAs. If you're gonna push your own root cert, you might as well push a RADIUS SAN along with it, I guess.