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jiiam | 1 year ago
For example the company servers could be hosted on an island with armed guards instructed to burn everything if anyone approaches and the decryption happens only on those servers: sure they have access by definition, but they really don't.
barsonme|1 year ago
The guards could decide they’re not getting paid enough and steal the data. Or the government could arrest them. Or the government could MITM the data center. Or any hundreds of different scenarios.
At the end of the day, the only thing preventing somebody from accessing the data is that they just… don’t.
This is very weak security and it is why cryptographers and security professionals call it “effectively plaintext.”
jiiam|1 year ago
I mean, having to modify server code in order to access data that is "effectively plaintext" is not so different from installing a backdoor inside the client: it's not like the user has any choice of client, so even for apps like whatsapp and signal that run E2EE one is still making a leap of faith.
If we add the fact that everything runs inside an os built by companies who may or may not be constantly spying on their users we could say that by definition there's a lot of stuff in our lives that lives in "effective plaintext".
usea|1 year ago
jiiam|1 year ago
The point is: even if they could, should they do so when compelled by authority?