[boeingUH60]

Until that licensing authority gets hacked, then RIP to online security..

[c22]

Sure, but this is like saying you shouldn't replace your cardboard box with a safe because it could get cracked.

[Spivak]

I think the argument against is that right now people know how terrible an authentication system this is and don't build actual security on top of it -- "we only have cardboard boxes so we installed cameras and encrypted the contents."

Once it's good people will outsource the work to what is essentially a CA system where every BMV in America is an issuer and I expect it to hold up at best as well as SMS verification.

[maxwell]

Cardboard boxes aren't subject to leaked electronic keypad codes.

https://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/liberty-safe-changes-its-p...

[Muromec]

That's a good reason to not use HTTP, because hey, the keys can be hacked! The CA can be hacked, let's just use plain text and pray.

[jerf]

The CAs have been hacked. Multiple times, in several different ways. And that's just the public ones we know about, which I have no reason to suppose are all of them or even necessarily a significant fraction of what we would consider compromises. At the scale of "everything done on the internet" or "all the money" you can't wave this issue away. It is difficult, if not impossible, to build a security system that is more expensive to break than "all the money and value in the world".

A government identity to do business with the government might just about be possible. A government identity to cover everything done by everyone everywhere is not. The value of cracking that system is just too high.