I don't want to minimize pilot errors but I can't stop thinking this dual inputs system easily ranks in the top 5 of the worst design ideas in history.
I always hate findings of "pilot error." Like you, I don't want to minimise it, but it never feels like it gets to the root cause. It often feels a bit like scapegoating. Why did highly trained, presumably competent pilots make the error? How can it be avoided in the future?
As you say, UI design choices can make errors more or less likely. Absolutely everyone makes mistakes. We need to design to reduce the likelihood of mistakes and to minimise the impact of mistakes when they do happen.
To be clear, I think everyone in the industry understands this, but when reported in the media, the average public just hears, "Pilots f'ed up," which is almost never a complete picture.
Aircraft investigations don't really work like pointy-haired-bosses who want a single simple answer for every problem. They do have nuance and list everything that contributed to the problem. Humans err frequently, and this is definitely a case where humans contributed. Dual input is a very fundamental violation of basic pilot training. While there may be systematic changes that could be made to improve it, pilot error absolutely should be on the list as well.
> when reported in the media, the average public just hears, "Pilots f'ed up,"
Unfortunately, for a mass media audience, this is unavoidable. People are always looking for "the answer". To understand nuance in a specialized field, most people will need an overview of the problem set to grasp the topic. Really you'd need more of a 60 Minutes type exposé to explain that; it's too much for a typical news report.
Sometimes it's really just pilots being incompetent or drunk - cf. Aeroflot Flight 821 and Aeroflot Flight 593 as good examples (not exclusively a Russian/Aeroflot thing, but they have particularly egregious examples.)
There was an IBM article a while back advocating for '5 Hows' as a replacement for '5 Whys' with this logic. How was it possible for this to happen and that should be the root question that drives improvements. Pilot error should effectively be a non-option for root cause.
Also important is that there is no single root cause for any event. Therefore there is no single 'error' that could be attributed to any one root anyway (in particular the pilot).
Sometimes it really does come down to sheer stupidity or incompetence.
Taking the recent incident at HND earlier this month between a JAL A350 and JCG DHC-8, the investigation (currently still ongoing) is pointing to the JCG Captain astronomically fucking up:
* ATC ordered the JCG DHC-8 to hold short of the runway and informed them they were #1 in the take off queue. Take off clearance was never given.
* The First Officer of the JCG DHC-8 read back the order to hold short and their position in the queue.
* JAL A350 had clearance to land and (along with other aircraft) listened in to the above conversation, routine stuff to help maintain situational awareness.
* The Captain of the JCG DHC-8 entered the runway, violating order to hold short, and sat there for approximately 40 seconds until they were struck by the JAL A350.
ATC, JAL, and even the JCG First Officer all did things right and yet all it took was apparently one Captain screwing up.
Yes, there were compounding factors like how it was nighttime and all the airport lights flooded out the JCG DHC-8's lights, but pilot error is the only reasonable way of ultimately explaining incidents like this.
> Why did highly trained, presumably competent pilots make the error?
Confirmation bias is really hard to break. When you're in a situation and start telling yourself a story about what's going on, it's really hard for even break that narrative, even when the "you're being an idiot" light turns on.
Dual inputs is there for redundancy in case of a jam in one of them, or in case one set of cables is cut. Everything is dual.
The reason pilots are there is to diagnose problems and take the right corrective action. This also means they can misdiagnose problems and take the wrong action. This is where pilot training comes in.
Say one pilot loses consciousness, the other one has to extract them from their seat before they can fly the airplane. That's no easy task - humans are surprisingly heavy once they pass out.
Airbus has had a Priority Takeover button, from the start, I assume Boeing also has something like that. Its primary use case is exactly what you’re talking about, although it also disables autopilot so it’s a good way to ensure you have manual input in case you need to react quickly.
Airbus has a dual input alert, apparently Boeing doesn’t, and didn’t add it after this incident, blows my mind. Still they’re far from perfect, stress deafness is absolutely a thing.
Active sticks (force feedback) are finally making it into commercial cockpits, they’ve been deployed in business jets, and the Irkut MC-21 was supposed to be the first implementation in an airliner (as it’s french-made, that’s been sunk by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent economic blockade).
This means hopefully active stick swill make it into big two airframes eventually. I assume there’s some redesign work ongoing as it likely requires additional power and data connection, AFAIK currently the sticks (Airbus’s anyway) are just centered and resisting via springs, I don’t think there’s any data fed back into the sticks.
