[createdapril24]

Overall oil refineries are decent targets because they are high cost and statically located and therefore difficult to defend, but Ukraine certainly wishes it had more conventional weapons at longer ranges so that it could strike deeper and dynamic targets.

Ukraine doesn't have many better alternatives. They can strike some energy infrastructure (which they've done) in an effort to affect Russian willpower. It can also try to hit airfields (which they've done) hoping to take out equipment, but Russia has been pretty good at moving equipment out of the way.

The strike campaign itself has been moderately effective but definitely short of a war-winning enterprise. Estimates on the actual damage on production and exports has ranged between the fantastical (28%) to the banal (6%). It looks like domestic petrol supply has been hit the hardest in terms of tangible economic costs, since oil prices have remained reasonable with lessened seasonal demand and lower OPEC supply targets. Russia has additionally made deals with Kazakhstan and Belarus to attempt to mitigate some of the economic effects, has been able to repair oil refinery damage, and has experimented with a range of mitigations.

The strike campaign has been further complicated by the US election year. The Biden Administration has asked Ukraine to stop targeting oil refineries, because global oil instability could cause a crisis that ultimately causes global issues, rising prices, and Biden a second term. Such strikes are expected to uptick after November. And with the possibility of long range missiles from military sponsors, plus winter-time difficulties, this might be a good window to see what Ukraine can really do.

Either way I think the article is not about the long range drones you are alluding to here, but the small commercial sized drones and mid-cost military drones that are based on them.

[ggm]

Moving equipment like fighters and bombers out of range of drones achieves a significant tactical victory for Ukraine by reducing loiter time at target for Russian aircraft. Incremental losses of both aircraft and crew also have compounding effects, since pilots for logistics roles like in air refuelling become scarce.

I agree that lack of weapons for direct assault limits some of the upside benefits as in "you cannot directly win a war on defensive moves" but you can force a better, safer, more advantageous outcome. In effect, Russia is losing a war of attrition on it's economy and materiel side. It does have massive manpower and stocks. It doesn't have infinite supply of economic resilience and home front tolerance for a failing economy undermines Kremlin myths.

Sometimes, not losing is the best you can get pending more help.

Ukraine is not losing.

Russia is not winning.

[createdapril24]

I disagree that failing to hit targets is a significant tactical victory.

But I agree that they should continue the strike campaign. They can't do much else on the battlefield right now. It's the right thing for them to look at areas they can raise cost and complexity for the Russians. I just wouldn't round it up too much...

I disagree that Russia is losing a war of attrition on economy (look at Russia's economy vs Ukraine's!). On a materiel side, maybe, Russia is using a lot of its stockpiles and those will eventually dwindle. But Russia is not somehow out of the fight when those stockpiles get low. On the other side of attrition, Ukraine is low on military aged men, artillery, fortifications, air defense. There's a strong argument to be made that Russia is the one winning the war of attrition, at least for the foreseeable future.

Russia is winning right now. But that doesn't mean it will win. The future isn't determined. I agree with you that a prolonged war won't necessarily go Russia's way, and that it may eventually lose the will to continue.

[eru]

I wouldn't call even a six percent reduction 'banal'. But it depends on the amount of resources invested on both sides.

As a hypothetical:

If the attacker invests approximately zero resources, the defender invests crazy amounts of resources, then even approximately zero actual damage is a great outcome for the attacker. The real damage is in the resources wasted on defense.

Btw, this is pretty close to what our societies did to our own civilian air travel in response to terrorist threats in the 2000s.

(I have no special insight into the numbers for the current war. But I wouldn't sneeze at 6% reduction.)

[createdapril24]

The attacker in this case is investing significant resources and the defender isn't investing crazy amounts of resources.

I see your point but I don't think the hypothetical as stated is a fair depiction of the dynamic.

[kiba]

Oil refinery damage are going to be increasingly hard to repair, given the lack of readily available parts and the loss of western expertise.

[shmerl]

Even those percentages of dropping oil profits can be pretty crippling for Putin. Especially since they can repeatedly hit what Putin wastes resources on repairing. And they should continue doing that even more.

But they surely need more effective ways to take out Russian military airplanes, especially those which are bombing the front line and cities. Not sure why allies can't supply them with needed technology to do it - they should possess some.

[unclebucknasty]

Russia's latest tactic uses fairly massive old-school dumb bombs, retrofitted with satellite guidance kits. These glide bombs are said to be launched by aircraft from high altitude, just outside of Ukraine's radar range. They have thus far proven highly effective and very difficult to intercept.

Not sure F-16s would help here in patrolling closer to launch points and intercepting the aircraft prior to dropping their payloads; or whether they would be too vulnerable. But, it does seem like a job for stealth interceptors, and certainly makes the case for air superiority.

[mcphage]

> Estimates on the actual damage on production and exports has ranged between the fantastical (28%) to the banal (6%). It looks like domestic petrol supply has been hit the hardest in terms of tangible economic costs, since oil prices have remained reasonable with lessened seasonal demand and lower OPEC supply targets.

Isn't that the point, though? Hit refineries, forcing Russia to sell more crude oil to the world, and have less refined oil internally to turn into gas, etc?

[createdapril24]

That's partly the point yeah. Every war is an iterative set of actions and mitigations. The point I'm making is that so far the actual effect created by the strikes hasn't come close to winning the war, and its hard to project the numbers culminating in a war-winning economic catastrophy.

None of that is to say Ukraine shouldn't try, or that it doesn't have some "annoying" affect that increases costs and complexity for Russia. It does. Just want to be accurate about the level of affect and its potential.

And again, I think November after the election is going to be the best show of what Ukraine can do.