[epoberezkin]

You should understand that you cannot have the cake and eat it.

The logic here is very simple:

1) Any scanning messages of children and their parents means providing access to them, effectively removing the protection provided by the encryption.

2) If these messages are accessible to any algorithm or systems, however secure, there is no way to guarantee that the bad actors will be prevented from accessing these messages - it's only the question of time until this information is leaked.

3) If these messages are accessible to bad actors, it will enable more grooming - because they will be used to train language models to more effectively manipulate children and other people.

So while politicians can engage in their wishful and magical thinking about some wonderful technology that will allow, what they call, a "lawful access" but at the same time will somehow prevent unlawful access by bad actors, everybody with a bit of technical knowledge understands that it is simply impossible - it's either e2e encrypted and nobody other than the communicating parties can access it, or it is not - and then anybody with resources can access it, including bad actors.

That's why they want to scan messages of everybody other than themselves: https://www.eureporter.co/business/data/mass-surveillance-da...

It was never about protecting children - it is simply about eradicating the privacy as we know it, and preventing any dissent from being formed, and criminalising private conversations in the same way free speech is being criminalised. These ideas are not new - it's just now that they try to weaponise "let's protect the children" narrative to achieve it.

The only way to protect children and vulnerable people online is to reduce their discoverability on online platforms, not to expose their communications to enable more efficient grooming - which would be the effect of the scanning.