This is unlikely to be of any consequence. ECHR has already ruled that weakening or backdooring e2ee isn’t allowed. So bar a law that bans rolling out e2ee at all, this won’t achieve anything.
I think this comparison deserves more consideration. I don't want to treat it as a strawman and ignore it, and I don't want to just automatically knock it down as ridiculous. I think it deserves thinking about as possibly the closest analogue we have to what the idea of un-inhibited access to on-the-wire end-to-end intent would be: it's morally equivalent to having a police camera in your home, all the time.
You don't know if it's being watched or not, you don't know if its event triggered or always-on, or how anything you say and do is contextualised. You only know it may be used against you at any time.
What it crystallises for me is the implicit "if you are pure you have nothing to fear" quality in these things. The idea that the loss of privacy is inhibiting and that this kind of law is antithetical to a fundamental expectation of privacy as a right. Many places have no written constitutional norms in this space, and so the right to privacy is assumed, not codified. (and, it would be equally simplistic to assume codified rights necessarily enshrine them or strengthen them)
daenney|1 year ago
JoeAltmaier|1 year ago
ggm|1 year ago
You don't know if it's being watched or not, you don't know if its event triggered or always-on, or how anything you say and do is contextualised. You only know it may be used against you at any time.
What it crystallises for me is the implicit "if you are pure you have nothing to fear" quality in these things. The idea that the loss of privacy is inhibiting and that this kind of law is antithetical to a fundamental expectation of privacy as a right. Many places have no written constitutional norms in this space, and so the right to privacy is assumed, not codified. (and, it would be equally simplistic to assume codified rights necessarily enshrine them or strengthen them)
hulitu|1 year ago