[becurious]

Along with the reasons others have mentioned, it would also bypass any filter driver in the file system stack (Windows has the concept of a stack of filter drivers that can sit in front of the file system or hardware) and would also ignore any permissions (ACLs) on who can see those files. There’s no way they can credibly use this technique outside of say something from SysInternals: it violates the security and layering of the operating system and its APIs.

[mardifoufs]

Is there a Linux equivalent for those "filters"? I'm a bit clueless about win32 and NT sadly enough...

Would that mean that there's no way to "scope" the MFTs?

Edit: That also makes sense, since if I got it right they aren't necessarily supposed to be consumed by userspace programs?

I guess that's why those tools always ask for admin access and basically all perms to the FS.

It's a bit sad that the user gets exposed to a much slower search and FS experience even if the system underneath has the potential to be as fast as it gets. And I don't think ReFS is intended to replace NTFS (not that it's necessarily more performant anyways)

[wongarsu]

There is no equivalent on Linux. That's why linux has no online antivirus scanners (scanners that scan the file as it's opened) while this is a basic feature of every antivirus program on Windows.

Linux has device mappers (dm-crypt, dm-raid and friends). But those sit below the file system, emulating a device. Window's file system filter drivers sit above the file system, intercepting API calls to and from the file system. That's super useful if you want to check file contents on access, track where files are going, keep an audit log of who accessed a file, transparently encrypt single files instead of whole volumes, etc. But you pay the price for all that flexibility in performance.

[loeg]

Filters are vaguely similar to things like mountpoints overlaying portions of the filesystem. E.g. in Linux you might have files in /d1/d2/{f1,f2,f3} in the root filesystem but you also have a mountpoint of a 2nd filesystem on /d1/d2 that completely changes the visibility / contents of d2. Filter drivers can do similar things (although they are not actually independent mountpoints).

[webstrand]

I believe they're approximately equivalent to FUSE

[RobotToaster]

> it violates the security ... of the operating system

Maybe stating the obvious, but if the security can be violated that easily, it's not very secure.

[wongarsu]

You need admin permissions to read the MFT on Windows. The traditional security model of both Windows and Linux assumes that the kernel is a security barrier between system and unprivileged user, and between different unprivileged users. An admin being able to bypass security restrictions isn't traditionally seen as a problem.

[skissane]

> it would also bypass any filter driver in the file system stack

The main use case for filter drivers is antivirus, and that is primarily about file contents not file metadata - so if MFT access bypassed filter drivers, that might not be a major issue. I think most non-antivirus use cases are also primarily about data not metadata.

If necessary, one could even devise a design in which MFT access is combined with filter drivers - MFT scanning to find matching files, then for each matched file access its metadata via standard APIs (to ensure filter drivers are invoked) before returning to client. That would be slower than a pure MFT scan but still faster than a scan done purely with standard APIs. A registry key could turn this on/off so sites can decide for themselves where to place the performance versus security tradeoff

> and would also ignore any permissions (ACLs) on who can see those files

They could expose an API which enables MFT scanning with some degree of ACL checking added.

If you do the ACL check as late as possible in processing the query, it would give much better performance than standard APIs that evaluate ACLs on every access. For example, suppose I want to scan a volume for all files with the extension ‘*.exe’. The API would only have to do an ACL check on each matching entry, not on every entry it considers.

There also might be reasonable situations in which ACL checking could be bypassed. For example, if I am requesting a search for files of which I am the owner, just assume the owner should have the right to read the file’s metadata. Or, if I have read permission on a directory, assume I am allowed aggregate information on the count and total size of files in that directory and its recursive subdirectories. These “bypasses” could be controlled by system settings (registry entries / group policy), so customers with higher security needs could disable them at the cost of reduced performance.

Rather than putting this in the OS kernel, it could be a privileged system service which exports an API over LPC/COM/etc. Actually with that design it isn’t even necessary to wait for Microsoft to implement this, it could always be implemented as an open source project, if someone felt sufficiently motivated to do so. (Or even as a proprietary product, although I suspect that would limit its adoption, and the risk is if it takes off, Microsoft would just implement the same thing as a standard part of Windows.)