[Kadin]

In many products, there are different firmware or software loads for the PRC market (specifically PRC -- until recently not the HK versions) and the rest of the world. In some devices it's possible to lock satellite positioning to only Chinese constellation (BeiDou), or introduce error, or just not include positioning by default.

Of course, some of those devices get through, or are carried in by tourists, or are enabled by enthusiasts who load the non-China firmware. This seems to be understood. The Chinese are smart enough, one presumes, to know that actual state-level competitors can get accurate (in the chosen geodetic system) location data without relying on tourists' geotagged Google Photos uploads.

But that does lead to the question, "why, then?" -- if your adversaries know your secret, it's probably not worth the effort of protecting, anymore. (And why, in the US, we know about stuff like VENONA now.) The Chinese seem focused on a different threat: they don't care if a few people have good location data, even if some of them work for the US NGA, they just don't want everyone to have that data.

Which is interesting, because it suggests that that they're less concerned about a foreign government with strategic intelligence, than they are their own domestic population.

This isn't about state secrets vs other states; it's about denying their own population a capability that they find valuable, and thus threatening.

[petre]

It's the commie way of "fixing" things to deter "enemies of the state": eastern radio bands, inaccurate maps, neighbour spy networks, serveral people on a landline so somebody can always listen, listening rooms for secret police inside state companies, heavily wiretaping citizens, continous party propaganda etc. Most of it is bs and it doesn't work or it's easy to circumvent, but one can never be too careful.