Three pilots with a voting algo, obviously. Or, maybe, a supreme court of nine pilots all constantly and continuously in search of perfect aerodynamic justice. Ah hell, just let ChatGPT fly the damn plane.
Edit: I've got it! We'll have a single pilot but they'll be based on a Rust rewrite of ChatGPT running on RISC-V.
By "dual input system" I was referring to the fact that both pilots can apply input into their sticks or trim wheels simultaneously resulting into inputs cancelling each other out or de-synchronizing.
There should never be a 'net' input. Only one pilot can fly a plane at a time. This is fundamental training for pilots, they would have learned this in the very first few moments they sat behind the controls.
goodcanadian|2 years ago
As you say, UI design choices can make errors more or less likely. Absolutely everyone makes mistakes. We need to design to reduce the likelihood of mistakes and to minimise the impact of mistakes when they do happen.
To be clear, I think everyone in the industry understands this, but when reported in the media, the average public just hears, "Pilots f'ed up," which is almost never a complete picture.
kube-system|2 years ago
> when reported in the media, the average public just hears, "Pilots f'ed up,"
Unfortunately, for a mass media audience, this is unavoidable. People are always looking for "the answer". To understand nuance in a specialized field, most people will need an overview of the problem set to grasp the topic. Really you'd need more of a 60 Minutes type exposé to explain that; it's too much for a typical news report.
WalterBright|2 years ago
I remember one airliner crash turned out to have been caused by one of the pilots letting his kid sit in the seat while at altitude.
When humans are involved, there's always the potential for human error.
sofixa|2 years ago
AdamN|2 years ago
Also important is that there is no single root cause for any event. Therefore there is no single 'error' that could be attributed to any one root anyway (in particular the pilot).
Dalewyn|2 years ago
Taking the recent incident at HND earlier this month between a JAL A350 and JCG DHC-8, the investigation (currently still ongoing) is pointing to the JCG Captain astronomically fucking up:
* ATC ordered the JCG DHC-8 to hold short of the runway and informed them they were #1 in the take off queue. Take off clearance was never given.
* The First Officer of the JCG DHC-8 read back the order to hold short and their position in the queue.
* JAL A350 had clearance to land and (along with other aircraft) listened in to the above conversation, routine stuff to help maintain situational awareness.
* The Captain of the JCG DHC-8 entered the runway, violating order to hold short, and sat there for approximately 40 seconds until they were struck by the JAL A350.
ATC, JAL, and even the JCG First Officer all did things right and yet all it took was apparently one Captain screwing up.
Yes, there were compounding factors like how it was nighttime and all the airport lights flooded out the JCG DHC-8's lights, but pilot error is the only reasonable way of ultimately explaining incidents like this.
dehrmann|2 years ago
Confirmation bias is really hard to break. When you're in a situation and start telling yourself a story about what's going on, it's really hard for even break that narrative, even when the "you're being an idiot" light turns on.
WalterBright|2 years ago
The reason pilots are there is to diagnose problems and take the right corrective action. This also means they can misdiagnose problems and take the wrong action. This is where pilot training comes in.
lbourdages|2 years ago
Say one pilot loses consciousness, the other one has to extract them from their seat before they can fly the airplane. That's no easy task - humans are surprisingly heavy once they pass out.
masklinn|2 years ago
Airbus has a dual input alert, apparently Boeing doesn’t, and didn’t add it after this incident, blows my mind. Still they’re far from perfect, stress deafness is absolutely a thing.
Active sticks (force feedback) are finally making it into commercial cockpits, they’ve been deployed in business jets, and the Irkut MC-21 was supposed to be the first implementation in an airliner (as it’s french-made, that’s been sunk by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent economic blockade).
This means hopefully active stick swill make it into big two airframes eventually. I assume there’s some redesign work ongoing as it likely requires additional power and data connection, AFAIK currently the sticks (Airbus’s anyway) are just centered and resisting via springs, I don’t think there’s any data fed back into the sticks.
voxadam|2 years ago
Edit: I've got it! We'll have a single pilot but they'll be based on a Rust rewrite of ChatGPT running on RISC-V.
skylabmelody|2 years ago
gray_-_wolf|2 years ago
Havoc|2 years ago
kube-system|2 years ago