[jmvoodoo]

So, essentially the system has a serious denial of service flaw. I wonder how many variations of flight plans can cause different but similar errors that also force a disconnect of primary and secondary systems.

Seems "reject individual flight plan" might be a better system response than "down hard to prevent corruption"

Bad assumption that a failure to interpret a plan is a serious coding error seems to be the root cause, but hard to say for sure.

[mjevans]

Reject the flight plan would be the last case scenario, but where it should have gone without other options rather than total shutdown.

CORRECT the flight plan, by first promoting the exit/entry points for each autonomous region along the route, validating the entry/exit list only, and then the arcs within, would be the least errant method.

[d1sxeyes]

You can’t just reject or correct the flight plan, you’re a consumer of the data. The flight plan was valid, it was the interpretation applied by the UK system which was incorrect and led to the failure.

There are a bunch of ways FPRSA-R can already interpret data like this correctly, but there were a combination of 6 specific criteria that hadn’t been foreseen (e.g. the duplicate waypoints, the waypoints both being outside UK airspace, the exit from UK airspace being implicit on the plan as filed, etc).

[mcfedr]

Reject the plan surely should have come many places before shutdown the whole system!